ntS 



LECTURES 



UPON 



LOCKE'S ESSAY. 



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PREFACE. 



The following Work has been undertaken with con- 
siderable reluctance. I have been repeatedly applied to 
by Dublin publishers to furnish them with a contraction 
of Locke's Essay, and have received liberal offers of pe- 
cuniary remuneration. Hitherto I have uniformly de- 
clined the undertaking-,* antl Have been only induced to 
enter upon the present work', T^having ascertained that 
a spurious contraction, in a catechetical form, is in circula- 
tion under my name, sold by the booksellers as mine, and 
bought as such by the students. Finding the defects of 
my own works sufficiently numerous, without being^stig- 
matised with the errors of others, I have, in self defence, 
attempted these Lectures upon the Essay. 

To execute what the publishers first proposed, a mere 
contraction of Locke's Essay, was a task to which I could 
not prevail upon myself to stoop. If this be considered 
arrogance, it is a charge to which I must honestly plead 
guilty. I have, however, attempted a work which I hope 
will be found more useful than any contraction could be, 



VI PREFACE. 

To illustrate and explain Locke's Essay on the Under- 
standing in a scries of Lectures, to compare his opinions 
on disputed points with those of other modern philoso- 
phers, to show where Locke disagrees with himself, and 
maintains contradictions, and to embody in the same 
work all the parts of the Essay, which were necessary 
and useful, by introducing them either in substance or 
in the very words of the author, where these are mate- 
rial, appeared to me a work likely to be more beneficial 
than the contraction required. Such has been my de- 
sign in the present Lectures; how far I have succeeded, 
must be determined by the opinions of others. 

The manner in which Locke's works are too often stu- 
died, appears to be attended with less benefit to the stu- 
dent than could be desired. It is the practice to " get by 
heart " the doctrines and sometimes little more than the 
words of this philosopher. Having no other works on the 
same subject in his hands, the student, when his acade- 
mical studies are completed, frequently goes forth into 
the world, fully persuaded that the opinions which he 
has thus " committed to memory" are infallibly right, 
and the only doctrines, on these subjects, held by rational 
creatures of this age. Absurd as this may appear, I 
have known many examples of it. One of the great 
benefits to be derived from this department of science 
seems to be the exercise which the understanding receives 
in the investigations which it involves. What strength 
can the intellect derive from " getting by heart" the 
opinions of Locke ? As well might we expect, by reading 



PREFACE. Yii 

a description of riding- or walking, lo acquire the vi- 
gour derivable from those healthful exercises. 

My object therefore has been, on disputable points, to 
give the reader, in some degree, a view of both sides of 
the question, and to enable him to judge and reason for 
himself. Where, therefore, I have ventured to differ 
from Locke, it is of little moment whether I am right or 
wrong; it will, in either case, contribute to disenthral the 
mind of the student from the bondage of a particular sys- 
tem, in matters on which mankind is never likely to agree. 

My publishers finding me determined against writing a 
catechetical contraction of Locke, have made a special 
request that I should annex a collection of questions upon 
the Lectures. Such students as think any advantage is 
derivable from this, will find them in the appendix. The 
questions which may be considered indispensable, and 
which even the most indolent student should be able to 
answer, are distinguished by the mark (§). Those who 
aspire to a more accurate knowledge of the Essay, should 
attend to those marked thus (f). Those who look for 
honors should be generally prepared in all the questions. 

The answers to the questions will be readily found, by 
referring to the corresponding section of the Lecture. 
This arrangement will, I trust, accommodate all classes 
of readers. 



LECTURES 



UPON 



LOCKE'S ESSAY. 



LECTURE I. 



INTRODUCTION. 



1. Locke introduces the subject of his Essay by enu- 
merating the motives which urged him, and which may 
therefore also be supposed to incite others to prosecute ah 
inquiry into the nature and extent of the intellectual ope- 
rations. These inducements he states to be three-fold : i°* 
the nobleness of the subject, 2° • the usefulness of the results, 
3° • the pleasure derived from the pursuit. When we consider 
that the understanding is the great power by which man 
is elevated above other animals, or in the words of our 
author, that which " sets him above the rest of sensible 
beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion 
which he has over them," it cannot but be considered one 
of the noblest objects of investigation. This being the 
power which " directs our thoughts in the search of other 

B 



things," and by the operations of which we are enabled to 
view the recesses of nature, which, but for its improve- 
ment, must for ever have been concealed : and what is of 
still greater moment, that by which a knowledge of our- 
selves, and of those rules by which as beings accountable 
to a moral governor we should regulate our actions, its 
extensive utility must be most striking. That a pursuit 
having such an object,* and such ends, should be pleasur- 
able, is a question only to be resolved by an appeal to ex- 
perience. The pleasure derived from it is illustrated by- 
Locke, by comparing it to the pleasure which light gives 
to the eye. 

In such an inquiry there are necessarily considerable 
difficulties to be overcome. The difficulties arise from 
the circumstance, that the objects and instruments of 
investigation are the same, namely, the operations of the 
mind. The inquiry is into the nature of these, and the 
only instruments by which the inquiry can be conducted, 
are these very operations. This difficulty Locke illustrates 
by the eye, which, though it is the mean whereby we see 
other things, can never behold itself ; thus the mind finds 
a similar difficulty in setting itself before its own view, and 
making itself " its own object." 

2. Having introduced the subject of his work, or as he 
modestly terms " his Essay," our Author proceeds to de- 
velope the views he designs to take of the human mind and 
its capacities. His object he states to be " human know- 
ledge" rather than the human mind, and " human know- 
ledge" as far only as respects its " original certainty, ex- 
tent and degrees." The word " original" here must be 



* The object and the end in popular works are frequently confounded. 
The object is the subject matter of a treatise ; the end, the purpose to be 
attained by treating of the object. Thus the objects of this Essaj are the 
operations of the mind. The end is to teach proper methods of searching 
after truth. 



taken in a limited sense. In its most extended acceptation 
it might be understood to apply to an investigation which 
would trace our knowledge and its elements, our ideas, as 
far back as their " first cause." To guard against this 
misconception, Locke distinctly declines the " physical 
consideration of the mind." Under the " physical con- 
sideration of the mind" is embraced l 0, all inquiry into 
its essence. 2°' The peculiar organic modifications and 
motions by which sensation is effected. 3 0, Whether ideas 
in their original formation depend upon matter ? These 
he declines, not from their inutility, but as not forming 
a part of his design, which, as has been observed, is 
strictly confined to what respects human knowledge, its 
original (.£„£. elements,) certainty and extent. 

The necessity of fixing the limits of knowledge, and of 
settling distinctly the measures of its certainty, must be 
strongly impressed upon us, when we observe the discord- 
ancy and even contradiction which exists in the opinions 
of mankind on various subjects. This discrepancy in 
judgment can only arise from men adopting wrong mea- 
sures of probability, and false criterions of certainty, but 
is nevertheless frequently attended with the mischievous 
consequence of driving unreflecting minds into positive 
scepticism, 

3. The method which our Author proposes to pursue 
in his inquiry is as follows : 

l 0. To inquire into the original of our ideas, or the 
ways whereby they come into the mind. 

2°* To determine the knowledge derived from them, its 
1°* evidence, 2°* certainty, and 3°' extent. 

3°* To inquire into the nature and grounds of faith or 
opinion. 

By faith or opinion is meant " that assent which is 
given to a proposition, of whose truth there is no certain 
knowledge." 

4. An ignorance of the extent of our intellectual fa- 



1 



cutties, and of the investigations to which they are pro- 
portionate, is productive of two opposite errors, scil. dog- 
matism and scepticism. The dogmatist overrates, the 
sceptic underrates our faculties. The one ascribes greater, 
and the other less validity to the conclusion of our reason 
than the grounds on which those conclusions are built 
would justly warrant- Of these intellectual maladies (for 
so we must call them) there are various degrees, and there 
is probably no finite being who is perfectly free from any 
degree of either. From the sceptic who rejects the con- 
clusions of abstruse metaphysics, to the sceptic who will 
not venture to affirm his own existence, we meet in com- 
mon life with all the intermediate shades of error. 

Extreme begets extreme. Scepticism is the child of 
dogmatism. The dogmatist, confident in the fancied ex- 
tent of his faculties, plunges into speculations, beyond the 
range of human intellect. He flounders in an ocean of 
error. Baffled and disgusted at his failure, and confounded 
with the contradictions and embarrassments in which he 
has involved himself, in a sort of intellectual sulkiness, he 
wilfully abandons all proper use of his mental energies, 
and concluding that, because he failed in his search into 
what was removed beyond the wit of man, he cannot de- 
pend with certainty on any thing, he gives himself up to 
absolute scepticism. The folly of this degree of scep- 
ticism is compared by Locke to that of one who w r ould re- 
ject the use of his legs, and " sit still and perish, because 
lie has not wings to fly." He also illustrates the folly of 
that indolence which is the consequence of scepticism, by 
one who would refuse the use of candle-light, because he 
had not broad sunshine, although the former were suffi- 
cient for his purposes. He that " entertains all objects in 
that way and proportion in which they are suited to his 
faculties, and capable of being j^resented to him," uses his 
understanding as he should. If probability is all that 



can be attained, he rests content with it, gives the propo- 
sition its proportionate degree of assent, and governs his 
conduct conformably to it. He does not, like the dogma- 
tist, attempt to reduce it to positive demonstration, nor like 
the sceptic, reject it altogether, because he cannot attain 
that demonstration. 

These are manifest abuses of our finest faculty. Were 
it possible to do that perfectly which Locke proposes ; to 
ascertain with distinctness the limits of our knowledge, 
the boundary between what may be, and what cannot be 
comprehended by the human mind, " the horizon which 
defines the enlightened and dark parts of things," these 
two abuses would be avoided. But though it be not pos- 
sible to effect this purpose, however desirable, it is yet 
possible to do much towards approximating to those li- 
mits, though it be not possible, perfectly to cure the 
diseases, their intensity may be very much mitigated. 
This Locke proposed to effect by his inquiry into the 
human mind, and has certainly to a great degree suc- 
ceeded in his design. He revolutionized the science of 
the mind, daslied to pieces speculations which had com- 
manded the reverence and admiration of ages, and fixed 
that science upon more rational and firm foundations 
than the united talents of the sages who preceded him 
had by their continued efforts been able to effect. 

5. Our faculties have limits. The knowledge there- 
fore to be attained by those faculties has corresponding 
limits. But this is a predicament in which we stand in 
common with all finite created beings. The difference 
between man and the highest created being lies only in 
the place of the limit. On this score we have then no 
cause of complaint or discontent, unless one would as- 
pire to one of the incommunicable attributes of divinity, 
infinite comprehension. As to the limitations which 
have been set to our intellectual capacity, Locke contends 
that we should rest satisfied with them for these reasons : 



6 



l°" When we compare ouv own powers with those of 
the other oceupants of the globe, we must at once per- 
ceive the immense superiority which is given to us ; so 
great, that although far from being the first in physical 
power, yet such is the dominion given us by the intellect, 
we maintain a sway over even the strongest and most 
ferocious. 

2°* Although the powers of mind given to us fall infi- 
nitely short of comprehending the vast extent of being- 
floating in the universe, and even probably shrink into 
nothing before the comprehensions of other and superior 
created beings, yet we have all that is necessary for the 
conveniences, comforts, and even luxuries and elegancies 
of this life, and what is of infinitely more consequence, 
we have powers fully adequate to point out the rules of 
conduct which will insure a permanent felicity in the next, 
we have, as St. Paul says, wavra npog ^torjv kcu tvcrtifiuav, 
every thing conducive to the convenience of life, and the 
cultivation of virtue. 

30. ^r e nave that degree of comprehension which is 
suited to our state. Had we more, the circumstances in 
which we are placed might become intolerable, and the 
extension of our intellect produce only an extension of 
misery. Had we less, our quantity of happiness would be 
proportionably less than our situation and circumstances 
would admit of. 

In a word, whatever may be the limits of our faculties, 
they are sufficiently and more than sufficiently wide for 
all our purposes here, and it is perfect folly to reject 
the use of them because they are not more extended. 
The sounding line of the mariner, as our author observes, 
is of considerable use to him, although it be not capable 
of fathoming all the depths of the ocean. It is sufficient 
for him if it measure those parts through which his voyage 
lies, and it is his own fault if he wander into regions 
which lie out of his way. Our faculties are perfectly 



adequate to investigate " all that concerns and conduct," 
and this is all that is absolutely necessary to be known 
here. 

6. Previously to entering upon his proposed inquiry, 
Locke premises that he shall proceed upon a certain pos- 
tulate. He states that he calls that thing about which 
the mind is occupied when the man thinks, an idea. 
His postulate is the assumption of the existence of ideas. 
It would appear from his definition that this is as evident 
as thinking itself. But from subsequent parts it appears 
that he means by the word idea, something more than is 
expressed in his definition. He speaks of external things 
as the exciting causes of ideas. He therefore evidently 
intends ideas and external things to be different beings. 
Suppose then it is asserted that the mind when it thinks is 
employed about external things, does Locke's postulate 
mean merely the existence of external things ? Certainly 
not, for in one of the chapters of the fourth book, he oc- 
cupies himself in the proof of this very proposition. Some- 
thing more than is contained in this postulate than ap- 
pears at the first view of it, and this is only to be col- 
lected from a consideration of other parts of the " essay." 
Locke's postulate is really this ; that there exist in the 
minds of men certain effects produced there by certain 
things existing in what is called the material world. These 
effects are what the mind contemplates in thought, and 
they are the only indications or proofs which man pos- 
sesses of the " existence of external objects," and they are 
what our author calls " ideas." The external exciting 
causes he denominates matter and its modifications. The 
existence of this latter he does not assume, but professes 
to prove from the former. The ideas and their exciting 
causes he takes to be things altogether heterogeneous, and 
admitting no comparison. 

Locke thinks himself warranted in this assumption, as 
he declares that every man is conscious of the existence 



s 



oi ideas in his own mind, and other men's words and ac- 
tions convince him that they exist in theirs. 

We have dwelt at length upon the matter of the intro- 
duction, as it is of considerable consequence in forming a 
clear view of the subjects of investigation, as we proceed 
through the essay itself. 



LECTURE II. 



Outline of the Essay. Of sensation and reflection. The 
Cartesian doctrine ; that of the soid combatted. 

1. Before we enter upon the details of the " Essay 1 ' 
it may be useful to take a general view of its subject, 
somewhat more developed than the short plan which our 
author has laid down in his "method" given in the in- 
troduction. 

Conformably to this plan he devotes the first two books 
to an inquiry into the true source of our ideas. The 
main doctrine which he establishes is, that all our primi- 
tive ideas originate in sensation. After the mind becomes 
furnished with ideas by the senses, it begins to exercise its 
capacities of compounding, comparing, abstracting, &c. 
The mind contemplating these, its own operations, ac- 
quires ideas of them, which ideas form a new class wholly 
distinct from the former, and which he calls ideas of 
reflection. His principal argument to establish the 
doctrine that sensation and reflection are the original 
of all our ideas, is an induction completed a fortiori. 
As it would be impossible to enumerate all our ideas, and 
prove each separately to come from one or other of these 
sources, he shews, in a general way, that very compre- 
hensive classes undoubtedly arise from them ; the most 
obvious are the ideas peculiar to each of the five senses, 
the ideas of the different operations of the mind, &c. 

c 



10 



This induction, which must, from its very nature be im- 
perfect, he confirms, by shewing that those ideas which 
seem to be most abstruse in their origin, and most un- 
likely to proceed from the sources he assigns, do, never- 
theless, actually proceed from them, and from no other. 
The ideas he selects for this purpose, are space, time, and 
infinity. 

2. This inductive process, though it is the principal, is 
not the only argument on which he founds his theory of 
sensation and reflection. There are several subsidiary 
arguments confusedly scattered through his work, which 
we shall attempt to enumerate here : 

1°* Those who denied sensation and reflection to be the 
only sources alleged many of our ideas to innate ; that is, 
to be originally impressed upon the mind in the first mo- 
ment of its creation, and to constitute an essential and 
inseparable part of the mind itself. They not only al- 
leged that there were certain ideas thus impressed, but 
also maintained that there were actually some truths, the 
perception of which was simultaneous with the creation of 
the living principle. To state this more plainly ; they 
maintained that at the moment that life is communicated 
to that portion of organised and hitherto inert matter de- 
signed to receive it in the womb, there are at the same 
time conveyed to it clear and distinct perceptions of cer- 
tain ideas, and even of the truth of certain abstract pro- 
positions, and hence these ideas and propositions have 
been called innate. Locke devotes his first book to the 
refutation of this doctrine ; and if this be the only 
source assigned for ideas, his own doctrine may be con- 
sidered to be thus established, by reasoning from the re- 
motion of one part to the position of the others. No 
idea can be considered innate, the existence of which may 
be accounted for by any of the ordinary ways whereby we 
get other ideas. For it is unphilosophical to ascribe more 
causes than are sufficient to solve the phenomenon. It 



11 



is contrary to the economy of nature to do by two 
different causes that which might have been done by one 
and the same. 

2°* He draws an analogical argument from tracing back 
the state of the mind from the adult to the child, from 
the child to the infant, and so back to the moment of its 
birth, which is the first moment in which we can observe 
it. Through all these stages we find the stock of ideas 
diminishing rapidly, and find scarcely any in the new- 
born infant ; whereas, had we proceeded in the other di- 
rection, we should have found the variety of ideas in- 
creasing in proportion to the variety of sensible objects 
which presented themselves, and to the attention with 
which they are contemplated. Arguing, therefore, by ana- 
logy, we may infer, that were we able to carry our obser- 
vation back from infancy to the moment of creation, we 
should find no ideas then actually existing, though pro- 
bably they would immediately begin to exist. 

3°' Locke frequently uses the argumentum ad ignoran- 
iiam. He appeals to his opponents to assign any idea 
not derived from these sources. Although this species of 
argumentation is in general not entitled to much weight, 
yet it is peculiarly fit in the case in which he applies it. 
It is on all hands admitted, that by far the greater num- 
ber of our ideas arise from sensation and reflection. It 
is therefore much more easy to assign some of the few, 
which have been alleged not to arise from them, than to 
go through an inductive process to establish the contrary. 

4 0, He deduces an argument from etymology in support 
o£ this doctrine. He observes, that most of the words 
in use, even those expressing ideas of reflection, are de- 
rived from names expressive of sensible ideas. Such are, 
imagine, apprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, 
&c. spirit, angel, &c. And he conjectures, that if we 
were able to trace all names back to their first origin, we 
should find them all ultimately implying sensible ideas. 



12 



3. In the course of his investigations respecting the 
original of our ideas, he enters into several inquiries 
which do not strictly come under that head. Thus he 
examines other qualities of ideas, as their clearness, dis- 
tinctness, reality, adequacy, &c. These considerations 
conclude his second book. 

According to the method laid down in the introduction 
he should next have proceeded to the consideration of 
knowledge and its attributes. In his progress, however, 
finding a more intimate connexion between language and 
ideas than he at first had expected, he conceived it ne- 
cessary to devote a part of his work to the consideration 
of language, and its influence upon our ideas and know- 
ledge. This subject he has very fully treated in his third 
book. The fourth book is altogether devoted to investi- 
gations respecting knowledge and probability, and their 
attributes. 

4. Having now stated more particularly the subjects to 
which we shall have to apply our attention in these lec- 
tures, we shall proceed to examine our author's reason- 
ings respecting the original of our ideas. As the doc- 
trine of innate ideas and principles is in a great degree 
exploded, we shall not at present enter into further par- 
ticulars respecting the subject of the first book than those 
which have been already stated. Assuming then the ex- 
istence of ideas in the mind, the question is, whence 
have they come ? The mind, in the first moment of its 
creation, is compared by Locke to " white paper," capa- 
ble of receiving various characters and impressions, but 
on which nothing is as yet written. " Whence comes it 
by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of 
man has painted on it, with almost endless variety ?" He 
ascribes all this in one word to experience. This expe- 
rience is two-fold ; sensation and reflection. Locke sel- 
dom gives formal and settled definitions of his terms, the 
circumstances under which he describes his " Essay" to 



18 



have been written may possibly account for this. His 
meaning is frequently to be only collected from carefully 
observing the manner in which he uses and applies his 
terms. The term sensation, is an example of this. He 
seems to use this term and perception nearly synony- 
mously. When examined, however, we shall find that 
perception is a more general term, as it is applicable to 
ideas of reflection as well as those of sensation. There 
are several different passages in the Essay which are in- 
differently considered as definitions of sensation, and in- 
deed seem to be given as such by the author. Such are 
the following : 

" This great source of most of the ideas we have depend- 
ing wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the 
understanding, i" call sensation. B. 2. Ch. I. § 3. 

Sensation; which is such an impression or mo- 
tion made in some part of the body, as produces some 
perception in the understanding. B. 2. Ch. I. § 23. 

Sensation ; which is the actual entrance of an 

idea into the understanding by the senses. B. 2. Ch. 
XIX. § 1." 

From a comparison of the last two definitions, one 
might suppose that by the word perception, our author 
meant an idea. If he does not mean by the word per- 
ception, in the first of these definitions, an idea, the two 
definitions are not alike, and therefore he uses the word 
sensation unsteadily. If, on the other hand, perception 
means, as would appear from B. 2. Ch. IX. the actual pro- 
duction of an idea, the last definition applies to percep- 
tion as well as to sensation; and in this case the second 
definition becomes absurd, only defining by a synonymous 
term. As to the first definition it is also objectionable, 
as we are ignorant (as far as respects any thing contained 
in it) what " that great source" is. These little inaccu- 
racies are every where observable through our author, 
who seems better qualified to prescribe rules to others how 



n 



to (avoid the unsteady use of words, than to avoid that 
abuse himself. 

5. His definition of reflection is " the notice which 
the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of 
them." This definition is perfectly adequate. The term 
" operations" might indeed be better replaced by powers, 
or still better by faculties, which implies either active or 
passive capacity. This objection, however, Locke guards 
against a little after by observing, that the term opera- 
tion is used " in a large sense, as comprehending not barely 
the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of 
passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the sa- 
tisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought." — 
This use of the word operation countenances a similar 
use of the same word in the definition of simple ap- 
prehension, in the Compendium of Logic by Murray. 
Judging by the example which our author here gives of 
the passive sense in which he uses the word operation, he 
does not seem altogether aware of the scope of the ob- 
jection to it, as it occurs in the definition of reflection. 
That objection is simply this, that " the notice which the 
mind takes" of certain passive faculties, as for example, per- 
ception, strictly speaking, does not come under the defini- 
tion of an idea of reflection, and yet our author plainly in- 
tends it should, for he declares that perception is the first fa- 
culty of the mind about its ideas, and therefore the first 
simple idea of reflection. (Gh. IX. § 1.) The suppressed 
premise in this enthymeme is evidently the definition of 
reflection; and it may be observed that he tacitly sup- 
poses the word " faculty" substituted for " operation." 
This, and such like examples, are properly the objections 
to the word "operation" in the definition of reflection ; 
which objection is however removed, if the word operation 
be taken as synonymous with faculty. 

6. Whatever confusion or inaccuracy there may be found 
in Locke's definitions of the terms sensation and reflection, 



15 



when subjected to a rigorous verbal scrutiny, no great 
difficulty can be presented to a candid inquirer after 
truth, who is not disposed to cavil in taking up the ge- 
neral tenor of our author's meaning. He supposes, as 
has been before observed, the existence of external ob- 
jects, which, by affecting our organs, produce ideas in 
our minds. This, it is true, is an hypothesis ; but that 
is no objection to founding upon it a definition. The 
impression which thus produces an idea in the mind is 
called sensation ; and the ideas produced are called ideas 
of sensation or sensible ideas, and sometimes sensible qua- 
lities. The mind being furnished with these ideas, and 
being also endued with certain powers capable of being 
exerted upon ideas, the exertion of those powers and 
operations effected upon the ideas of sensation, follow. 
The mind being conscious of these operations, zand feeling 
them going forward, turns its view inwards upon itself, 
and attentively observes the processes, and thus acquires 
ideas of these operations. This is called reflection. To 
give an example; let us suppose that yesterday a tulip 
had fallen under our view, and we thus acquired by the 
senses an idea of it. To-day we wish to describe it to 
another, and endeavour to reproduce the same idea with- 
out the presence of the object itself. Succeeding in doing 
so, we observe the process of mind necessary for that pur- 
pose, we acquire a distinct idea of it, and we call that 
idea by the name recollection. The acquisition of our idea, 
whether of sensation or reflection, is called perception. 

7. The perception of ideas of reflection necessarily oc- 
curs later than those of sensation, for two reasons; I 0, be- 
cause ideas of sensation must have been perceived before 
the mind could have had any operations, and therefore 
before it could have had ideas of reflection. 2 0# Ideas of 
reflection require an observation of the operation of our 
minds, and an abstraction from external objects, which 



U) 



cannot be looked for but in persons somewhat advanced 
in life. 

8. Having explained the nature of sensation and re- 
flection, Locke combats the principle of Des Cartes, that 
the quality of thinking is the essence of the soul. This 
Philosopher held the doctrine, that nothing exists but 
substances. Substances he divided into two classes, 
thinking substances, and extended substances; thus 
making thought the essential quality of the one class, 
and extension that of the other. The essence of spirit 
being thus fixed in thinking, he concluded that thinking 
is absolutely inseparable from spirit, and thence, that the 
supposition that the soul, at any moment was free from 
thought, involved a positive contradiction. In virtue of 
the other principle, that the essence of matter consisted 
in extension, he concluded that there was no vacuum, nor 
even a possibility of it, and that therefore the universe is 
absolutely full. By this principle, space, void of body, 
is totally excluded, for extension being implied in the 
idea of space, matter is so too, as he makes it the distin- 
guishing property of matter. Locke attacks both these 
principles ; we shall however for the present confine our- 
selves to the first. 

9. Locke considers thinking the action of the soul, and 
conceives it to be no more essential to the soul than motion 
is to the body. The body having the power to move may 
or may not exert that power, as the will may dictate. 
So the soul having the power to think, the will possesses 
a certain power over the thoughts, though not to the same 
extent as in the former case. The action of the mind in 
thinking cannot be suspended by the dictate of the will. 
The attention may be increased or relaxed, the current 
of the thought may be in some degree regulated and di- 
rected by the will, but that current cannot be stopped. 
It ceases only in sleep or in death. This perhaps it was 
which led Des Cartes to his principle. Perceiving the 



17 



inability of the will to suspend the process of thought 
while awake, and not conceiving how that could be 
considered as an action over which the will had no 
power, he concluded, that it must be an essential 
quality of the soul, and that it must subsist in sleep, al- 
though from some physical cause, depending on the state 
of the body, we are not conscious of it. Locke considers 
Des Cartes to have been guilty of sophistry, in establish- 
ing this position by a petitio princlpii. He supposes 
him to have first defined the soul to be a thinking being, 
and then inferred that it always thinks. But Des Cartes 
was too acute to impose on himself, and too prudent, as 
well as too honest, to attempt to impose on others by such 
a flimsy sophism. The truth is, Des Cartes never de- 
signed it as an inference. It was one of his hypotheses; 
for the philosophy of that day proceeded entirely on hy- 
potheses. Des Cartes invented this as that which was most 
adequate to solve the phenomenon. The objection which 
may with truth and effect be brought against the Cartesian 
principle is, 1°* That it is a mere hypothesis; and 2°. That 
it is inadequate to account for the phenomenon of sleep, 
in which all men agree that they are not conscious of 
thought. 

We shall now follow our author through the different 
absurdities which he shews that the Cartesian doctrine 
will lead to : 

1°' Granting that the soul thinks while the man sleeps, 
we can scarcely deny that it has the usual concomitants 
of thought, pleasure or pain, happiness or misery, accord- 
ing to the nature of its speculations. If we look further, 
and consider it as a moral agent, it has its duties and 
sins, and its merits and demerits, and is entitled to re- 
wards, and obnoxious to punishment. Of all this the 
sleeping man is perfectly unconscious, and therefore is not 
answerable for it. Thus, to all intents and purposes, the 

D 



18 



soul and the man are two distinct beings, the soul as a 
moral agent to be disposed of, and judged by circum- 
stances, which the man has no more consciousness of, nor 
responsibility for, than Socrates had of or for the thoughts 
or deeds of Des Cartes himself. Thus personal identity is 
confounded. 

The answer, that men are conscious of the process 
of thought during sleep, but immediately forget it, Locke 
rejects as a gratuitous assumption, and which in itself is in 
the highest degree improbable. 

2°* Granting that the soul thinks while man sleeps, the 
thoughts ought to be more rational than while the man 
wakes, for then the thinking being is, as it were, disen- 
gaged from, and disencumbered of the material being, 
and therefore the thoughts should be more clear and ele- 
vated, and the conclusions and reasonings more valid. 
But whenever our sleeping thoughts (dreams) are remem- 
bered, they are always on the contrary found to be inco- 
herent, absurd, and extravagant. 

3°' Granting that the soul thinks while the man sleeps, 
and yet totally forgets its thoughts, such thinking is ut- 
terly useless. This contradicts that economy of nature 
by which she does nothing in vain, much less does she 
create one of the noblest faculties to be expended for no 
purpose. 

4°* Granting that the soul thinks while the man sleeps, 
if it be answered, that the ideas are forgotten, because the 
bodily organs not being employed in this thinking, no im- 
pressions are left, and consequently no memory of such 
thoughts; it may be replied, that it is quite as easy to sup- 
pose the soul to retain its ideas without the help of the 
organs, as to receive and contemplate them. 

5°' Granting that the soul thinks from the first moment 
of its creation, and before it has received ideas from the 
senses, it must have ideas not derived from sensation or re- 
flection ; of such ideas we find no trace. 






LECTURE III 



Ideas, simple and complex. — Division of simple Ideas. 

1. Haying first divided our ideas as they enter the 
mind, into those of sensation and reflection, Locke next 
viewing them in another respect, divides them into simple 
and complex. 

He defines a simple idea to be " one uniform and un- 
compounded appearance or conception in the mind, which 
is not distinguishable into different ideas." » 

We have rendered the word " different" here empha- 
tical, because the definition has been frequently miscon- 
ceived, by substituting the word " several" in its place. 
Our author extends the name <; simple idea" to certain 
classes of ideas which are separable into " several" ideas, 
provided all those ideas be of the " same kind." Thus, 
for example,' the idea of a straight line of the length 
one foot, is a simple idea, although it may be resolved in- 
to twelve ideas, or rather into twelve repetitions of the 
same idea of a straight line of the length one inch. This 
should be the more particularly observed, as some who 
wrote against the Essay shortly after its publication, fell 
into the same error, and were refuted by Locke merely 
by shewing that he used the word " different," and not 
"^several," in his definition. Complex ideas are those 
which are made up of several ideas, 



20 



2. We have before observed that Locke uses his words 
loosely and unsteadily, and certainly without that exact 
attention to correctness which the nature of his subject 
required. This defect is doubly objectionable in one who 
proinulges new doctrines, as his readers have no other 
guide in that case than his own definitions and reasonings. 
The use of the terms simple and complex ideas, is 
an instance of an apparent vacillation in the mind of 
our author, as to the exact signification of his terms. 
By his definition of simple ideas, he expressly includes 
those ideas which are compounded of the same idea ; as 
in the instance already cited; and in Ch. XII. of the se- 
cond book he makes " simple modes" one of the classes 
of complex ideas. His definition of " simple modes" is 
" those complex ideas which are only variations or dif- 
ferent combinations of the same simple idea, without the 
mixture of any other." Here these ideas are expressly 
made complex ideas ; and they are simple ideas according 
to his own definition. Again he changes his meaning in 
Chap. XV. Book 2d, when speaking of the simple modes 
of duration and space, " their parts being all of the same 
kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder 
them not from having a place amongst our simple ideas." 
It will be observed that the very words of his definition 
of the class oi complex ideas, called simple modes, are here 
used to prove that simple modes are simple ideas. On 
the whole, our author's meaning seems to be this : — 

1°* Ideas which have no manner of composition what- 
ever, whether of ideas of the same, or different kinds, 
come decidedly under the class of simple ideas, and no 
other. 

2 0, Ideas which are compounded of the same simple 
idea (simple modes,) though in a strictly literal sense 
they are complex ideas, yet our author generally re- 
fers them to the class of simple ideas, and speaks of 
them as such. In doing so. however, he does not set 



21 



aside all notice of their composition, but on the other 
hand, has occasion frequently to introduce it into his rea- 
soning. 

3 0, Ideas which are compounded of different simple 
ideas, come decidedly under the class of complex ideas, 
and no other. 

3. The power of the mind over its ideas is compared 
by Locke to that which we possess over the elements of 
matter. In this comparison the elementary parts of mat- 
ter are considered analogous to our simple ideas, and 
masses of matter of various figures, &c. are analogous to 
our complex ideas. He compares them in five respects : 

1°* As we possess the power of uniting together the 
parts of matter so as to form combinations in endless va- 
riety, so also we possess the power of uniting, in ways 
infinitely various, our simple ideas, so as to form com- 
plex ones. 

2 0, As we possess the power of comparing together 
collections of matter in various respects, so also we pos- 
sess the power of comparing our ideas from which arises 
that class of ideas called relations. 

3°* As we possess the power of dividing the parts of 
bodies so as to obtain any proposed part separately from 
the others, so also we possess the power of resolving our 
complex ideas into parts, so as to be able to consider 
any part separately from the others, from which arises 
abstract ideas. 

4°* As we do not possess the power of creating a par- 
ticle of matter, so neither do we possess the power of 
creating a simple idea not derived from sensation or re- 
flection. 

5 0# As we do not possess the power of destroying a par- 
ticle of matter, so neither do we possess the power of 
destroying any simple idea. 

4. In the perception of simple ideas of sensation, the 
mind is perfectly passive, and cannot refuse to have, nor 



22 



can it alter the simple idea derived from any sensible ob- 
ject affecting the proper organ. This passiveness Locke 
illustrates by the images of objects placed before a mirror. 
There is, however, this difference, as we shall see hereaf- 
ter. The " images" or ideas in the mind, and the objects 
which produce them, have no resemblance whatever. 
With respect to the ideas of reflection, it may be ques- 
tioned whether the mind is passive in the reception of 
these. Locke declares that they require attention, and 
attention is not a passive faculty. 

5. One of the peculiarities of simple ideas is, that their 
names do not admit of definition. A definition is the ex- 
planation of a word by several others not synonymous 
with the word defined, nor with each other. A simple 
idea not being compounded of different ideas, cannot be 
expressed by several words not synonymous, and therefore 
cannot, properly speaking, be defined. There are, how- 
ever, three ways whereby the significations of the names 
of simple ideas may be communicated. 

1°* By a synonymous word. 

2 0, By naming the subject in which the quality subsists. 

3 0# By shewing the subject in which the quality subsists. 

Thus if the object of the colour we wish to express be 
not present, we say peach- colour, slate-colour, violet-co- 
lour, &c. 

Though these observations properly respect words 
rather than ideas, yet, as in discoursing of simple ideas, 
we shall have occasion to allude 'to this peculiarity of 
their names, we thought it necessary to premise this 
previously. 

6. The original conduits, therefore, and the only ones 
of simple ideas, are the senses. Language can never 
communicate a new simple idea. It may recall one for- 
merly had by sensation, but here its power over simple 
ideas terminates. Without the senses we should have no 
ideas whatever; for, as we have already shown, sensation 



23 



must precede reflection. Although ice cannot have any 
other ideas than those conveyed by our senses, it does 
not however follow that other beings may not have ideas 
for which we have no conduits. To suppose so would be 
just as unreasonable as for the blind or the deal* to sup- 
pose no ideas to enter by the senses of which they are res- 
pectively deprived. Of the number of our senses Locke 
declines giving any opinion, but seems to think that 
"they may be justly accounted more than the five which 
are commonly enumerated." 

7. Our author next proceeds to a more particular di- 
vision of our simple ideas " with reference to the ways 
whereby they make their approaches to our minds." He 
inadvertently professes here to divide only our " ideas of 
sensation," whereas the division includes all ideas. This 
division is sometimes considered therefore inadequate, 
" the parts containing more than the whole." This how- 
ever is mere cavilling, and treating as an error what is real- 
ly only a verbal oversight. 

The classes of our simple ideas, divided with respect to 
their entrance into the mind, are four: 

1°* The ideas which enter by one sense only. 

2° The ideas which enter by more than one sense (i e. 
by sight and touch). 

3°* The ideas which enter by reflection only. 

4°' The ideas which enter by both reflection and sen- 
sation. 

The ideas which chiefly compose the first class may be 
enumerated as follows : 

1°* Light and colours. 

2°- Tastes. 

3°- Sounds. 

4 0, Odours. 

5°* Solidity, temperature, configuration, adhesion, and 
such like. 

8. To enumerate all the simple ideas peculiar to each 



24 



sense, would, even were it of any material utility, be im- 
possible; for they have not all names. Were all the Va- 
rieties of ideas coming under the several classes above 
mentioned, to be distinctly denominated, names would 
be endless. One word signifies generally several modes 
and degrees of the same idea, as sweet and bitter. In- 
stead of attempting to enumerate our simple ideas, and 
bring them successively under examination, our author 
selects one of these which he considers most material to 
his purpose, and which, though a frequent ingredient of 
complex ideas, is not apt to be particularly noticed. He 
selects the simple idea, " solidity," probably because it is 
connected with one of those principles of the Cartesiaa 
philosophy, which he proposes to refute, 



LECTURE IV 



Solidity. 

1. Solidity is one of the most familiar of those simple 
ideas peculiar to the sense of touch. The same idea is 
sometimes expressed by the term impenetrability. Locke 
however prefers the former term, and grounds his pre- 
ference on three reasons : 

l 0. Because Solidity is the term in most common use. 

2°' Because Solidity is a positive, and impenetrability 
a negative term. The idea to be expressed being a positive 
quality, he thinks it improperly denominated by a nega- 
tive term. 

3°* He considers that impenetrability is rather a con- 
sequence of solidity than solidity itself. 

2. We have already observed that the names of simple 
ideas do not admit of definition. Solidity is an instance 
of this. Locke consequently declines defining it, and the 
description he gives of it, is nothing more than an appeal 
to the senses. Let us bring together under our view the 
different attempts at describing this idea, which are scat- 
tered throughout this part of his Essay. 

" It arises from the resistance which we find in body to 
the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, 
till it has left it." Chap. IV. § 1. 

" That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, 

E 



26 



when they are moved one towards another, I call solidity." 
ib. ib. 

" The idea the most intimately connected with, 

and essential to body, so as no where to be found or 
imagined but only in matter." ib. ib. 

It is that property by which a body <c will for ever 
hinder any other two bodies that move towards one 
another in a straight line, from coming to touch one 
another, unless it moves from between them in a line not 
parallel to that which they move in." § 2. 

" If any one ask me, what this solidity is ? I send him 
to his senses to inform him : let him put a flint or a foot- 
ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, 
and he will know." § 6. 

&. Any, or all of these may he received as a descrip- 
tion to help the mind of the student to the meaning of the 
author, but none of them can for a moment stand the 
test of examination as a definition. We shall not here 
enter into any metaphysical discussion on the subject, 
farther than to compare the statement made in the third 
passage quoted above, with another of our author's state- 
ments. In this passage it will be observed, that some- 
thing beyond mere explanation is contained. It contains 
a very important metaphysical theorem, scil : That the 
property by which a body refuses admission to another 
body into its place until it quits it, is a quality exclusively 
belonging to matter. " It is no where else to be found," 
nor even possible to be " imagined." We are strongly 
inclined to think that in writing some parts of the Essay, 
Locke forgot statements which he had made in other 
parts. We beg to call the attention of the student to the 
following passages : — 

* * * " We never finding, nor conceiving it possi- 
ble, that two things of the same kind should exist in the 
same place at th« same time, we rightly conclude that 
whatever exists any where, at any time, excludes all of 
the same kind, and is there itself alone." Ch. XXVII. § 1. 



27 



" For though these three sorts of substanees (God, 
spirits, and bodies,) as we term them, do not exclude one 
another out of the same place, yet ice cannot conceive 
but that they must necessarily, each of them exclude any 
of the same kind out of the same place :" ib. •§ 2. 

Speaking of the mind he says, 

* * * As itself is thought to take up no space, to 
have no extension, so its actions seem to require, &c. &c. 
B. 2. Ch. IX. § 10. 

Speaking of spirits he says, 

* * * Each has its determinate time and place of 
existence, &c. B. 2. Ch. XXVII. 

It must appear evident that Locke here ascribes to spi- 
rit that quality which is defined " the occupation of 
space to the exclusion of things of the same kind," and 
which when found in body is called solidity. And yet 
he denies to the human mind the same quality, for he 
says " it takes up no space," that is, it occupies no space. 
I confess that I cannot understand any thing by "mind," 
but a spirit ; that being which we have altogether inde 
pendently of our body, which perceives, remembers, re- 
flects, &c, and Locke declares that this spirit " takes up 
no space," although in another place he declares that 
finite spirits do take up space, to the actual exclusion of 
other finite spirits. Besides this, it may be a fair sub- 
ject of inquiry, what difference does Locke acknowledge 
between spirits and bodies ? Body occupies space, so does 
spirit. Body excludes body from its place, until it quits 
it, so also spirit excludes spirit from its place till it quits 
it. Can the occupation of space belong to a thing which 
is unextended ? If not, then extension is a common at- 
tribute of both body and spirit. Body is moveable, so is 
spirit. Thus he ascribes to spirit a collection of attri- 
butes, which differ from the primary attributes of body 
only in being ascribed to a different being. We are thus 



28 



driven to the necessity of either acknowledging that spirit 
differs from body only in having the attributes of thinking, 
&c. superinduced upon the primary qualities of body, or 
of denying to spirit those attributes, which I cannot per- 
suade myself would ever have been ascribed to it, had 
the absurd consequences to which they lead been detected. 

4. Thus by following the reasoning of Locke upon this 
point, we are driven from absurdity to absurdity. This 
might easily, however, have been anticipated, as the hypo- 
theses on which he proceeds are actually contradictory. 
He declares in the clearest and most explicit terms, in 
one place, that the quality of excluding other things of the 
same kind from the place it possesses, &c. is exclusively 
confined to body, and in another states, that it is M impos- 
sible to conceive" the same property not to belong to all 
substances of the same kind, having previously made the 
kinds of substances to be " God, finite spirits, and bodies." 

5. It is very probable that many of the difficulties in 
which the subject is thus involved, have arisen from the 
imperfect definitions given by Locke of the term solidity. 
It will however be more useful to guard the student against 
certain senses of that word in which our author does not 
use it, than to enter into any further disquisition as to that 
sense in which he does use it. There are three common- 
ly received uses of this word, which we may call its popu- 
lar, physical, and mathematical senses. 

1°* In a popular sense solid is used to a certain degree 
synonymously with hard. Thus a body is said to be 
more or less solid than another, according as its parts 
hold together with a more or less firm cohesion. This 
differs from the quality intended to be expressed by Locke 
by the term " solidity," in this respect, that the one qua- 
lity admits of degrees, the other of none. The one is 
relative, the other positive. A body of any given species 
is said to be more or less hard as its parts adhere with a 
greater or less force or tenacity than those of bodies of 
that species usually do. Thus if we speak of stones, we 



29 



say diamond is hard, sand -stone soft; speaking of woods, 
box is hard, lime soft. Solidity, on the other hand, in 
that sense in which it is used in the Essay admits of no 
degrees ; the softest body in the universe is not less solid 
than the hardest. When a body, after impinging upon 
another, occupies its place, the other body must either 
have quitted it or not; if it has quitted the place, it is 
solid, otherwise not. In such a quality it is impossible 
even to imagine degrees, 

6. The compressibility of bodies is a phenomenon, 
which to a first view might appear to evert, the hypothe- 
sis that all bodies are solid. Compressibility, however, 
when properly explained, so far from being the opposite 
of solidity is in some degree a consequence of it. Bodies 
of finite bulk are composed of small elementary particles 
of matter, which, though very close in their position, are 
not in absolute contact; the interstitial spaces, which con- 
stitute a part of the bulk or magnitude or volume of the 
whole body, are called pores. Substances are said to be 
more or less dense as their pores bear a lesser or greater 
proportion to their volume. The mass of a body is the 
quantity of particles of matter included in its volume. 
Compressibility is the effect which is produced, when the 
volume of a body is diminished without changing its mass. 
It follows then, admitting the quality of solidity, that the 
pores must be diminished by exactly the same quantity as 
the volume. Thus, in the Florentine experiment, if it be 
admitted that the change of figure of the globe instantly 
produced the dew upon its surface, and that the quantity 
of the water which thus forced its way out was exactly 
equal in volume to the diminution of volume produced by 
the change of figure, it would then follow that the water 
was not capable of being compressed by a force equal to 
that which produced the change of figure in the globe. But 
whatever might have been the result of this experiment it 
could neither establish nor subvert the hypothesis that all 



so 



bodies arc solid, nor was the experiment ever designed for 
such a purpose. In this respect a student is extremely 
apt to fall into misconception from certain expressions 
used by Locke. His words are as follow : 

" The experiment, I have been told, was made at 
Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water 
and exactly closed, which further shews the solidity of so 
soft a body as water* For the golden globe thus filled 
being put into a press, which was driven by the extreme 
force of screw r s, the water made itself way through the 
pores of that very close metal." Chap. IV. § 4. 

In these expressions, and especially those printed in 
Italic, it is certainly implied, if not directly affirmed, that 
the experiment was intended to be a criterion to establish 
the solidity of water, and that had the experiment pro- 
duced a result different from that which followed, the 
conclusion would have been that water was not solid. This 
however Locke could never have meant, and we must as- 
cribe his expressions to that negligence and inaccuracy 
which is observable throughout the works of this great 
man. He must have been perfectly aware, that all elas- 
tic fluids were compressible, and that if one of these had 
been enclosed in the globe the result would have been 
different, and yet the fluid so compressed would not be 
less solid (in his own sense of the word) than adamant. 
Air is capable of being reduced in its bulk in proportion 
to the compressing force, and Locke, knowing this, de- 
clares air to be as solid as water. 

7. Although the physical investigation connected with 
the Florentine experiment has no relation to the object 
of our present lecture, yet as Locke has alluded to it, and 
as his allusion is calculated to mislead the student on this 
subject, we shall here digress so far from our subject as to 
^3Ut him in possession of a correct account of the matter. 

An experiment was instituted at the Academy del Ci- 
mento, such as Locke describes, to try the compressibility 



31 



of water. The vessel containing the fluid was made sphe- 
rical, because a sphere is the figure which possesses the 
quality of including the greatest possible volume within a 
given surface, and consequently any alteration of the 
figure which would produce no increase of surface, would 
necessarily diminish the volume ; whereas had the vessel 
been of any other figure, an alteration might have in- 
creased the volume, and therefore nothing relative to the 
compressibility could have been inferred. Gold was se- 
lected as the material, being the least porous metal then 
known. Since this experiment, Platina has been disco- 
vered, which is still more dense than gold. The result 
was, that upon compression, the water first forced its way 
as described, and the outside of the globe was found wet. 
When further compressed, it actually made a cleft in the 
metal, and spouted out with considerable force. This 
experiment, properly considered, could not establish the 
fact of incompressibility. To do so it would be requisite 
accurately to measure the volume of the water which 
transuded upon the first compression, next to measure 
the diminution of the volume of the vessel consequent 
upon the alteration of the figure- All this never could 
be done with sufficient delicacy to estimate so very small 
a quantity, as it must have been obvious the compressi- 
bility of water was. Since the time of Locke, Canton, an 
English philosopher, has, by some very ingenious expe- 
riments, shewn that water and other liquids are not only 
compressible but elastic. 

8. 2°' In physics, solidity is taken to mean that quality 
which is the opposite of fluidity. " It means that quality 
by which the minute parts are connected together, so as 
not to give way or slip from each other on the least im- 
pression." — (Hutton Diet. Solid.) 

9. 3 0, In mathematics, solidity means that quantity of 
space occupied by a body. In this science solid is used in 
contradistinction to line and surface. Line is length with- 



32 



out breadth or thickness. Surface, length and breadth 
without thickness. Solidity is space, having all three 
qualities, length, breadth, and thickness. Line is tech- 
nically called space of one dimension, surface, space of 
two dimensions, and solidity, space of three dimensions. 

10. It will readily be perceived that the sense in which 
Locke uses the term solidity, is different from all these. 
It is built upon the hypothesis that extension or space is 
an existence distinct from body, and not merely one of its 
qualities. In the Cartesian philosophy, extension is merely 
considered an attribute of matter, and as incapable of any 
existence independently of matter, as solidity or colour. 
It was before observed, that it was the Cartesian princi- 
ple that all being must be either body or spirit, the lead- 
ing attribute of the one being extension, and the other 
thinking. The Cartesians would feel as much difficulty 
in admitting an extended spirit as a disciple of Locke's 
philosophy in admitting a solid spirit. The doctrine of 
Locke seems to be, that there are three classes of exist- 
ence, spirit, body, and space. He expressly and repeat- 
edly insists upon the existence of the last independently 
of either of the former, although in his formal enumera- 
tion of substances, he confines himself to spirits and 
bodies. (Book 2. Chap. XXVII. § 2.) Hence we may in- 
fer that his division of being is into substances and space; 
and his subdivision of substances as abovementioned. 

Although he speaks of extension not merely as a qua- 
lity, but as an independent being, yet he certainly also 
speaks of it as a quality. Thus he says, " the extension 
of body consists of the cohesion or continuity of solid, 
separable, and moveable parts." It is not easy exactly 
to shew his sense of the word extension. In many parts 
of his work he uses this term synonymously with space ; 
examples of this occur every where ; thus in Chap. V. 
he says, space or extension is one of those ideas which 
come by " divers senses." On the other hand, in Chap. 



IV. § 5. he says, that " the extension of space consists of 
unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable parts." Here he 
plainly makes extension a quality of space, and not space 
itself, otherwise the sentence would be absurd," the space 
of space consists, &c. &c." 

13. Locke contends, in opposition to Des Cartes, that 
extension or space is not inseparable from body, nor merely 
one of its attributes. He appeals to the imagination 
whether one body may not be conceived to move while 
every other body in existence is quiescent, and if so, the 
place from which it has moved gives us the idea of pure 
space void of body, and so enable us to imagine the ex- 
istence of space as a being. 

He anticipates an objection of the Cartesians, that mo- 
tion could not take place in one body without producing 
motion in those which are contiguous to it; and answers 
by stating that the necessity of such a motion is built upon 
a gratuitous hypothesis, " that the universe is a plenum," 
or that all space is filled with body. Besides that when 
the question is merely confined to the possibility of having 
the idea of pure space, the fact, if admitted, that pure 
space has no existence is irrelevant, in as much as its non- 
existence does not argue the non-existence of an idea of 
it. Our author thinks that the idea of motion in one body 
no more infers the idea of motion in others, than the idea 
of a square figure in one body infers the idea of a square 
figure in others. He further declares, that the very fact 
of the existence of disputes about a vacuum proves that 
whatever may be determined with regard to its existence, 
there can be no doubt of the existence of the idea of it. 

12. To this a disciple of the philosopher of France 
may be supposed to reply, that in order to imagine one 
body to move, all others being quiescent, it is necessary 
previously to have an idea of space into which it may 
move, and this space must be void of body, otherwise the 

p 



31 



body occupying it would be displaced, contrary to the 
hypothesis, and therefore this process presupposes the 
idea of pure space, and therefore is a petitio principii: 
This is an objection of a more decided character than 
Locke seems to have anticipated. Besides, it may be re- 
plied, that to suppose the universe not a plenum is as much 
hypothetical as the reverse, and such a supposition as be- 
fore presupposes the idea of a vacuum. Also as to the 
proof afforded by the existence of disputes about a vacuum, 
Locke should remember what he states himself in his 
third book on the abuse of words, where he condemns the 
schools for the constant use of terms, which never had 
any meaning, &c. These the student may suppose to be 
the replies of a Cartesian. They are not given here in 
refutation of the English philosopher, but to shew the 
student fairly both sides of the question. 

The mobility of body, its resistance, impulse, and pro- 
trusion, are qualities of body arising immediately from its 
solidity. 



LECTURE V. 



Of Ideas which enter the Mind in several Ways. 

I. The ideas which enter the mind by the senses of 
sight and touch are, according to our author, 

1. Space or extension. 

2. Figure. 

3. Motion or rest. 

When these ideas are said to enter "by sight, the asser- 
tion must be understood with some modification. The 
eye, the organ of sight, is not capable of receiving any im- 
pression, except that of light. It is true, as will appear 
in the next lecture, that from the exertion of judgment 
on the impression made by light upon the eye, the mind 
arrives at the abovementioned ideas. But it may fairly 
be questioned how far those ideas can, upon these 
grounds, be properly said to enter by the sense of sight. 
As we shall have occasion to enlarge upon this subject 
hereafter, we shall not insist upon it further at present. 

2. The ideas which enter by reflection alone, are those 
of the powers and operations of the mind. The actions 
of the mind are as various, if not more so, than those of 
the body. All the various modes of thinking, willing, me- 
mory, discernment, reasoning, judgment, knowledge, 
belief, &c. &c. are ideas of reflection. 

The two principal faculties or powers of the mind, are 



36 



called the understanding and the will. The understand- 
big is the power of thinking^ and the will is the power 
of willing-. In the use of the word perception, Locke 
vacillates. In B. 2. Ch. VI. he uses it synonymously 
with thinking*; and in Ch. IX. he makes a marked dis- 
tinction between these terms. When we come to treat of 
perception, we shall speak more fully of this distinction. 
It is sufficient at present to observe that the word think- 
ing, in the definition of the understanding, is to be re- 
ceived as a general term, of which all the different intel- 
lectual faculties and operations are species or modes. This 
is evidently Locke's meaning, as may be seen by reference 
to B. 2. Ch. XIX. where he treats of the modes of 
thinking, under which he brings all operations of the 
mind. 

S. The fourth class of ideas, divided as they enter the 
mind, is that of the ideas which enter by all the senses, 
and by reflection. This class Locke reduces to these 
five: 

L Pleasure. 

2. Pain. 

3. Power. 

4. Existence. 

5. Unity. 

4. Under each of these it is understood that all the va- 
rious modes and degrees of the respective ideas are in- 
cluded. That pleasure and pain are excited by objects 
affecting all the senses, every one's experience must prove. 
Those who, withdrawing their attention from external 
things, note the operations of their minds, and the feel- 
ings connected with them, must be sensible also that per- 
ceptions of enjoyment, and uneasiness, frequently accom- 
pany them. A painful exertion of memory is a common 
phrase ; and there are few who have entered into scientific 
speculations who have not felt the pleasure arising from 
the exercise of the discursive faculty. We must not ; how- 



37 



over, confound the pleasure which arises from the ideas 
excited with the pleasure arising from the operation 
which excites them. These are totally distinct, though 
frequently so mingled in the mind that it is not easy to 
separate them. The ideas concerned in any speculation 
may themselves be pleasurable, either on account of their 
beauty, or grandeur, or sublimity ; the ingenuity of the 
reasoning about them, the contrivances by which proper 
means are interposed, the mental artifices which are de- 
vised to exhibit the relation of the ideas, may also strike 
the mind with pleasure and admiration. In such a case, 
therefore, there are two sources of pleasure, one from the 
ideas themselves ; the other from the operations of the 
mind, whereby the relations between these ideas are made 
apparent ; in the one the pleasure arises from sensation 
in the other from reflection. Although in the first case 
there may be no sensible object exhibited, yet the ideas 
excited must be sensible ideas formerly received from 
sensible objects. 

The discoveries of Newton in Physics are remarkable 
instances of the two species of enjoyment blended toge- 
ther. It is difficult to say whether the magnificent spe- 
culations brought before the mind in his investigation of 
the motions and attractions of the bodies of the universe, 
or the wonderful powers of mind displayed in the process 
of reasoning by which he leads to these results, strike us 
with more admiration. Who can say whether his opti- 
cal discoveries, or the reasonings used to establish them, 
are the more beautiful ? 

5. The uses of pleasure Locke states to be twofold : 

1°' To excite us to action both mental and bodily, Ch. 
VII. § 3. 

'2 0, To assist the memory. Ch. X. § 3. 
The uses of pain are fourfold: 

i°* To excite us to action. Ch. VII. § 4. 

2°* To preserve our organs from injury, ib. ib. 



38 



8 ' To induce us to look forward to a future state of 
greater felicity, " in the enjoyment of him with whom 
there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are plea- 
sures for evermore." Ih. § 5. 

4°* To assist the memory. — In this it is more efficacious 
than attention, as it acts quicker in grown persons, and 
supplies its place in children. Ch. X. § 3. It would 
probably be more correct to say that it excites attention in 
both grown persons and children. 

6* Pleasure and pain are the springs of action. The 
will, whether it directs the actions of the body, or regu- 
lates the current of our thoughts, is always determined by 
a prospect of pleasure or pain, either immediate or remote. 
It is true, we see men not unfrequently, voluntarily un- 
dergo what produces immediate pain, and sometimes death 
itself. But in these cases there is always a previous cal- 
culation made in the mind, the result of which is, that 
though the course determined upon is productive of im- 
mediate pain, yet that ultimately there will be more 
happiness or less misery than in any other course of ac- 
tion which can be pursued. At this conclusion the mind 
must always arrive before the will can dictate the action. 
The reasoning by which we arrive at this conclusion, how- 
ever, may be, and very frequently is fallacious and sophis- 
tical, founded on false principles, taken up hastily and in- 
considerately. In such determinations, also, immediate 
pleasure operates much more powerfully than that which 
is remote, even though the latter should be equally cer- 
tain and much more considerable. The reason of which 
is, that there is a repugnancy of the mind to the desire, 
i. e. uneasiness with which the intervening time must be 
occupied. So completely is the will decided by the pre- 
sent view which the mind has of the pleasure or pain aris- 
ing from this or that action, that were these feelings not 
annexed to our actions and thoughts, our lives would be 
" a lazy, lethargic dream;" we should have no incite- 



39 



ment to prefer one action to another, motion to rest, wak- 
ing* to sleeping, active thought to passive reverie, and wc 
should dream away an useless, unproductive existence, 
more resembling the growth of a vegetable than the state 
of an intellectual being. 

7. The second use of pain is the preservation of our 
organs of sense, not only from destruction, but even from 
the slightest injury. It is a principle of the medical sci- 
ence, that bodily pain is a necessary indication of some bo- 
dily disorder. An animal, with all its organs in their na- 
tural and healthful state, regularly fulfilling their various 
functions, cannot be sensible of bodily pain. Should any 
derangement take place pain is produced, which warns 
us of the danger, and prompts us to guard against it. 
Bodily pain and bodily injury being found generally con- 
comitant, we are justified therefore in the assumption, that 
one of the uses of pain is to give us notice of existing 
danger. Light and heat are instances of this. So long 
as these qualities are attended with no injurious effect, so 
long no pain is produced ; but the moment the injury 
commences, pain commences with it. Those extremes, 
on the other hand, which are innocent, produce no pain* 
Darkness is an example of this. 

8. Existence and unity are two ideas necessarily sug- 
gested by every idea both of sensation and reflection. 
An idea itself is an existence, and is one. 

9. Power is two-fold, active and passive. Active 
power is the capability of producing, passive of receiving 
a change. It will hereafter appear, that active power is 
an idea purely of reflection. The changes which exter- 
nal objects continually undergo, as well as the effects con- 
stantly produced upon our own minds, are the sources of 
our idea of passive power. The power we possess of 
thinking and motion is the only source of our idea of ac- 
tive power. We shall enlarge upon this subject when we 
come to consider these ideas separately. The idea of sue- 



40 



cession* although specified amongst the ideas entering 
by sensation and reflection, is an idea purely of reflec- 
tion. AVe have it from the contemplation of the train of 
ideas in the mind. Of this also we shall speak more fully 
when we come to speak of time. 

10. We have now, in a general way, enumerated the 
principal of the simple ideas which the mind perceives? 
and which constitute the elements of our knowledge. It 
will possibly appear wonderful that so narrow a basis 
should allow of such a stupendous superstructure as hu- 
man knowledge, and that such boundless variety as we 
find the fancy of man can produce from our stock of 
ideas, should proceed from such confined sources as the 
senses. Let it be however considered that the modifica- 
tions of one of our simplest ideas, extension, has occu- 
pied the learned of the world for more than three thou- 
sand years, and seems even still to furnish inexhaustible 
sources of speculation to the geometers of this and future 
ages. The endless variety of number shews what may be 
done by modifying an idea so simple as one ; and lan- 
guage, what may be produced from the combinations of 
twenty-four symbols. 

11. This lecture brings us to the conclusion of one 
stage of our progress. Our next object will be to enter 
upon a more minute inspection and careful examination 
of several of those simple ideas which have been already 
enumerated. Having first considered our simple ideas of 
sensation relatively to the things which produce them or 
their exciting causes, Locke applies himself to a particular 
consideration of the principal simple ideas of reflection, 
namely, perception, retention, discerning, comparing, 
compounding and abstracting. These will constitute the 
subject of the succeeding lectures, and will terminate the 
second stage of our course. 



LECTURE VI. 



Ideas of Sensation considered relatively to their exciting 

Causes. 

1. Notwithstanding our author's resolution against 
entering upon the physical consideration of the mind, 
and inquiring " whether our ideas do in their formation 
any or all of them depend on matter or no," (Lect. I. 
§ 2.) yet he subsequently found it necessary to change his 
determination. In order to discourse intelligibly of the 
ideas of sensation, it is necessary that the nature of sen- 
sation should be in some degree explained, and to distin- 
guish between the qualities of bodies and the ideas pro- 
duced by them. The student will observe that we as- 
sume not only the existence of certain beings in the mind, 
which Locke calls ideas, and which he considers as the 
immediate and only things about which we think, but we 
also assume the existence of a material world, external 
to, and heterogeneous with our mind and its ideas. We 
adopt as an hypothesis, that the beings of this external 
world, denominated bodies, produce certain effects upon 
our organs of sense, which are themselves bodies, and 
therefore homogeneous with them. 

2. These effects are supposed to be produced either 
by the body immediately acting upon the organ of 
sense, or acting upon it through the intervention of 
some other body, as light or air. The organs' thus af- 
fected are connected with the nerves, by which an im- 

G 



42 



pression is immediately produced upon the brain. Va- 
rious experiments have enabled us to trace the effects thus 
far, but here the physical part seems to end. When the 
brain thus receives an impression, the mind instantly be- 
comes conscious of the presence of an idea. How the 
ideas are produced by the impression on the brain, we 
cannot tell. But we presume the relation of cause and 
effect to subsist between the impression and the idea. 
There arc some circumstances which render it probable 
that the relation is reciprocal. The memory or imagina- 
tion summoning- an idea into the mind, we sometimes find 
that the brain, and thence the nerves, receive a correspond- 
ing impression. The effect of the imagination is well 
known to physicians, and every one must have observed 
the ravages which grief will sometimes make upon the 
body ; this can only proceed from the impression made 
upon the brain and nerves by the ideas which are recalled 
by the memory. 

If the existence of an external material world be grant- 
ed, the connexion between the bodies of it as causes, and 
the ideas of the mind as effects, must also be granted. 
There is however this defect in it as an hypothesis, that 
it will not account for all our ideas, we must invent ano- 
ther hypothesis to account for some of them, e. g. ideas 
of reflection, memory, imagination, &c. 

3. We shall now briefly state the manner in which the 
ideas of each of the senses are supposed to be produced in 
the mind by the agency of external objects. We must 
here be excused for stepping a little out of the way, and 
trespassing on the boundaries of natural philosophy. 
Without doing so it would be vain to attempt making the 
doctrine of Locke intelligible, and we shall digress no 
farther than is absolutely necessary for that purpose. 

I 0, Light is a fluid compounded of seven simpler ele- 
ments. These elements differ from each other, and from 
the compound in several qualities, and particularly in co- 
lour. The particles of light are so extremely minute, 



43 



that their existence is manifested only by indirect means. 
They move in right lines with immense speed, and enter- 
ing the eye through the pupil, impinge upon the posterior 
surface of the inner part of the eyeball. The substance 
thus affected by them is a nerve, which, extending to the 
brain, continues to it the effect produced. When this 
takes place, the mind is immediately conscious of the 
presence of an idea, which idea we call light. The idea 
produced, and the substance by whose impact upon the 
organ this idea is produced, are here called by the same 
name, although they are not only different things, but 
so utterly heterogeneous, as not even to allow a compa- 
rison,, one being material, and the other mental. The 
eye, however, is not always the first body on which light 
impinges. It frequently impinges upon external objects, 
and being repelled or rejiccted from their surfaces, subse- 
quently impinges upon the eye. Of the several compo- 
nent parts of the light incident upon the surfaces of bo- 
dies, all are not generally reflected. Of these compo- 
nent parts, some are absorbed and some reflected. Those 
which are reflected impinging upon the eye, pi'oduce an 
idea. This idea is that of a colour, and that colour de- 
pends upon the parts of the light reflected by the ob- 
ject. When therefore a certain object is said to be of 
a certain colour, all that should be meant is, that it is 
capable only of reflecting those parts of light which, 
when they impinge upon the eye, produce an idea in 
the mind called by the name of that colour. Here, as 
before, there is some confusion in the use of the name. 
It is applied as well to the idea in the mind, as to that 
part of light which produces the idea. But there is 
even still further confusion, for it is also applied to the 
body which reflects the light. As an example of this, 
the solar light is itself said to be tvhite ; when it im- 
pinges upon the eye, and produces an idea of a cer- 
tain colour in the mind, that idea is called tvhite; 



■11 



when it impinges upon the paper on which I write, 
and thereby alter reflection renders that paper visible? 
the paper is said to be white. Here the word white is 
made indifferently to stand for three things, differing 
altogether from one another. The quality in the light by 
which it produces the idea called white in the mind, 
and the idea so produced, are things of totally different 
kinds ; and as to the paper, it has no more right to be 
called white, because the light reflected by it is called 
white, than a flat wall would have to be called round, be- 
cause the tennis balls reflected by it are round. Such, 
however, is the imperfection of language, which imper- 
fection has arisen from our ignorance as to the real na- 
ture of sensation. 

Respecting the objects of sight, scil. colours, the student 
should therefore endeavour distinctly to bear in mind, 

l 0. That their names properly stand for certain ideas 
produced in the mind by light reflected from external ob- 
jects affecting the eyes. 

2°' That the capability of producing this effect upon 
the mind resides in the light and not in the object from 
which it is reflected, and that the name of the colour is 
sometimes used to express this power of the light. 

3°' That the power or quality of reflecting any particu- 
lar part of the light, and absorbing the remainder which 
exists in the body, is also sometimes called by the name 
of the colour. 

4 0, That the ideas, the power in the light to produce 
them, and the power in bodies to reflect that light, are 
called in general by the name quality. 

2°* Sound is an idea produced by the vibrations of the 
air affecting the ear, which organ being connected with 
certain nerves which continue the effect to the brain, the 
idea called sound is produced in the mind. The vibra- 
tions in the air are usually produced by the impact 
of some body upon the air. Here also the name is ap- 



45 



plied to the body, which produces the effect upon the air, 
and the observations already made are {mutatis mutandis) 
equally applicable. 

3°* The senses of smell and taste are differently circum- 
stanced with respect to their exciting causes from those 
of hearing* and seeing. The former are immediately af- 
fected by the object themselves, but the latter are affected 
by the objects through the mediums of air and light. 
Bodies affect the sense of smelling by continually project- 
ing from their surfaces indefinitely small particles called 
effluvia , which affect our organs and produce the ideas 
in the mind. Bodies affect the taste by the minute com- 
ponent parts coming into contact with those parts of the 
palate fitted to receive impressions from them, and thence, 
as before, producing the corresponding ideas. - 

4. The sense of touch differs from the other senses in 
this, that it is capable of being affected by the grosser 
parts of bodies. This sense is also however capable of 
being affected by the minute particles, as in the case of 
heat. 

Thus the senses in general are capable of being affected 
by particles of matter of inconceivable and intangible mi- 
nuteness; it being the privilege of the sense of touch 
alone to be impressed by parts of gross and palpable bulk 
or volume. The ideas which are produced by the opera- 
tion of minute particles, Locke denominates secondary 
qualities. He also however gives this name to the powers 
by which bodies produce these ideas. To the ideas 
which are produced by the grosser parts of body, as well 
as to the powers which produce these ideas, he gives the 
name primary qualities. 

The doctrine of Locke is, that the idea produced in the 
sentient being and the power of producing it in the in- 
sentient, have no resemblance whatever in secondary qua- 
lities, but that they are exact copies in primary qualities. 

5. I shall now endeavour, as far as I can understand 



JO 



our author, to explain the arguments which he adduces 
in support of these two principles. 

One might suppose that it would not require much ar- 
gument to establish the fact, that an impact and a colour, 
or that a taste and friction are different things. How- 
ever, it must be considered that Locke, the founder of a 
new doctrine, had to encounter ancient prejudices and 
preconceived and misconceived notions, and was obliged 
to select his arguments and proofs accordingly. We will 
here subjoin, in a summary way, his arguments that se- 
condary qualities are not resemblances. 

1°* Because it is no more absurd that there should be 
no resemblance between the ideas produced in our minds 
by external objects, and the qualities which produce them, 
than that there should be no resemblance between pain 
produced in us, and the thing which produces it. 

2°" Because if we acknowledge the relation of cause 
and effect, a sufficient proof of resemblance in cases where 
the senses are concerned, we shall arrive at manifest con- 
tradictions, e. g. the same water which will produce heat 
in one hand, may produce cold in the other. This will 
happen whenever the one hand, having been previously 
immersed in water at a very high, and the other at a very 
low degree of temperature, both are plunged in water of 
an intermediate temperature. If then the heat be in the 
water because we feel it, the same water is hot and not 
hot at the same time, &c. 

3 0, An alteration in the texture and arrangement of 
the minute parts, will produce a corresponding change on 
the secondary qualities, which shews that these latter de- 
pend on the former. E. g. An almond pounded changes 
its colour. 

4°. The colour of bodies change with the light in which 
they are seen, and yet it cannot be said that the same 
body has at the same time two different colours. 

5. These are Locke's arguments against " secondary 



47 



qualities'' being resemblances. They must be looked 
upon rather as the popular arguments in support of that 
principle : we shall take a more philosophical view of it 
presently. 

Our author maintains that primary qualities are re- 
semblances, with quite as much earnestness as he does 
that secondary qualities are not so. I have very carefully 
endeavoured to divest my mind of the influence of precon- 
ceived opinions, in order to select and state with their 
due force Locke's arguments, that primary qualities are 
resemblances. So little success, however, has attended 
my attempts that I have been unable to find a single pas- 
sage in the entire chapter (Ch. VIII. B. 2.) which I can 
induce myself to believe that Locke seriously considered 
as an argument. I subjoin all the passages which relate 
to this principle. 

" Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such 
as are utterly inseparable from the body, in whatsoever 
state it be ; such as in all the alterations and changes it 
suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly 
keeps ; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle 
of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and 
the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, 
though less than to make itself singly to be perceived by 
our senses ***** *. For division can never take 
away either solidity, extension, figure or mobility, from 
any body * * * * Book 2. Ch. VIII. § 9. 

The particular bulk, number, figure and motion of the 
parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether any one's 
senses perceive them or no ; and therefore may be called 
real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies ; 
but * * * * § 17. 

A piece of manna, of sensible bulk, is able to produce 
in us the idea of a round or square figure, and by being 
removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. 
This idea of motion represents it as it really is in the 



IS 



manna moving' ; a circle or a square are the same, whe- 
ther in idea or in existence, in the mind or in the manna 
and thus both motion and figure are really in the manna, 
whether we perceive them or no : This every body is ready 
to agree to" § 18. 

The preceding extracts will, I believe, be found to con- 
tain all that Locke offers to prove that (i primary quali- 
ties are resemblances." 

If these be arguments, then it will be no very difficult 
matter to refute all the doctrines of Locke. It is only to 
make so many assertions contradictory to them, and to 
maintain each assertion by repeating it, under several 
different forms, and sometimes under the same form, with 
several degrees of force of asseveration, and sometimes 
with the same force, and the thing is done, the refutation 
is complete. 

6. Locke seems emphatically to distinguish primary 
qualities by their being in the things themselves, whether 
we perceive them or no. Let us consider what this of 
" being in the things themselves, whether we perceive 
them or no," means. 

Locke* defines an idea to be " whatsoever the mind 
perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of percep- 
tion, thought, or understanding. 

He then defines the word quality thus : 

" The power to produce any idea in our mind, I call 
quality of the subject wherein that power is." Ch. VIII. 
§8. ' 

If this be taken as the sense of the word quality, w r e 
shall find that it is by no means peculiar to primary qua- 
lities, " to be in the things themselves, whether we per- 
ceive them or no." The power of producing an idea is 
not destroyed because it is not exerted. The secondary 
qualities, considered as powers, are just as real, and just 
as really resident in the subject as primary qualities, and 
are quite as independent of the subject on which they act. 
When Locke asserts that the primary qualities are " in 



49 



the things themselves, &c." he cannot therefore be sup- 
posed to mean that the secondary qualities are not also 
" in the things themselves, whether we perceive them or 
no." Nor can his meaning be more clearly ascertained 
from other parts. His first distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities is this : 

" To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and 
to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to 
distinguish them, as they are ideas or perceptions in our 
minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the 
bodies that cause such perceptions in us." Ch. VIII. § 7, 

Locke here divides ideas into two classes. The first he 
states to be ideas or perceptions in our minds. The se- 
cond class are ideas which are not ideas, but are the 
modifications of matter which produce ideas. It would 
appear from this that he considered the first class to be 
mental ideas, which terminate in themselves ; the other 
physical ideas, which terminate in the production of 
mental ideas. All this, however, is mere jargon. 

7. The difficulties and obscurity into which Locke has 
fallen, have arisen from his not perceiving that the argu- 
ments which must have convinced him of the absurdity of 
supposing a resemblance in secondary qualities, equally 
extend to primary qualities. The circumstance of being 
produced by the operation of indefinitely small particles 
on the senses, may be admitted as a good reason for dis- 
tinguishing these qualities into two classes; and pro- 
vided the meaning be previously explained, there is no 
material objection to the use of the terms " primary" 
and f* secondary," as a mark of the distinction. But 
unless the want of resemblance is deduced from the 
distinguishing marks, why should it be supposed to apply 
to the one species and not to the other? The philoso- 
phical proofs of no resemblance are equally applicable 
to all ideas. 

H 



U) 



An idea can have no resemblance to any thing but to 
another idea. An idea is an existence in the mind, and 
it is perfectly impossible when due consideration is given 
to it, even to conceive a resemblance between an idea in 
a sentient intelligent being, and another existence in an 
insentient mass of matter. Can an idea exist in matter? 
Can any thing not an idea resemble an idea? Can there 
be any thing like thought in an unthinking being? such 
a supposition, if properly expressed, would become a 
verbal contradiction. 

8. The existence of an external material world, known 
only by its effects upon the mind, is by some philosophers 
considered as a very unnecessary hypothesis, and pro- 
ductive of the most mischievous consequences in leading 
men to scepticism. They maintain that an external 
world, of which we can have no idea, can be of no use. 

For it is on all hands admitted : 

1°* That the external material world answers no other 
purpose than that of exciting ideas. 

2 0, That the ideas excited cannot bear any resemblance 
whatever to any thing in that external world. 

It is considered, therefore, that nature would never 
create two worlds, one of which is of no other use than to 
produce the other, the external material world to produce 
the internal immaterial world, especially when it is also 
acknowledged that the latter can exist independently of 
the former. This is considered contrary to that principle 
of philosophy which forbids us to assigu to several causes 
that which may be assigned to one and the same. These 
were the doctrines of Berkeley, and with some modifica- 
tion were adopted by Hume. 

Other philosophers, on the contrary, altogether deny 
the existence of ideas, and maintain that we think of, and 
conceive the things themselves and their qualities imme- 
diately, without the intervention of ideas. 

Such, and so various are the opinions on these subjects 



51 



held even at this clay. They are mentioned here, in or- 
der that the student may not suppose that the principles 
of Locke are the only ones at present received. 

9. We shall not insist further upon this very obscure 
part of the Essay, than to state in a summary manner 
such parts of the doctrines promulged in it as have 
not been already discussed. He conceives that positive 
ideas may arise from privative causes, because " all sensa- 
tion being" produced in us only by different degrees and 
modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated 
by external objects, the abatement of any former motion 
must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the va- 
riation or increase of it." Here it is supposed that " a 
new sensation" is a " positive idea," and also that " the 
variation or increase of a motion in our animal spirits," 
must necessarily produce a positive idea. 

10. The outline of the doctrine of qualities, as it would 
appear that Locke intended to lay it down, is, that the 
powers of bodies to affect the senses are three-fold. The 
primary qualities produce in the mind pictures of them- 
selves, the mental idea being an exact picture of the cor- 
poreal power which produces it. The other qualities he 
holds to bear no resemblance to the ideas they produce. 
A third sort of qualities are those by which bodies produce 
a change in the sensible qualities of other bodies, and 
through them acting upon the senses. These last he calls 
powers, and between these and the things which produce 
them, no resemblance is ever supposed. Locke accounts 
for our never supposing a resemblance between the powers 
of external bodies upon each other and the effects pro- 
duced by these powers; and yet that we do suppose a re- 
semblance when the same bodies affect our senses instead 
of affecting each other, thus : When bodies affect each 
other the cause and effect are both external and both ma- 
terial, and therefore admit of a comparison by which their 
dissimilitude may be ascertained ; but when the effect 



produced is an idea, and llie cause producing it an exter- 
nal body, the cause and effect are so totally dissimilar, of 
natures so entirely discrepant, that they do not even ad- 
mit of a comparison, or of being brought, as it were, into 
jnxta-position ; being therefore unable to asertain their 
imlike»ess, we presume a likeness, merely because the re* 
lation of cause and effect exists between them. He de- 
nominates powers secondary qualities mediately perceiva- 
ble, the others being secondary qualities immediately per- 
ceivable. 



LECTURE VIL 



Perception, 



1. The method we have laid down now leads us to con- 
sider some of the simple ideas of reflection. The ideas 
of reflection being ideas of the operations of our minds, 
the first and simplest of these is perception. Perception 
being the name of a simple idea, is considered by Locke 
to be incapable of definition. (Lect. III. § 5.) " Whoe- 
ver reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss 
it : and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world 
cannot make him have any notion of it." It may, howe- 
ver, be easily collected from what our author says him- 
self, that he means by this term " the actual production 
of an idea in the mind." Under this definition memory 
would be included, and so memory would be perception. 
The mind may be as properly said to perceive an idea 
when recalled by memory, as when originally had from 
sensation or reflection, and thus memory may be esteemed 
secondary perception. 

Locke uses the term perception in different senses. He 
sometimes expresses by it " the production of an idea," 
sometimes, the idea produced ; thus he speaks of an idea 
and a perception synonymously. In another place he de- 
fines the understanding to be " the power of perception," 
and perception to be " the act of the understanding," and 
makes it threefold. 



.H 



I 0, The perception of ideas in the mind. 

2°* The perception of the signification of signs. 

3°* The perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas.— B. 2. Ch. XXI. §5. 

2. In the present case we must be understood to con- 
fine the sense of the term perception, to the production of 
an idea. Locke states, that perception is distinguished 
in the propriety of the English language from et thinking," 
in this, that thinking is only applicable to those faculties 
in which the mind is active, whereas in perception the 
mind is for the most part passive. Notwithstanding this 
distinction, our author himself adopts the improper use 
of the term frequently throughout the Essay. 

The passiveness of the mind in perception only applies 
to ideas of sensation. In the perception of the ideas of 
reflection the mind is certainly active, and cannot be other- 
wise. The reason why it is passive in the perception of 
ideas of sensation is, that this depends on the operation 
of external bodies upon the organs, the operation of the 
nerves of these organs upon the brain, and finally, the 
operation of the brain upon the mind. In this case the 
mind suffers the impression, and cannot increase it nor 
diminish it; and is therefore, in this respect, a passive re- 
cipient. But in the perception of ideas of reflection the 
body and its organs have no part whatever ; the process 
is exclusively mental. The mind, by the dictate of the 
will, turns its attention to one of its own operations, and 
from viewing it, acquires an idea of it. Here there are 
two actions, an act of the will and an act of the under- 
standing. In the perception of ideas of sensation, there- 
fore, the mind is passive, and in the perception of ideas 
of reflection, active. 

3. Locke implicitly enumerates three requisites for the 
perception of ideas of sensation ; two of ihem bodily, and 
one mental : 



1. Perfect organs. 

2. Sufficient impression upon the organ. 

.3. That the mind should be disengaged from 
other objects. 
On the perfection of an organ it would not be easy, or 
perhaps possible to pronounce. The ears or eyes of no 
two human beings were ever formed with the same de- 
gree of sensibility, and even those of the same indivi- 
dual change their sensibility from time to time. Some 
standard should therefore be selected as the standard of 
perfection. Without this, however, in a general and po- 
pular sense, an organ is said to be perfect when it has no 
obvious defect or inferiority to those of men in general. 
Eyes, which can see at the distance, and with the degree 
of light which is sufficient to produce vision in general, 
are deemed perfect, without fixing any standard more 
scientifically exact. 

4. The impression necessary to be made upon the or- 
gan in order to produce perception, depends on its sensi- 
bility. An impression sufficient to produce perception in 
one organ may be quite insufficient to produce it in ano- 
ther. The quality of the impression made is also some- 
times concerned. Some persons are able to read by moon- 
light, who could not see, distinctly, a face at three yards 
distant in broad day. On the other hand, there are per- 
sons who can see distinctly at considerable distance in 
the day, who could not distinguish a letter upon the page 
by moonlight. Deaf persons frequently find it easier to 
hear a distinct speaker than a loud one. The impression, 
therefore, both in its quantity and quality, must be suited 
to the state and construction of the organ which is designed 
to receive it. 

5. Even though an impression suitable to the organ be 
made, and therefore the corresponding effect produced 
upon the sensorium, there may yet be no perception. 
This may happen when the attention of the mind is oc- 



cupied in the contemplation of some other object. Every 
one must have experienced when occupied in intense 
thought, that he has not been sensible of persons addres- 
sing him. Various instances of this abstraction of mind 
continually recur. In order therefore that perception 
should follow an impression which is usually sufficient to 
produce it, it is necessary that the mind should be dis- 
engaged from the attentive contemplation of other objects. 

The precedency of our ideas in entering the mind, is 
not very easily determined, and not very useful, even if it 
were determined. Hunger and warmth, Locke conjec- 
tures to be the first. After being born, pain and light 
are probably the first. These ideas, which enter first, 
whatever they may «be, differ from other ideas of sensa- 
tion only in precedency of time. They are wholly dif- 
ferent from innate ideas. (Lect. II.) 

6. The perception of ideas of sight is produced, as we 
have stated, by the impression of light upon the eye. 
Colours are therefore the proper and only objects of vi- 
sion. The eye, however, as has been formerly observed, 
takes cognizance of the ideas of space, figure, and motion. 
We now propose to examine how it happens that these 
ideas are common to the sight and touch, and in what 
sense only they can be properly said to be common to 
these two senses. In order perfectly to explain this matter, 
we must, as in a former instance, step a little out of the way. 

Any object is seen in that direction in which the light 
reflected from it enters the eye. Let P be a visible point, 
and E the eye of the spectator, the direction in which the 
point P is seen and judged to be, is that of the line EP. 

In like manner p being another visible point, it is es- 
teemed to be in the direction Ep. Now if these points 
respectively move along the lines of their direction, the 
eye at E will be sensible of no change whatever in their 
mutual position. If P move to P', and p to p', no vi- 
sible change takes place as their mutual position. It is 
true that one will grow visibly larger and the other visi- 



57 



ble smaller, but this might take place had they remained 
at P and p, and changed their actual magnitudes. 




Hence it appears that the eye is neither sensible of 
actual motion, nor actual position. 

7. Let us suppose the point P to move from P to Q. 
The eye becomes immediately sensible that it has changed 
its direction by the angle PEQ. This change the judg- 
ment suggests may have been produced by some motion 
by which the point has passed across the intermediate 
space, but the effect would be equally produced by any 
motion across that space as PQ ; ; it is not even necessary 
that its motion between the two lines should be rectilinear. 
Finally, the effect may be produced, even when the point 
P is quiescent, if a corresponding motion in the opposite 
direction be given to the spectator. The conclusion from 
all this is, that the eye perceives neither distance nor mo- 
tion. It only perceives the direction of objects, and that 
by the light reflected from them. We receive from this 
sense no idea of space but that of the inclination of the 
directions of different objects ; and I leave it to the me- 
taphysician to determine whether we would receive even 
this idea, had we not previously the idea of linear space, 
and the other modes of extension by the touch. 

8. If the eye judge not of distance, it cannot judge of 
figure. The figure of a visible object must be deter- 
mined by the different distances of the points of its sur- 
face from the eye : these distances the eye cannot esti- 
mate, and therefore cannot judge of the figure. When 

i 



)H 



Locke stales that a globe of an uniform colour presents 
to the mind, when viewed with the eye, the idea of a flat 
plane, variously shadowed, he means that it presents the 
same idea to the mind, as a flat plane variously shadowed 
would present ichai viewed with the eije. The truth is, 
neither the globe nor the plane, nor any thing else af- 
fecting the sight only, could produce the idea of aflat 
plane. This is an idea to be had from the touch, and 
from the touch only. The light and colour reflected from 
a flat plane, and received by the eye, could no more of 
themselves produce in the mind the idea of a flat plane, 
than the light and colours reflected from the leaves of 
sweet-briar could produce an idea of the scent of that 
shrub. 

9. To prove that the ideas produced by the same object 
through the senses of sight and touch are not the same, 
and indeed bear no resemblance whatever to each other, 
Locke produces the Problem of the celebrated Molyneux. 

" Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught 
by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere 
of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as. 
to tell when he felt the one and the other, which is the 
cube, and which the sphere. Suppose then, the cube and 
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to 
see : quere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, 
he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe and 
which the cube ? To which the acute and judicious pro- 
poser answers : not. For though he has obtained the ex- 
perience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch ; 
yet he has not yet obtained the experience that what af- 
fects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so ; or 
that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his 
hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the 
cube."— Book 2. Ch. IX. § 8. 

To this solution of the problem it has been objected 
that the cube gave to the touch an idea of a figure, 



59 



bounded in certain parts by right lines, and the globe 
gave the idea of curvature; that although the ideas pro- 
duced, when viewed with the eye, be not the same ex- 
actly as those of the touch, yet that the cube both to 
sight and touch gives the ideas of right lines, and the 
globe of curvature. This objection, though at first view 
it appears of some weight, yet upon a closer examination 
is quite futile. It is founded on, and derives its force 
entirely from the supposition that the ideas of aright line 
and curve produced by the touch, are the same as these 
ideas produced by the sight; that is, that if a right line 
and circle be described upon paper, and viewed with the 
eye, and also the same lines formed of any tangible sub- 
stance and felt with the hand, the mind will receive in 
both cases the same, or at least similar ideas. This, 
however plausible, is quite unfounded, the ideas received. 
in these two ways are so perfectly distinct and dissimilar 
as not to bear a moment's comparison. The idea of figure 
and magnitude which we receive from sight has been 
called visible figure and magnitude. Those which we re- 
ceive from the touch, tangible figure and magnitude. 
These ideas have no kind of resemblance. Having how- 
ever been always accustomed to receive both ideas from 
the same subject, we bring ourselves by use to consider 
either indifferently as a sign of the presence of the same 
object. No sooner is the visible figure and magnitude 
perceived, than an act of the judgment substitutes in its 
place the idea of the tangible figure and magnitude. 
This is done under a supposition which seems to have 
prevailed with mankind, that the touch is a sense more 
to be relied upon in giving ideas of real existence than 
the sight. 

10. Visible and tangible figures arc ideas so totally dif- 
ferent that Bishop Berkeley concluded that they could not 
belong to the same object, and uses this as one of the ar- 
guments to establish his hypothesis of the nonexistence 



00 



of a material world. If external objects exist, and that 
figure and magnitude be attributes of them, this figure 
and magnitude is cither l 0, visible, 2 0, tangible, or 3°* 
both. The last is manifestly absurd, for no one will 
seriously believe, that the same object has, at the same 
time, two figures and two magnitudes entirely different 
from each other. If the external object exist then at 
all, it can have but one figure and one magnitude, and 
whichever of the two this is alleged to be, the other must 
be purely a mental fiction, having no real existence 
whatever. But if we acknowledge the ideas of one sense 
to be mere fictions, and not to belong to any external 
thing, we must also acknowledge those of all the senses 
to be so. 

Reid maintains that visible and tangible figure and ex- 
tension are both real, but that the former is a partial and 
incomplete conception, whereas the latter is a perfect con- 
ception of the qualities which really exist in the object. 

11. It may be objected against Locke's theory, that 
the act of the mind whereby the idea of tangible figure 
is substituted for that of visible figure, the aj3pearance 
for the cause, the sign for the thing signified, is not 
noticed, that we are not conscious of any such act. He 
anticipates this objection, and gives two reasons for our 
unconsciousness. 

1°* The rapidity with which the acts of the mind are 
performed makes many of them often pass unnoticed. 
Thus the mind glances through all the steps of a demon- 
stration frequently in less time than would be consumed 
in stating verbally a single step. He thinks it not won- 
derful that actions performed with such rapidity should 
not arrest the attention, and impress us with a conscious- 
ness of them. 

2°* The process objected to, is one to which we must 
necessarily have been accustomed from our earliest in- 



(it 



fancy ; it is probably the first exertion of judgment which 
is demanded from the mind of a child; and it is one 
which must be practised every moment of our lives, except 
during sleep. When we consider that habit, in matters 
of much less frequency and much shorter duration, 
makes us unconscious of what passes in our mind, we 
cannot wonder at its effects in this case. Locke instances 
the use of by- words, and the fact of our being in dark- 
ness every time we wink our eyes without being conscious 
of either, as examples of this. It may however be 
questioned whether the latter example will hold; for it 
is known that the sensation continues for some time after 
the remotion of the sensible object, and if the eye be 
opened again before the sensation ceases, we have not 
been in darkness. Though this example may have been 
unhappily chosen, yet the principle he wishes to esta- 
blish is certain. He gives a more just and striking ex- 
ample in language, where the idea is instantly substituted 
for the word without any consciousness. 

12. The reason given by Locke why we change the 
ideas of sight into those of touch, and do not change the 
ideas of any other two senses one into another, is as 
follows : 

" Because sight, the most comprehensive of our 
senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and 
colours, which are peculiar only to that sense ; and also 
the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the 
several varieties whereof change the appearances of its 
proper object, viz. light and colours ; we bring ourselves 
by use to judge of the one by the other." B. 2. Ch. IX. 
§9. ^ 

This, I believe, will be found, when examined, to 
amount to nothing more than an assertion, that we do 
change the ideas of visible space, figure, and motion, 
produced by light upon the eye into " the far differ- 
ent" ideas of tangible space, figure, and motion, pro- 



b! 



duced through the sense of touch. It is difficult to con- 
ceive how Locke could mistake a simple statement of a 
fact for a reason for that fact. The ideas of sight are 
changed into those of touch ; and his ohject is to show 
why the ideas of no other sense are changed into those of 
touch, or into those of any other sense, and he does this 
by a very circuitous statement of the fact itself. If this fact 
could be admitted as proof in the case at ail, it would 
prove the opposite ; for by analogy, if what he states be the 
case with sight it is likely to be so also with the other 
senses. 

Locke considers perception in its lowest degree to be 
the distinction between animals and the inferior orders of 
the creation. 



LECTURE VIII. 



Memory. 

1. Contemplation is that act or power of the mind 
whereby it holds its ideas continually in view. This 
power in the human mind is very limited. It is limited 
both as to the number of ideas and the time it can con- 
template them. According to Locke, the mind cannot 
have a distinct view at the same time of more than a sin- 
gle idea, nor can it keep the same idea in view for any con- 
siderable length of time. The ideas in the mind of man 
exist in succession, nor can that succession be stopped 
in order to dwell upon any particular idea. B. 2. Ch. 
XIV. § 13. 

There are two ways whereby an idea may be produced 
in the mind, perception and memory. Properly speak- 
ing, these are both perception, but this term is usually 
confined to the production of an idea of sensation by the 
eifect of an external object or of reflection by noticing* 
the operations of our minds. The mind possesses a power 
of reproducing any idea which it has formerly had from 
sensation or reflection, merely by an act of the will, and 
without the presence of the object or the existence of the 
operation from which such idea was originally derived. 
Many attempts have been made by philosophers to ac- 
count for this power, but it is probable that the modus 



64 



operandi must lie hidden from us until our faculties are 
so improved as to be able to discover the nature and 
construction of the human mind. Some have supposed 
that when the sensible object is removed, and therefore 
the impression upon the organ of sense, and on the 
nerves with which it is connected, has ceased, the im- 
pression upon the brain continues. This however will 
be found, even if admitted, quite inadequate to account 
for memory. It might indeed be taken as a reason for 
contemplation, but not for memory. 

2. We shall here transcribe the observations of Reid, 
upon Locke's account of the memory. 

Mr. Locke, and those who have followed him, speak 
with more reserve than the ancients, and only incident- 
ally, of impressions on the brain as the cause of memory, 
and impute it rather to our retaining in our minds the 
ideas, got either by sensation or reflection. 

This, Mr. Locke says, may be done two ways : " First, 
" By keeping the idea for some time actually in view, 
" which is called contemplation. Secondly, By the power 
" to revive again in our minds those ideas, which, after 
" imprinting, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, 
" laid out of sight ; and this is memory, which is, as it 
" were, the storehouse of our ideas." 

To explain this more distinctly, he immediately adds 
the following observation : " But our ideas being nothing 
" but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be 
" any thing, when there is no perception of them, this 
" laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, 
" signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power, 
u in many cases, to revive perceptions which it once had, 
" with this additional perception annexed to them, that 
" it has had them before ; and in this sense it is, that 
" our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed 
< f they are actually no where ; but only there is an ability 
" in the mind, when it will, to revive them again? and, 



65 



" as it were, paint them anew upon itself, though some 
" with more, some with less, difficulty, some more lively, 
" and others more obscurely." 

In this account of memory, the repeated use of the 
phrase, as it were, leads one to judge that it is partly figu- 
rative: we must therefore endeavour to distinguish the 
figurative part from the philosophical. The first being 
addressed to the imagination, exhibits a picture of me- 
mory, which, to have its effect, must be viewed at a pro- 
per distance, and from a particular point of view. The 
second being addressed to the understanding, ought to 
bear a near inspection, and a critical examination. 

The analogy between memory and a repository, and 
between remembering and retaining, is obvious, and is 
to be found in all languages, it being very natural to ex- 
press the operations of the mind by images taken from 
things material. But in philosophy we ought to draw 
aside the veil of imagery, and to view them naked. 

When therefore memory is said to be a repository or, 
store-house of ideas, where they are laid up when not 
perceived, and again brought forth as there -is occasion, 
I take this to be popular and rhetorical. For the author 
tells us, that when they are not perceived, they are 
nothing, and no where, and therefore can neither be laid 
up in a repository, nor drawn out of it. 

But we are told, " That this laying up of our ideas in 
" the repository of the memory signifies no more than 
" this, that the mind has a power to revive perceptions, 
" which it once had, with this additional perception 
" annexed to them, that it has had them before." This, 
I think, must be understood literally and philosophi- 
cally. 

But it seems to me as difficult to revive things that 
have ceased to be any thing, as to lay them up in a re- 
pository, or to bring them out of it. When a thing is 
once annihilated, the same thing cannot be again pro : 

K 



GC 



duccd, though another thing similar to it may. Mr. 
Locke, in another place, acknowledges, that the same 
thing cannot have two beginnings of existence ; and that 
things that have different beginnings are not the same, 
but diverse. From this it follows, that an ability to re- 
vive our ideas or perceptions, after they have ceased to 
be, can signify no more but an ability to create new ideas 
or perceptions similar to those we had before. 

They are said " to be revived, with this additional 
rt perception, that we have had them before." This, 
surely, would be a fallacious perception, since they could 
not have two beginnings of existence ; nor could we be- 
lieve them to have two beginnings of existence. We can 
only believe, that we had formerly ideas or perceptions 
very like to them, though not identically the same. 
But whether we perceive them to be the same, or only 
like to those we had before, this perception, one would 
think, supposes a remembrance of those we had before, 
otherwise the similitude or identity could not be per- 
ceived. 

Another phrase is used to explain this reviving of our 
perceptions. " The mind, as it were, paints them anew 
" upon itself." There may be something figurative in 
this ; but making due allowance for that, it must imply, 
that the mind, which paints the things that have ceased 
to exist, must have the memory of what they were, since 
every painter must have a copy either before his eye, or 
in his imagination and memory. 

These remarks upon Mr. Locke's account of memory 
are intended to shew, that his system of ideas gives no 
light to this faculty, but rather tends to darken it ; as 
little does it make us understand how we remember, and 
by that means have the certain knowledge of things past. 

Every man knows what memory is, and has a distinct 
notion of it : But when Mr. Locke speaks of a power to 
revive in the mind those ideas, which, after imprinting, 



07 



have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid out of 
sight, one would hardly know this to be memory, if he 
had not told us. There are other things which it seems to 
resemble at least as much. I see before me the picture 
of a friend. I shut my eyes, or turn them another way; 
and the picture disappears, or is, as it were, laid out of 
sight. I have a power to turn my eyes again towards the 
picture, and immediately the perception is revived. But 
is this memory ? no surely ; yet it answers the definition 
as well as memory itself can do. Reid, Essay III. Ch. VII. 

3. It will be remembered that Reid's opinions are in 
direct opposition to Locke's doctrine of ideas. 

Berkely and Hume pushed the doctrine of ideas much 
farther than Locke, and finished what he left imperfect. 
The first rejected the existence of the material world as 
an unfounded and an unnecessary hypothesis, and the 
latter rejected the existence of every thing except ideas 
or impressions. Hume's account of memory is as follows : 
impressions originally made upon the mind, when they 
re-appear and retain none of their original vivacity, become 
ideas; but when they retain a considerable share of their 
primitive vividness, they may be considered as something 
between ideas and impressions. The faculty of producing 
the former effect is imagination, and the latter memory. ' 

4. Memory is a faculty which cannot always be com- 
manded. Different men have it in different degrees, and 
the same man on different occasions has it in different de- 
grees. Ideas are observed to be imprinted upon the me- 
mory, as it is figuratively expressed, with more or less 
force ; by which it is meant that they are recalled with 
greater or less facility. There are several circumstances 
connected with the first perception of ideas which give 
this facility. These circumstances are usually called the 
helps to memory. Locke enumerates four of them : 

1°' Attention to the original impression from sensa- 
tion. 



68 



•2°* Frequent repetition oJ the impression upon the or- 
gan of sense. 

3°* Pleasure, which may accompany the original im- 
pression as well as the reminiscent recurrence of it. 

4°* Pain, which may accompany them. 

In addition to these, the association of ideas and me- 
thod are sometimes enumerated, 

5. The causes of ideas or impressions fading from the 
memory, or without a metaphor, the causes of an ina- 
bility to revive ideas formerly impressed, are enumerated 
b} r Locke to be three : 

1°* Because perception has not been produced suffici- 
ently often, and perhaps but once. 

2°' Because no attention, or insufficient attention has 
been given to it, even supposing the impression re- 
peated. 

3°' Because of some physical defect in the construc- 
tion of those organs of the brain or sensorium on which 
memory depends. 

He might also have added that the idea, though it 
might have occurred with frequency, and may have been 
attended to, yet not producing pleasure or pain, being, 
in a word, indifferent, did not fix itself in the memory. 

6. As examples of ideas being lost from want of repe- 
tition, our author instances persons who became blind in 
early infancy, losing the ideas of light and colours. The 
ideas fade from their minds "like shadows flying over 
fields of corn.'' 

He by no means supposes our ideas and our minds to 
be coeval either a parte ante or a parte post. He sup- 
poses the mind in the first moment of its creation to be 
completely free of ideas, " like a sheet of white paper ;" 
and he thinks that our ideas, like the children of our 
youth, may die before us. Our minds, in surviving their 
ideas, he compares to the tombs to which we are hasten- 
ing, " where, though the brass and marble may remain, 



09 



yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery 
moulders away." 

7. That Locke conceives the memory to be a faculty 
which, in a great degree at least, depends upon a physical 
constitution, appears from what follows : 

" How much the constitution of our bodies, and the 
make of our animal spirits are concerned in this" (the , 
degree of our retention,) " and whether the temper of 
the brain makes this difference, that in some it retains 
the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like 
freestone, and in others little better than sand, I shall 
not here inquire." B. 2. Ch. X. § 5. 

8. The ideas which are least apt to be forgotten, he 
thinks are those which are oftenest repeated, and these he 
reduces to three classes : 

1°* The primary qualities of bodies. 

2 0, The secondary qualities which oftenest affect 

us, as heat and cold. 
3°* The affections of all beings, as existence, dura- 
tion and number. 
He might have stated as one class the ideas which en- 
ter by all the ways of sensation and by reflection. These 
must last as long as life itself. 

9. Memory differs from perception in two respects : 
1°* Perception (as far as regards sensation) requires an 

external object, a sound organ, and a sufficient impression 
upon that organ. Memory requires none of these. After 
the organs are gone, the memory of the ideas may remain. 

2 0# Perception (as far as regards sensation) is a passive 
faculty. Memory is sometimes passive, sometimes active. 

Aristotle points out distinctions between different modes 
of memory. 

The most perfect memory is where the idea offers itself 
without any spontaneous act of the mind, when there is 
occasion for it. The next degree is where the idea itself 
is forgotten, but some other idea with which it is asso- 



70 



ciated brings it into the mind without an effort. The 
third degree (specified by Locke,) in which the mind " sets 
itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns 
as it were the eye of the soul upon it," is distinguished by 
Aristotle as that degree of memory in which is included 
an act of the will, and which may be called recollection. 

10. Between mere memory and recollection, Aristotle 
makes a marked distinction. So much so, that though 
he allows to brutes the former faculty, he denies them the 
latter. That brutes have memory Locke acknowledges, 
and produces the fact of birds learning tunes as an in- 
stance of it. The only possible causes which could ac- 
count for this phenomenon are instinct, mechanism, or 
memory. 

1°* Locke denies it to be instinct, because this faculty 
is only given to supply the want of reason in matters 
which concern the preservation of the animal. As the 
learning a tune does not in any way tend to the bird's 
preservation, he denies it to be instinct. 

2°' He denies that it can be the mechanical effect of 
the traces produced by the sounds upon the brains of 
the bird, because the effect produced is not what such a 
mechanical cause would produce. Were the cause me- 
chanical, the sound of the bird's notes would immediate- 
ly follow the traces received by the brain, and gradually 
be lost when those traces would disappear. Whereas 
the case is exactly the reverse; the bird approximates 
gradually to the tune, instead of gradually losing it. 

1 1 . Locke enumerates two defects which exist in the 
memories of men, compared one with another : 

1°* Oblivion, or the irrecoverable loss of the ideas. 
This is productive of ignorance. 

*2 ' Slowness, or a difficulty of reviving the idea, which 
produces stupidity. 

Memory supposes ideas to exist in succession. There- 
fore this quality itself is a defect, and one which coidd not 



71 



be ascribed to a perfect intellectual being who must ne- 
cessarily be supposed to have all his ideas present toge- 
ther. It is a quality given to supply the want of perfect 
contemplation. 

12. The primitive idea of sensation differs from that of 
memory : 

1°* Because the presence of an object is required in the 
one, and not in the other. 

2 0# Because the same degree of pleasure and of pain 
does not accompany them. 

3 0# The idea of memory is generally more faint. 

4°* The additional idea of having had it before accom- 
panies the one, and not the other. 



i e> 



LECTURE IX 



Discerning, Comparing, Compounding, and 
Abstracting. 

1. The faculty by which the mind distinguishes be- 
tween two ideas, and perceives them to be different, and 
perceives in what their difference consists, is called dis- 
cerning. 

Locke considers, that from overlooking the faculty of 
discerning, many general propositions have been mistaken 
for innate truths. Under this class all general proposi- 
tions respecting identity and diversity come. Their truth 
was observed to be self-evident, and the perception of it 
really depends on the faculty of distinguishing between 
our ideas ; and as the ideas themselves are not innate im- 
pressions, so neither are those propositions into which 
they enter innate truths. 

2. The imperfections of the discerning faculty arise 
from three causes : 

1°* Defective organs. 

2 0, Want of acuteness or attention in the under- 
standing. 
3°* Hastiness and precipitancy natural to some 
tempers. 
The perfection of this quality is of the last importance 
to intellectual beings. Defects in it produce confusion in 



73 



our notions of things, and disturbance and uncertainty 
in our judgment and reasoning. 

Judgment and wit are qualities which Locke places in 
direct opposition. He defines them thus : 

Judgment consists in the nicely discriminating things 
between which there is the least difference. 

Wit lies in the assemblage of ideas with quickness and 
variety, between which there is the most remote simi- 
litude. 

The sense in which the word judgment is used here, 
must be carefully distinguished from another sense in 
which our author uses the same term in his fourth book, 
where he treats of probability. In the sense in which it 
is here used, it appears nearly synonymous with discern- 
ing. He probably intended that discerning should be the 
name of the power, and judgment the act. 

3. The definition of wit given above, is pronounced by 
Addison to be the best and most philosophical account 
of that quality he ever met with. He adds, which in- 
deed may be also collected from Locke, that every re- 
Semblance of ideas is not wit, unless it be such an one as 
gives delight and surprise to the hearer. In order that 
the assemblage of two ideas may be wit, it is necessary 
that they should not lie too near each other in the nature 
of things ; for where the likeness is obvious it gives no 
surprise. 

" When a poet tells us that the bosom of his mistress 
is as white as snow, there is no wit in the comparison; 
but when he adds, with a sigh, that it is as cold too, it 
then grows into wit." Addison thinks that although the 
Source of wit pointed out by Locke is by far the most 
fertile, yet that there is another, which arises not from 
the resemblance, but from the remarkable opposition of 
ideas. 

Lord Karnes differs from Locke in defining wit. As, 
however, the subject does not strictly come under our ar- 



7* 



rangement, we merely refer the student to his Elements 
of Criticism. 

Wit is generally acceptable, because its beauty appears 
at first sight, and requires no laborious examination. 
Locke thinks that there is something in it not perfectly 
conformable to " truth or good reason," as it is consi- 
dered an affront to subject it to these tests. 
. 4. The power of comparing ideas furnishes the mind 
with that class of ideas called relations, of which we 
shall treat at large hereafter. Locke thinks that brutes 
participate in this faculty only so far as regards " the 
sensible qualities attached to the objects themselves ;" in 
other words, he admits that they may compare particu- 
lar ideas, but denies them the power of comparing ab- 
stract ideas, and then forming abstract relations. His 
reason for thinking that they do not compare abstract 
ideas is, that they cannot have an abstract idea. His rea- 
son for this opinion we shall presently explain. 

5. That particular species of compounding, which con- 
sists in continual repetition of the same idea, is called 
enlarging. Our ideas of integral numbers are examples 
of this, being continual repetitions of unity or one. 
Locke thinks it probable that brutes have not the faculty 
of enlarging; for animals, which have a numerous brood 
of young, will not miss some of them if they be taken 
away. This being the simplest species of compounding, 
the fact of their wanting it might be taken as an a for- 
tiori argument that they do not compound at all. But 
independently of this, he states, that the young of a fox 
may be substituted for those of a dog, and the animal will 
not be sensible of the change when once they have taken 
her milk. 

6. Although brutes do not compound, yet this is no 
proof that theymay not have complex ideas. Many of 
our own complex ideas are not made by the mind. The 
senses receive from a single external object a collection 



7* 



of simple ideas. The mind, without any act of compo- 
sition, looks on that collection as a single complex idea ; it 
supposes the simple ideas to be connected in nature. In 
this way brutes may, without compounding, receive com- 
plex ideas from external objects. There are some reasons 
which render it probable that they do receive and retain 
such ideas. A dog will know the different individuals 
whom he has constant opportunities of observing, from 
strangers. This indicates judgment. Though this ren- 
ders it probable that brutes have complex ideas, yet it is 
not conclusive as to the fact, because the distinction might 
be founded upon a single simple idea, as the smell. One 
of the instances already mentioned would seem to coun- 
tenance some such hypothesis. 

7. The doctrine of abstraction is one, which at a very 
early period attracted the attention of philosophers, and 
to this day they have not agreed upon it. We shall first 
attempt to explain Locke's theory, and then shew the ob- 
jections to it, and the opinions of others upon the same 
subject. 

According to Locke, man is forced to abstract by his 
social habits. It would appear, from his observations, 
that if a solitary individual existed who never had occa- 
sion for language, he would probably never abstract. 
This opinion I found upon the following passage : 

" The use of words being to stand as outward marks 
of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from 
particular things, if every particular idea that we take in 
should have a distinct name, names must be endless. 
To prevent thiSy the mind makes the particular ideas re- 
ceived from particular objects, to become general ; which 
is done by considering them as they are in the mind, such 
appearances, separate from all other existences, and the 
circumstances of real existence, as the circumstances of 
time, place, or any other concomitant ideas, This is 
called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular 



78 



beings, become general representatives of all of the same 
kind, and their names general names, applicable to what- 
ever exists conformable to such abstract ideas." — B. 2. 
Ch. XI. § 9. 

It appears from this, that it is to prevent names " from 
being endless," that men abstract, and that therefore 
man is indebted for this most important exertion of his 
faculties, and that which Locke declares to distinguish 
him from brutes, to the necessity of holding society with 
his kind by means of his organs of speech. It would 
further follow from this, that if men could shew their 
ideas to each other immediately, and therefore had no oc- 
casion for words, they would have no occasion for ab- 
straction. In some part of his Essay, Locke conjectures 
this to be a privilege of spirits, and from comparing this 
with what we have just stated, it would amount to this, 
that man is elevated above the condition of brutes by 
having the power of abstraction, and that spirits are ele- 
vated above the condition of man by wanting the power 
of abstraction. 

8. The process of abstraction, according to Locke, as 
well as I can understand it, appears to be this : Things 
and their qualities exist individually. A general or ab- 
stract existence is an absolute absurdity, and if the defi- 
nitions were substituted for the words, would become a 
contradiction in terms. Ideas of things and of their qua- 
lities also exist individually. These ideas are, in the first 
instance, conformable to the individual things and their 
qualities. But by due contemplation of these ideas, and 
subjecting them to certain modifications, the mind forms 
out of them other ideas, which although they are in them- 
selves particular individual existences in the mind, yet 
they are not conformable to any particular individual 
thing, but are looked on as the mental general signs of 
certain classes of individual existences. This second class 
of ideas supposed by Locke to be made by abstraction, he 



77 



calls abstract ideas, or universal or general ideas. The 
Platonists held nearly the same opinions, differing only 
in this, that the abstract ideas are not made by the mind, 
but have been eternal and immutable existences, conform- 
ably to which all particular things have been made. 
Thus Locke holds that abstract ideas are formed from, 
particular existences, and the Platonists, that particular 
existences are formed from abstract ideas. I cannot per- 
ceive any material difference between Locke's doctrine 
of abstraction and that of Aristotle. This philosopher 
rejected Plato's supposition of the eternal existence of 
abstract forms or ideas, but Jhe held that every individual 
of a species must be conformable to the abstract idea of 
that species, and that the abstract idea constituted the es- 
sence of that species, and that all science must relate to 
abstract ideas as the individual existences are subject to 
continual fluctuation and change. 

9. Other philosophers, and particularly of the mo- 
derns, Berkeley and Hume, deny the existence of any such 
process of mind as Locke describes, as well as the exis- 
tence of any such ideas as are produced by it. They 
maintain that words are general, but that an abstract 
idea is a manifest absurdity. 

There has been a third sect of philosophers who held 
that there are not only abstract ideas, but real universal 
existences. These three sects are called, from their pe r 
culiar tenets, the conceptualists, the nominalists, and the 
realists. 

Locke himself appears to have been a conceptualist, 
although I think an attentive student of his Essay would 
become a nominalist. He seems to consider that the ab- 
stract idea is created by the mind for no other purpose 
than to receive a name. In the formation of this idea, or 
fiction of the mind, he states, that there is considerable 
difficulty, and when formed, considerable inconsistency. 

" Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, 



78 



or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they 
seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and 
familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely re- 
flect on them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions 
and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with 
them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt 
to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains 
and skill to form the general idea of a triangle ? (which 
is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and 
difficult ;) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, 
neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scatenon, but all and 
none of these at once. In fact it is something imperfect 
that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts are dtf- 
iexent^ndi in -inconsistent ideas put together" B. 4. Ch. 
VII. § 9. 

The most zealous nominalist could hardly support his 
system by stronger argument or clearer language than 
the above. What are we to think of a system, which „ 
demands from us a postulate that we have ideas which 
are made up of other ideas totally inconsistent with each 
other ; that we have ideas existing in our minds, and yet 
not existing ; that we have an idea of a triangle which is 
equilateral and not equilateral ; isoceles and not isosce- 
les at the same time ; which is large and not large ; small 
and not small, &c. — all these and none of these at the 
same time ? But Locke thinks that we are driven to the 
necessity of calling into existence these mental monsters, 
for the mere purpose of giving them names. How then, 
answers the nominalist, do young children discourse so 
fluently ? Have they even in their early infancy con- 
jured up this world of inconsistent, impossible beings, 
which are declared by Locke to be existences tvhich can- 
not exist ? 

At present we shall not enter further into the question 
between the nominalists and conceptualists, as it will be 
necessary to speak of it again, and considerably more at 
length when we come to treat of general terms, 



79 



10. As Locke considers abstraction to have been the 
consequence of language, he denies the faculty to brutes. 
Though many brutes, as parrots, &c. can produce articu- 
late sounds, yet they are never used by them as language, 
nor to express abstract ideas, and yet men who have 
no language, who are dumb, find means, as our author 
declares, of expressing abstract ideas. His reasoning to 
shew that brutes have no abstract ideas, reduced to a lo- 
gical form, stands thus : 

All beings having abstract ideas express them, 
Brutes do not express abstract ideas, 
Therefore, brutes have not abstract ideas. 

11. The faculties of the mind are, according to Locke, 
liable to two opposite defects, too great and too small a 
degree of intensity. To the one defect he ascribes lu- 
nacy, to the other, idiocy. The lunatic, by the violence 
of his imagination, adopts precipitately false propositions 
as principles, and from these, by right reasoning, he 
deduces false conclusions. The idiot, however, seldom 
puts ideas together, so as to form a proposition, and 
never reasons. 

12. We have now arived at the conclusion of ano- 
ther stage of our course. In the investigations we have 
just made of the earliest and principal operations of the 
mind, we have for the most part considered them as 
employed upon simple ideas of sensation : 

1°' Because these are the ideas about which the mind 
first employs itself. 

2°* Because the operations are more easily understood 
relatively to simple ideas. 

3 0, Because these operations themselves employed 
about simple ideas of sensation, furnish another class of 
simpler ideas, viz. simple ideas of reflection. 

13. Locke, recapitulating his theory of ideas, illus- 
trates it in the following manner : 

" These alone," (sensation and reflection,) " as far as T 



80 



can discover, arc the windows by which light is let into 
this dark room ; for methinks the understanding is not 
much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only 
some little opening left to let in external visible resem- 
blances, or ideas of things without; would the pictures 
coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie 
so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very 
much resemble the understanding of a man in reference 
to the objects of sight, and the ideas of them." B. 2. 
Ch. XI. § 17. 

This illustration is evidently borrowed from Plato. He 
illustrates the manner in which we perceive external ob- 
jects of sense, by supposing a dark cave in which men 
are so bound, that they can only view one part of it. 
Behind this, at a distance, is a light, some rays of which 
pass over a wall to that part of the cave which is before 
the eyes of those who are confined in it. Various ob- 
jects pass iytfween them and the light, the shadows of 
which the^feehold, but not the objects themselves. 
Locke, however, seems to confine the illustration to per- 
ceptions of sight. 



LECTURE X. 



Division of Complex Ideas. Idea of space and its 
modes. Extension not body. 

1. COMBINATIONS of simple ideas frequently enter 
the mind from external objects, and are looked on as com- 
plex ideas, without having been connected together by any 
immediate act of the mind. In this way Locke thinks it 
probable that brutes receive complex ideas. (Lect. IX. §6.) 
By far the greater number of our complex are, however, 
wholly made by and receive their unity from an act of the 
mind, a#l even those collections of simple ideas which are 
received from external objects are subsequently rendered 
more exact types of the originals from whence they were 
taken, by mental operations. 

2. The classes of complex ideas, according to Locke, 
and which are sometimes called his Categories, are 

1. Modes. 

2. Substances. 
8. Relations. 

1°. Modes in general are "such complex ideas, which 
however compounded, contain not in them the supposition 
of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as depen- 
dences on, or affections of substances." Modes are two- 
fold, simple and mixed. Simple modes are compounded 
of repetitions of the same simple idea. The component 

M 



82 



simple ideas in a mixed mode are different, Locke uses the 
word " modes" in these cases, ".out of its ordinary signi- 
fication." But where it is necessary to communicate a new 
notion, it must be done either by inventing a new term or 
using an old one in a new sense. He thinks the latter 
preferable. 

2°. Substances are " those combinations of simple ideas, 
as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsist- 
ing by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea 
of substance, such as it is, is always first and chief." Sub- 
stances are divided into single, as they are considered to 
exist separately, as a man or a sheep, and collective where 
several are put together, as an army, a flock. 

3°. Relations are those complex ideas which arise from 
the comparison of two ideas in any respect. 

3. In the examination of our ideas, Locke commences 
with the simple modes of space and time. He assumes as 
self-evident that we obtain the idea of space both by sight 
and touch. Space may be considered in three respects. 
1° When it is considered " barely as length between any 
two beings," it is called distance. 2°. When considered as 
having length, breadth, and thickness, it is called capa- 
city. 3°. Considered in the abstract, it is called exten- 
sion. 

4. The idea of immensity is obtained by repeating with- 
out limit the idea of a finite space. Figure, another mo- 
dification of space, is " the relation which the parts of the 
termination of extension or circumscribed space have 
amongst themselves." The infinite variety of this class of 
ideas appears from the vast, number of figures which 
really exist, as well as from the unlimited power of the 
mind in varying the idea of figure. 

Place is " the relation of distance between any thing 
and any two or more points which are considered in keep- 
ing the same distance one with another, and so considered 
at rest." The necessity of fixed points to determine 



88 



place is manifest from our inability to determine the place 
of the universe. 

5. Locke takes occasion in treating of space to impugn 
the Cartesian doctrine, that space is inseparable from 
body. He considers that the impossibility of solidity ex- 
isting independently of extension, is not a proof of exten- 
sion being inseparable from body, as many ideas require 
others as necessary to their existence, and yet the ideas 
may be perfectly different. Thus scarlet colour cannot 
exist without extension, and yet these are distinct ideas. 
He states also, that if spirit be admitted to be different 
from body because it has not extension, it must also be 
admitted, that space is different from body because it has 
not solidity. In fine he thinks extension or space different 
from body, for three reasons. 

1°. Because extension includes neither the idea of so- 
lidity nor its consequence, resistance; and body includes 
both. 

2°. Because the parts of space are inseparable really or 
mentally, and the parts of body are separable both really 
and mentally. 

[To divide actually or really is by removing the parts 
from one another to produce two surfaces where before 
there was but one. To divide mentally is to imagine this 
done.] 

3°. The parts of space are immoveable, and those of 
body moveable. 

6. Extension has been defined to be that which has 
partes extra partes. This Locke translates, " that which 
has extended parts exterior to extended parts." This as a 
definition is defective, because the term to be defined is 
introduced into it ; the absurdity of which he illustrates 
by comparing it to defining a fibre to be that which is 
made up of several fibres. He considers that extension 
being a simple idea does not allow of definition. (See 
Lcct. III. § 5.) 



The following dilemma has been brought to prove that 
space cannot exist without body : 

Space is either something or nothing. 

If nothing be between two bodies they touch. 

If something be between them, it must be either body 
or spirit. 

v There is no space, &c. 
This is a petitio principii, for it assumes that all beings 
are included under body and spirit, whereas the very point 
in question is, whether there is not a third being, viz. 
space. 

7. Locke thinks that those who deny the existence of 
pure space must suppose body infinite ; for if body were 
finite it would be impossible not to suppose space beyond 
its limits. Let a man placed at the bounds of body stretch 
forth his hand, and he must stretch it into pure space. 
He also thinks that they must deny to the Creator the 
power of annihilation, for if they grant that, they must at 
least grant the possibility of a vacuum. He conceives that 
the motions of the bodies of the universe prove the ex- 
istence of pure space, for if space was completely filled 
with matter, no motion could take place ; for no solid 
body could be conceived to be so divided that the parts 
would move freely amongst each other. 



LECTURE XL 



On Duration and its Modes. 

1. THE difficulty of explaining what duration is, arises 
from the circumstance of its being a simple idea, and 
therefore incapable of definition. Locke mentions one 
who being asked " what time was ?" answered " si non 
rogas intelligo " which evidently means, " I know what 
it means, but cannot explain it." Locke, however, con- 
siders this answer to be equivalent to saying " the more 
I set myself to think upon it, the less I understand it." 
According to Locke, the manner in which we obtain the 
idea of duration is as follows: by observing the train of 
ideas passing continually in our minds we get the idea of 
succession, and " the distance between any parts of that 
succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in 
our minds, is that we call duration," It should be care- 
fully observed that the word " distance" here means the, 
number of intervening ideas, and not the time elapsed be- 
tween the passage of the two ideas in the mind ; for if it 
meant the latter, it would be saying no more than that 
we get the idea of duration from duration. From the suc- 
cession of ideas we are conscious of the continuation of our 
existence, and the continuation of existence suggests im- 
mediately the idea of duration. 

That succession is necessary to the idea of duration ap- 
pears from this ; that when succession ceases our idea or 



86 

consciousness of duration ceases with it. Thus a man in 
sound sleep is not conscious of duration. When he awakes 
it is true he perceives that a certain portion of time must 
have elapsed by observing the change from evening to 
morning, or by observing the hour indicated by a clock ; 
but this is acquiring the conviction that duration must 
have elapsed by a process of reasoning. 

If Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) 
instead of their ordinary night's sleep had passed the whole 
twenty-four hours in one continued sleep, the duration of 
that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to 
them, and been for ever left out of their account of time. 
" If however during sleep a man dreams, and a variety of 
ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after 
another, he has then during such dreaming a sense of du- 
ration." Locke's arguments to prove succession necessary 
to duration seem to be these : 

1°. Because in sound sleep where succession ceases, we 
have no sense of duration. 

2°. Because if during sleep we dream, the sense of du- 
ration returns. 

3°. Because if a man could keep one idea without vari- 
ation in contemplation, he would have no sense of du- 
ration. 

2. Some have supposed that our idea of succession was 
derived from motion. Locke contends that motion only 
produces the idea of succession by exciting a train of ideas 
in the mind. He conceives that motions which fail to ex- 
cite this train, produce no notion of succession. This is 
the case with motions either very quick or very slow. 
" Motions very slow, though they are constant, are not 
perceived by us, because in the remove from one sensible 
part towards another, the change of distance is so slow 
that it causes no new ideas in us, but a good while one 
after another, and so we have no perception of motion or 
succession." 



87 

3. w On the contrary things which move so swift as not 
to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable 
distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of 
ideas in the mind, are not also perceived to move ; for any 
thing that moves in a circle in less time than our ideas are 
wont to succeed each other in our 'minds, is not perceived 
to move, but seems a perfect circle of that matter or co- 
lour." Locke infers from these circumstances, that the 
velocity of the succession of our ideas has a major and 
minor limit. He conceives that portions of duration, less 
than the least possible interval between two ideas, are not 
perceived. As an example of this he supposes " a cannon 
bullet to pass through a room, and in its way to take with 
it the limb and fleshy parts of a man. It is clear that it 
must successively strike the two sides of the room, that it 
must touch the parts of the flesh in succession, and yet no 
succession can be perceived." He therefore conceives that 
all successions are measured and determined by that of our 
ideas. 

4. The power of the will over the succession of ideas is 
very limited. As has been observed, it cannot increase 
or diminish its rapidity beyond certain limits. It follows 
therefore a fortiori, that it cannot stop the succession in 
order to contemplate solely arid exclusively any one idea. 
The only powers possessed in this case by the will is, the 
selection of the ideas and the degree of attention with 
which they are observed. 

5. Time is " duration, set out by certain periods, and 
marked by certain measures or epochs." Time is more 
difficult to measure than space, because its parts are not 
coexistent. There are three requisites for a good measure 
of time, that it should be, 1°. Constant; 2°. Regular; 
3°. Universally observable. If the measure of time were 
not constant, the chronology of one age of the world 
could not easily be compared with that of another. If it 
were not universally observable, different nations should 



88 



have different measures of time, and therefore their 
chronology could not be compared. A measure of time 
not regular, that is, which does not divide duration into 
equal portions, would obviously be useless. The revolu- 
tions of the celestial objects are good measures of time, be- 
cause they fulfil all these conditions. They are observable 
to the whole world ; they are regular, and have continued 
so since the creation. It is however by their periodical 
appearances, and not necessarily by their motions, that 
they measure duration. Any periodical phenomenon, 
" as the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant re- 
turning at equi-distant periods at all parts of the earth, 
would serve to reckon years as well as the motion of the 
sun. An instance of this is found in an American nation, 
who counted their years by the coming of certain birds 
among them." 

6. No two parts of duration can be certainly known to 
be equal, because they are not co-existent, and do not 
therefore allow of juxta-position. " Duration itself must 
however be considered as going on in one constant, equal, 
uniform course ; but none of the measures of it which we 
make use of can be known to do so." 

Two erroneous opinions have prevailed respecting time 
and motion ; one, that motion is the measure of time and 
the other, that time is the measure of motion. We have 
already showed that motion is no more a measure of 
time than any other periodical phenomenon. Time is 
only one of the elements necessary to measure motion. If 
by motion be meant velocity, then time and space are ne- 
cessary to measure it. If by motion be meant moving- 
force or momentum, then three things are required to 
estimate it, the time, space, and the mass or quantity of 
matter in the thing moved. The measures of time, mi- 
nutes, hours, days, &c. are no more necessary to duration 
than inches, feet, yards, &c. are to space. Having, how- 
ever, acquired ideas of finite lengths of duration from 



89 

these measures, we can apply them to duration in which 
the measures themselves did not exist. Thus we can con- 
ceive twenty-four hours before the creation of the sun. In 
this sense we are to understand the expressions day and 
night, applied in the Mosaic history before the creation of 
the sun. 

7. Having obtained the idea of any finite length of 
time, as a day, or a year, and being able to repeat it, 
and add it to itself without ever coming to the end of such 
addition, we get the idea of eternity. 



LECTURE XIL 



Duration and Expansion compared.— Number— 
Infinity. 



I. 

Duration and Expansion. 

1. HAVING considered the modes of space and du- 
ration separately, Locke next proceeds to compare them 
together. The idea which he has hitherto expressed by 
the words space or extension, he here calls expansion. He 
thinks the term space objectionable, because it is sometimes 
applied to duration (" the distance of fleeting successive 
parts,") and he rejects the term extension, because it 
implies body. Although Locke makes this selection of 
terms, he by no means subsequently adheres to it, and he 
uses the term extension at least as often as expansion to 
express pure space. 

2. Locke points out six remarkable congruities between 
the ideas of expansion and duration, and two striking 
points of dissimilitude. Before we enter upon the parti- 
culars of each of these we shall shortly enumerate them. 

Congruities. 

1. They are both capable of greater and less. That is, 
they consist of parts and not of degrees, and are capable 
of unlimited increase and decrease. 



91 



2. They are neither of them bounded by those things 
which are commonly used as their measures. Space is 
not bounded by matter, nor duration by motion. 

3. Time is to duration as place is to expansion. This 
analogy holds good in two senses of the words time and 
place. 

4. They are affections of all beings. Every thing that 
exists must have time and place of existence. 

5. All the parts of extension are extension, and all the 
parts of duration are duration. 

6. Their parts are inseparable. 

Differences. 

1. Duration is as a line and expansion as a solid. 

2. All the parts of expansion are coexistent, and no two 
parts of duration are coexistent. 

3. These ideas derive their first point of agreement from 
being both modes of quantity. Quantity is whatever con- 
sists of parts, and its modes are space, duration, and num- 
ber. Other ideas, which consist of degrees, are not capable 
of unlimited increase, for example, colours, &c. Locke 
considers, that if we were to allege that beyond the 
bounds of matter there is nothing, we would be limiting 
the Deity to matter, of whom Solomon declares, " hea- 
ven, the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee." Al- 
though no one denies infinite duration, yet many are 
found who doubt of the infinity of space. He accounts 
for this thus : it has been usual to express space by the 
term extension, and extension has been conceived to be an 
essential attribute of matter ; so that matter and extension 
became so associated in men's minds, that they were inse- 
parable, and never supposing matter to be infinite, men 
were unwilling to ascribe infinity to its attribute extension. 
This difficulty Locke gets rid of by adopting the principle 
that space or extension is not an attribute of matter, but 



an independent being, and that properly the attribute of 
matter is the capability of filling space. 

4-. Time is analogous to place in two respects. 1°. They 
are each of them so much of those boundless oceans 
of eternity and immensity as is set out and distinguished 
from the rest, as it were by land-marks, and so are made 
use of to denote the position of finite real beings in re- 
spect to one another in those uniform oceans of duration 
and space. In this sense, time is that portion of infinite 
duration bounded by the existence of the world, and 
place that portion of infinite expansion occupied by the 
world. 2°. Time is also sometimes applied to such por- 
tions of infinite uniform duration, which we upon any oc- 
casion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured 
time, and so consider them as bounded and determined, 
even though those portions of duration be before the crea- 
tion. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, 
in that great inane beyond the confines of the world, when 
we consider so much of that space as is equal to or ca- 
pable of receiving a body of any assigned dimensions as a 
cubic foot. 

5. Expansion and duration being simple modes, it is 
natural to ask what the simple idea is of which they are 
compounded? Locke thinks, that the least portion of 
either of which we have clear and distinct ideas, may 
perhaps be fittest to be considered by us as the simple ideas 
of that kind, out of which our complex ideas of space, 
extension, and duration, are made up. Such a part of 
duration may be called a moment, and is the time of one 
idea passing in our minds in their ordinary succession. 
The simple idea of expansion may be called a sensible 
point, and is the least part of matter or space we can dis- 
cern, and which is ordinarily about a minute of a circle of 
which the eye is the centre. 



93 

II. 

Number. 

1. The most simple of our ideas is unity, or one. There 
is no shadow of variety or composition in it, and every 
object of our senses and every thought of-our minds brings 
this idea with it. The modes of unity furnish us with 
that class of ideas called number. These modes are of all 
others the most distinct, " because every the least variation 
which is an unit making each combination, as clearly dif- 
ferent from that which approaches nearest to it as the 
most remote. This is not so in other simple modes, in 
which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to dis- 
tinguish between two approaching ideas which are yet 
really different. Who can assign that angle next in mag- 
nitude to a right one ? Hence it is that demonstrations 
in numbers are the most precise. All number is related 
to one standard quantity, unity, and the relation to this is 
always clearly conceived and expressed ; whereas in geo- 
metry there is no such fixed standard. The clearness of 
our ideas of number does not, as is sometimes observed, 
arise from it admitting of a least quantity, unity, for this 
would be excluding fractions from the idea of number. 
In one or two instances it would appear that Locke ex- 
tended his notions of number no further than integers. 
Thus, he says, that ninety-one is the next excess above 
ninety. 

2. There are two requisites to perfect numbering. 1°. That 
the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are dif- 
ferent from one another only by a single unit. 2°. That 
it retain in memory the names or marks of the several 
combinations, from an unit to that number. This is the 
reason why children do not number earlier. 



94 



III. 
Infinity. 

1. Finite and infinite are modes of quantity. They are 
primarily and literally ascribable to space, duration, and 
number. When infinity is attributed to the Deity, it is 
strictly ascribed only to his duration and ubiquity, but 
figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness. Infinity 
may, however, in a certain sense, be literally applied to the 
moral attributes of God, as to the number and extent 
of the acts or objects of these powers. 

2. The idea of infinity is derived from our faculty of 
enlarging, applied to whatever admits of unlimited in- 
crease. It is therefore only applicable to those ideas 
which consist of parts, and not to those which consist of 
degrees. For in all these last, there is a degree beyond 
which is no higher. Thus there are various degrees of 
white or red, but it is plain that there is an highest degree 
of each of these colours. 

3. We have no idea of a space actually infinite, although 
we have of the infinity of space. The having an idea of a 
space actually infinite implies a contradiction. The in- 
finity of space is the conception of the capability of the 
endless enlargement of our idea of a finite space. 

Infinity, as Has been observed, is applicable to all the 
modes of quantity, but number affords the clearest idea 
of it. Locke illustrates our different conceptions of the 
infinity of number, duration, and expansion thus: the in- 
finity of number resembles a line whereof one end termi- 
nating with us, the other is extended still forwards be- 
yond all that we can conceive. It is plain from this that 
Locke confines his ideas of number to integers. The in- 
finity of duration resembles this line of number extended 
both ways to an inconceivable undeterminate and infinite 
length. The infinity of space is as if we conceived our- 



95 

selves in the centre and those interminable, lines of number 
extending from us in all directions. Matter, though not 
supposed infinite, yet affords us the idea of infinity by its 
divisibility. 

4. It has been sometimes maintained that the idea of 
infinity is positive. This principle has been supported by 
defining infinity the negation of an end, and assuming that 
an end is negative, its negation is positive. 

5. This argument Locke considers puerile, and may be 
retorted on its own principles. A beginning must be ac- 
knowledged to be positive, therefore its negation negative, 
and therefore infinity a parte ante may be proved negative 
by the same proof that a parte post it is proved positive. 
But independently of this he denies that an end is nega- 
tive, and states that he who perceives that an end of his 
pen is black or white, and possesses attributes, will find it 
difficult to admit that it is a mere negation. Locke con- 
siders our idea of infinity partly positive, partly relative, 
and partly negative. 1. The idea of so much space as 
the mind can clearly contemplate is positive and clear. 
2. Greater than this is clear also, but comparative. 3. So 
much greater as cannot be comprehended is plainly ne- 
gative. 



LECTURE XIII. 



Modes of Thinking, — Pleasure and Pain, — 
Power, 

1. IT is unnecessary to enter into a particular enumera- 
tion of the simple modes of other sensible ideas, nor in- 
deed would it be possible, as most of them have not par- 
ticular names. In general it may be observed, that those 
simple modes which are considered but as different degrees 
of the same simple idea, though they are in themselves 
many of them very distinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no 
distinct names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct 
ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. 
This defect in naming may have arisen either 1°. from 
men wanting measures nicely to distinguish between the 
ideas ; 2°. because were they so distinguished that know- 
ledge would not be of general or necessary use. 



Modes of Thinking, 

2. Amongst the most striking modes of thinking are, 
sensation, remembrance, recollection, contemplation, re- 
verie, attention, study or intention, dreaming and ecstacy 



97 

Sensation is the actual entrance of an idea into the un- 
derstanding by the senses. (See Lect. 11. § 4.) 

Remembrance is the recurrence of an idea, without the 
operation of an object on the external senses. 

Recollection is recalling an idea with exertion and dif- 
ficulty. 

Contemplation is the retaining an idea under attentive 
consideration. 

Reverie is the floating of ideas without choice or selec- 
tion in the mind. 

Attention is the careful notice taken of ideas, so as to 
register them in the memory. 

Study or Intention is the earnestness with which the 
mind fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, 
and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of 
other ideas. 

Dreaming is having ideas in the mind, whilst the out- 
ward senses are stopped, (so that they receive not outward 
objects with their usual quickness,) not suggested by any 
external object or known occasion, nor under any choice 
or conduct of the understanding. 

Ecstacy may be defined to be dreaming with the eyes 
open. 

From the various degrees of intention and remission, 
which are to be observed in thinking, Locke infers that 
thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul, the 
essential qualities of things not being capable of these 
variations. 



98 



II. 



Modes of Pleasure and Pain. 

3. Things are said to be naturally good or evil, only in 
reference to pleasure and pain. We call that good which 
is apt to produce or increase pleasure or diminish pain in 
us, or to procure or preserve to us the possession of any 
other good, or absence of any evil. On the contrary, we 
name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any 
pain, or diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure 
us any evil, or deprive us of any good. 

Pleasure and pain are the hinges on which our passions 
turn, of which we may form ideas from observing the ef- 
fects of pleasure and pain. 

Love is the thought of the delight which any present 
or absent thing is apt to produce. 

Hatred is the thought of the pain which any present 
or absent thing is apt to produce. 

Desire is the uneasiness produced by the absence of a 
thing whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight 
with it. 

Joy is the delight occasioned by the present or assured 
approaching possession of some good. 

Sorrow is the uneasiness produced by a good lost, 
which might have been enjoyed longer. 

Hope is the pleasure arising from the thought of the 
profitable future enjoyment of any thing. 

Fear is an uneasiness upon the thought of future evil. 

Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any 
good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes 
producing pain, sometimes indolence. 

Anger is pain produced by the receipt of an injury, 
with a present purpose of revenge. 



99 

Envy is the pain produced by the thought of a good 
which we desire, obtained by one we think should not 
have had it before us. 

Anger and Envy differ from the other passions above- 
mentioned, in not being caused by pleasure or pain, sim- 
ply in themselves, but having in some mixed considera- 
tions of ourselves and others. They are not therefore, like 
the others, to be found in all men. 



III. 

Power. 

4. By observing in any thing the possibility of having 
its sensible qualities changed, and in another the capabi- 
lity of producing that change, we obtain the ideas of pas- 
sive and active power ; passive power being the capability 
of receiving, and active power the capability of producing 
the change. Cause and effect are the exertions of active 
passive power. It has been observed elsewhere that Locke 
divides beings into God, finite spirits, and bodies. He 
conceives God to be incapable of passive, and matter in- 
capable of active power. Intermediate beings alone he 
considers capable of both. 

It may be objected against classing powers among our 
simple ideas, that they include the idea of relation (viz. a 
relation to action or change) and so ought to be brought 
under the class of complex ideas. Locke assigns three 
reasons for placing them amongst simple ideas. 1°. All 
our ideas, when attentively considered, include relation. 
2°. Powers constitute the principal ingredients of our 
complex ideas of substances. 3°. They generally termi- 
nate in the change of some sensible quality, and therefore 
in the production of some simple idea. 

5. No clear idea of active power can be had from sen- 



100 



sation, and the only way by which we obtain it is by re- 
flection. Locke proves this by the following disjunctive 
reasoning. All action consists in either thought or mo- 
tion. Of thought we acquire no idea by sensation. Mo- 
tion does not necessarily give the idea of action. That 
which produces motion is an action, but the continuation of. 
motion, after it has been produced, is no more an action 
than the continuation of the alteration of the figure of a 
body by a blow, is an action. Of the production of motion 
we receive no idea from sensation, which only gives us an 
jdea of its continuance when received. Hence it follows, 
that since all idea of active power must be derived either 
from thought or from the production of motion, we must 
have it by reflection alone. 

6. The will and understanding are two powers; the act 
of the will being called volition or willing, and the act of 
the understanding perception or thinking. Any action is 
called voluntary when it is the immediate dictate of the 
will, involuntary if done without any exertion of the will. 
Voluntary is not opposed to necessary, for the same action 
may be both voluntary and necessary. We may choose to 
act so or so, and yet might have been unable to act other- 
wise had we not so chosen. Perception, or the act of the 
understanding, is three-fold. 1°. The perception of ideas 
in the mind. 2°. The perception of the signification of 
signs; and 3°. the perception of the agreement or disagree- 
ment of ideas. All these are attributed to the understand- 
ing or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only 
that use allows us to say we understand. 

7. In what precedes, a short draught has been given of 
our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, 
and of which they are made up. Locke conceives that 
they may be all reduced to the following : — 



101 

Extension, 1 

Solidity, >- By sensation from Body. 

Mobility, j 

MoTivity^' 3 By reflection from the Mind ' 

Existence,! 

Duration, > By both. Sensation and Reflection. 

Number, 3 

These are sometimes called Locke's Catagories. 



LECTURE XIV. 



Mixed Modes and Substances. 

I. 

Mixed Modes. 

1. MIXED modes are distinguished from complex 
ideas of substances, by not being looked upon to be cha- 
racteristic marks of any real beings that have a steady 
existence, but scattered and independent ideas put toge- 
ther by the mind. From the circumstance of being made 
exclusively by the mind without reference to patterns, and 
being as it were their own patterns, they have been called 
notions, as if they had their original more in the thoughts 
of men than in the reality of things. The scattered and 
independent ideas which compose a mixed mode derive 
their union, and the mode derives its unity, from an act of 
the mind compounding them, and looking upon them as 
one ; and the marks of that unity, and that which renders 
the union permanent, is the name. The cause of making 
mixed modes is the necessity in our intercousse with so- 
ciety, for an easy and rapid interchange of ideas, and, 
therefore, we give names to those combinations of ideas 
which we have frequent occasion to speak of. And as 
these occasions vary with the state of society, and with 



103 



the variation of civilization and knowledge, so also the 
words necessary to express ideas of mixed modes change, 
some becoming obsolete, and new ones continually appear- 
ing. Also, the different states of society in different coun- 
tries, render it necessary to have words in one language 
expressing ideas, which have no corresponding names in 
another. Hence we continually find untranslateable words. 
Mixed modes being thus arbitrary, can only be said to 
exist in their names : as soon as the name is lost or for- 
gotten the idea ceases to exist. 

2. We usually obtain the ideas of mixed modes in three 
ways : 

1°. Observation. 

2°. Invention. 

3°. Explanation. 
The last is the most usual way, for we hear the words 
or names most frequently before the idea occurs, and in 
order to understand the language we hear spoken, we are 
forced to seek for explanations of the terms. 

3, The ideas which have been most modified are think- 
ing, motion, and power. Because action being the great 
business of mankind, and that about which all laws are 
conversant, it is no wonder that the modes of think- 
ing, motion, and power, (in which all action consists,) 
should be carefully noticed and named. The principle 
that thinking and motion includes all action, might seem 
to be contradicted by the import of certain terms which 
seem to express action, but really signify nothing of the 
modus operandi at all, but barely the effect produced, with 
some of the circumstances of the subject wrought upon, 
or the cause operating, e. g. creation, annihilation, &c. 
Freezing, which seems an active term, merely signifies the 
effect produced. 



104 

II. 

Substances. 

1. There are two points of view in which the ideas of 
substance may be contemplated. It was observed in a 
former lecture, that certain combinations of simple ideas 
are observed to co- exist in nature, and so are taken to re- 
present particular things. Finding this constant co-ex- 
istence, and presuming it not to take place without some 
J-*** ^^fefficient cause, we habitually assume, that there is some 
substratum or support or substance in which these co- 
existent qualities unite. Now the idea of substance is 
surtj^a^ #t sometimes taken to be the idea of this substratum, and 
«* ^^a,^ Sometimes as merely being a complex idea, composed of 
the simple ideas of the co-existent qualities. The one is 
called substance in the abstract, the other the sorts of sub- 
stances. 
"T '*" ^T>^2. Of substance in the abstract, Locke contends that 
/& U^"*^\ve~have no idea whatever. To say that it is the support 
"fti ^mS-^ accidents, is to define by a, synonymous term, since the 
► ^accLtUc+tr ^ or d support is equivalent in this sense to substance itself, 
^ ■i*c»J--i- 1 ^ e i^ ustrates tne absurdity of attempting to form an idea 
AU *h^e&£ of substance in the abstract, by the Indian philosopher, 
T72* who alleged that the world was supported by a great 
elephant. Upon being asked what supported the ele- 
phant, he answered a great tortoise ; and upon being fur- 
ther pressed, he acknowledged his ignorance of the final 
fulcrum of the universe. 

3. We obtain ideas of the sorts of substances, by care- 
fully observing and collecting such combinations of sim- 
ple ideas as are by experience and observation of men's 
senses noticed to exist together, and are therefore sup- 
posed to flow from the particular internal constitution or 
unknown essence of that substance. 



10.5 



4. For these reasons it appears that we have as clear 
ideas of spirits as of bodies. Of the substance in the ab- 
stract we have no idea in either case, and we have as clear 
ideas of thinking, knowing, motivity, and the other qua- 
lities of the mind, as we have of extension, solidity, and 
the other qualities of body. 

Oar ideas of substances are composed of primary qua- 
lities, secondary qualities, and powers. The last two 
classes ought properly to be considered one, both being 
powers. By far the greater part of the ingredients are 
therefore powers. 

Locke conjectures that if our organs of sense were ren- 
dered considerably more acute than they are at present, 
all the secondary qualities of objects would be changed. 
When the minute parts of any coloured object would af- 
fect our sight it would appear wholly different from what 
it does. We have an example of this in blood, which, 
when viewed through a microscope, appears to be a pellu- 
cid liquid, having some few globules of red in it. Hence 
he thinks that our faculties of discovery are suitable to the 
state in which we are placed (see Lect. 1. § 5.) It is pro- 
bable that any material alteration of our faculties would 
render a change in our situation in every other respect 
necessary. He conjectures that it may probably be the 
privilege of superior spirits to frame and shape to them- 
selves organs of sensation or perception suitable to their 
present design, and the particular circumstances of the 
objects which they would converse with. 

Our conception of the infinite spirit of God is obtained 
by adding infinity to expansion, duration, and the moral 
attributes. 



LECTURE XV. 



Relations in general, 

1. WHEN the mind considers one thing, so as to 
bring it to and set it by another, and so compares these 
things in any respect, there arises the idea of a relation. 
The things compared are called correllatives, and it fre- 
quently happens that only one of the two correllatives have 
received a name; in consequence of this the relation is fre- 
quently overlooked, and the term considered absolute. 
Such relations are called external denominations. Many 
terms also seem absolute until their meanings are carefully 
examined, such are old, great, imperfect, &c. The same- 
ness of relation does not suppose a sameness of subject, 
neither does a change in the relation suppose a change in 
the subject. Between different pairs of men the same re- 
lation, e. g. father and son, may subsist, and between the 
same men different relations, as younger, stronger, &c. 
may subsist at the same time. Of relations in general we 
may observe: 

1°. That all things which admit of comparison are ca- 
pable of relation. 

2°. That the relation is frequently clearer than the ideas 
of the subjects related, because the relation after includes 
but one simple idea. 



107 

?>°. Relations can be resolved into simple ideas. 
4°. All terms which lead the mind beyond the subject 
denominated are relative. 



I. 

Cause and Effect, Sfc. 

1. When a change in any substance is produced it is 
called an effect, and that which produces it is called cause. 
It has been observed before, that cause and effect are the 
exertions of active and passive power. 

Creation is the production of a thing, no part of which 
had any previous existence. 

2. Generation is the production of a substance formed 
of pre-existing particles, produced in the ordinary course 
of nature by an internal principle, but set on work and 
received by some external agent or cause. This is called 
making, when the cause is extrinsical, and the effect pro- 
duced by a sensible separation or juxtaposition of parts. 
When any quality is changed, we call it alteration. 

Time, dates, ages, places, are all relations, although the 
terms seem absolute. 



II. 



Identity and Diversity. 

1. We derive our ideas of identity from comparing an} 7 
thing existing at any determined time and place with 
itself existing at another time. Our notions of identity 
are founded on the supposition that it is impossible for the 
same thing to exist in different places at the same time, or 



10£ 



for different things to exist in the same place at the same 
time. Hence time and place become the criterions of 
identity. It follows from this also that the same thing 
cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor different 
things the same beginning of existence, since the begin- 
ning of existence is determined by the time and place of 
that beginning. 

2. There are three classes of substances: 

1. God. 

2. Finite spirits or intelligences. 

3. Bodies. 

Since God fills all space, and all time his identity, and 
his unity are evident. The identity of spirits is to be de- 
termined by the principiwn individuationis, or the begin- 
ning of their existence. The identity of a particle of mat- 
ter is to be determined in the same way. The identity of 
a mass of matter is to be determined by the identity of its 
parts. 

3. The identity of living things is to be determined by 
the participation of the same continued life, by constantly 
fleeting particles of matter in succession, vitally united to 
the same organized body. The identity of an animal is 
illustrated by that of a watch. It continues the same watch 
although every part of it may have been successively 
changed by repairs. 

4. Personal identity consists in consciousness. The word 
w person 1 ' means, " a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as the same 
thinking thing in different times and places." This being- 
Locke's definition of the word person, it is evident that 
sameness of person must be determined by an appeal to 
consciousness. 



log 
in. 

Proportional, Natural, Instituted Relations. 

1. Proportional relations arise from considering the 
equality or excess of the same simple idea in several sub- 
jects, as whiter, sweeter, &c. 

2. Natural relations arise from the comparison of 
things with respect to the circumstances of their origin or 
beginning, e. g. father, son, &c. It is the peculiarity of 
these relations that they are as lasting as the subjects to 
which they belong. It may be observed of these relations, 
as well as of other relations and of mixed modes, that such 
only have received names as are necessary for communi- 
cation. 

3. Instituted relations arise from considering things 
with respect to some act whereby any one acquires a mo- 
ral right, power, or obligation to do something, e. g. a ge- 
neral, a citizen, &c. These relations differ in particular 
from natural relations in being all of them alienable from 
the subject to which they belong, while the others are 
permanent. It frequently happens with instituted rela- 
tions that they are only external denominations, having no 
correlative terms, and are therefore frequently not con- 
sidered as relations. 



LECTURE XVI. 



Moral Relations. 

4?. MORAL relations arise from considering the con- 
^ M ^ Tormity or disagreement of our^actions to a rule to which 
they are referred, and by which they are judged. Good 
and evil are two-fold, natural and moral. Natural good 
and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which 
produces or increases pleasure and pain. In like manner 
moral good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of 
our actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn 
on us by the will and power of the legislator, which good 
or evil is called the sanction of the law, or the reward and 
punishment. There are two requisites to render a law 
efficacious. 1°. It must be published or promulged to 
those whose actions it is v designecf to govern. 2°. It must 
be attended with a sufficient sanction, that is, a reward or 
punishment independently of any good or evil which is 
the natural consequence of the law itself. By the natural 
consequence is here meant any good or evil which would 
have attended the action had the law not been made ; for 
evidently such a good or evil would have operated upon 
the agent equally forcibly without any law. Thus it would 
be absurd in the civil legislature to pass a law against in- 
temperance and debauchery, and to declare that the pu- 
nishment should be a shattered constitution, broken for- 
tune, and danger of punishment in a future life. 



Ill 



5. The laws by which men's actions are or should lie 
regulated are threefold : 

1. The Divine Law. 

2. The Civil Law. 

3. The Law of Opinion. 

In the divine law God is the legislator. It is pro- 
mulged partly by tffac light of nature, that is to say, we 
obtain a knowledge of it by the use of our natural facul- 
ties, and partly by revelation. The Deity possesses the 
right to legislate because we are his creatures j he has, 
1°. Infinite wisdom to direct us to what is right. 2. Infi- 
nite power to reward the conformity with, and to punish 
the breach of his laws. 3°. Infinite goodness to temper 
the severity of justice. This law is the only infallible 
touchstone of moral rectitude ; actions relatively to it are 
denominated sins and duties. 

6. The civil law is the rule set by the commonwealth 
to the actions of those that belong to it. Relatively to this 
law actions are denominated criminal or innocent. The 
right of the commonwealth to legislate is ultimately de- 
rived from the power which every individual has over his 
own actions, and the absolute freedom which he possesses 
in a state of nature. This power over himself, and this 
absolute liberty, he surrenders to those who are delegated 
by the public to frame laws, and receives in exchange 
civil liberty, which in society is found more valuable. As 
the Commonwealth is bound to protect the lives, liberties, 
and properties of those who live according to its laws, so 
it has power to take away the life, liberty, and property 
of him who disobeys them. 

7. The law of opinion is the general judgment of the 
community in which we live, approving some actions and 
condemning others. Relatively to this law actions are 
denominated virtuous or vicious* That this is the proper 
sense of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who con- 
siders that although that passes for vice in one country, 



112 



which is counted a virtue, or at least not a vice in another ; 
yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame, go to- 
gether. The following passages show this. 

Sunt sua praemia laadi. Virgil. 

Nihil habet natura praestantius, quam honestatem 9 quam 
laudem quam dignitatem quam decus; Cic : 

" Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, 
if there be any virtue, if there be any praise ," &c. St. Paul. 
Philip, iv. 8. 

8. The law of opinion for the most part coincides with 
the divine law. This is not surprising when we consider 
how natural it is to encourage with esteem and reputation 
that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame 
and discountenance the contrary ; and nothing can be 
more certain than that the law which God has established 
tends to the general good of mankind, even here, without 
any reference to a future state. Even those men whose 
practice is otherwise in this respect, give their approbation 
right, and for their own sakes discourage in others the 
faults and crimes which they commit themselves. 

9. The enforcements or sanction of the law of opinion 
are commendation and discredit. There is no law so ri- 
gidly observed as this. The divine law is frequently vio- 
lated, because its penalties are remote, and not very ob- 
vious, and therefore few men seriously reflect on them, 
and of those that do, many, while they break the law, en- 
tertain hopes of future repentance and reconciliation. The 
civil law is violated because men flatter themselves that 
they shall escape with impunity ; but no man escapes the 
punishment of their censure and dislike who offends 
against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps. . 

10. To conceive rightly of moral actions we must take 
notice of them under this two-fold consideration: ^.With- 
out any reference beyond themselves, and merely as com- 
binations of simple ideas, under which point of view they 
are mixed modes. 2°. The same complex idea, when re- 



113 



(erred to a moral law becomes a relation. Thus duelling, 
considered as a mixed mode, is a particular sort of action 
distinguished from others by particular ideas. When this 
action is referred to the law of God it is called a sin ; to 
the civil law, a capital crime ; and to the law of opinion, 
valour and virtue. When the mixed mode and moral re- 
lation have the same name, a confusion is frequently pro- 
duced in reasoning. Thus the taking; from another what 
is his without his knowledge or allowance, is properly 
called stealing; but that name being commonly understood 
to signify also the moral pravity of the action and to de- 
note its contrariety to law, men are apt to condemn what- 
ever they hear called stealing as an ill action ; and yet the 
privately taking away his sword from a madman is pro- 
perly denominated stealing, although when compared with 
the law of God, it is no sin or transgression, but the con- 
trary. 



LECTURE XVII. 



Ideas, clear or obscure. Distinct or confused. 
Meal or fantastical, 

1. IN the preceding Lectures the original of our ideas 
has been analysed and traced back to the two great foun- 
tains of all notions, sensation and reflection. We have 
also followed these simple elements through the various 
combinations into which they are formed by the powers of 
combining and comparing, and examined generally into 
the results of these operations, scil. mixed modes, sub- 
stances and relations. There are, however, some other 
qualities of ideas, which not coming immediately within 
this arrangement, the discussion may form a supplement 
to the preceding Lectures. 



Clear and obscure Ideas, 

1. The clearness and obscurity of ideas may be illus- 
trated objects illuminated with different degrees of light. 
A simple idea is said to be clear when it is such as the 
object itself from whence it was -taken did or might, in a 



115 



well ordered sensation or perception present it. So far as 
it may want this exactness, so far it is obscure. Complex 
ideas are clear when the component simple ideas are clear, 
and their number and order determinate and certain. 
Hence a complex idea may be obscure from either or both 
of these two causes. 

2. The causes of obscurity are threefold. 1. Dull or- 
gans. 2. Slight impressions. 3. Defective memory. Locke 
illustrates these causes by the impression of a seal upon 
wax. He compares dullness of organs to wax so hard- 
ened by cold as to refuse the impression. The second 
cause of obscurity he compares to the seal being impressed 
with insufficient force ; and the third to the wax being of 
so soft a quality as not to retain the impression. 

II. 

Distinct and confused Ideas. 

1. Locke first defines a distinct idea to be one wherein 
the mind perceives a difference from all other ideas, and 
a confused idea such a one as is not sufficiently distin- 
guishable from another from which it should be different. 
This definition he shows, however, to be absurd, because 
" let any idea be as it will, it can be no other than such 
as the mind perceives it to be, and that very perception 
distinguishes it from all other ideas. No idea, therefore, 
can be undistin<mishable from another from which it ought 
to be different, unless you would have it different from 
itself." 

2. He therefore thinks that ideas can only be said to be 
confused in reference to settled names. That which makes 
an idea be said to be confused is, when it is such that it 
may be as well expressed by another term as that which is 
used to express it : the difference which keeps the things 



116 

to be ranked under those two different names distinct, and 
makes some belong to one and some to the other being left 
out, and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept 
up by those different names being quite lost. 

3. The causes which produce confusion are three- 
fold :— 

1°. When any complex idea is made up of a smaller 
number of simple ideas that the idea which word it is ex- 
pressed by signifies. This is caused probably by the com- 
mon method of defining by general terms, so as to explain 
the meaning of one word by two others, instead of enume- 
rating the component simple ideas severally. Thus, to 
define a leopard to be a spotted beast, does not distinguish 
it from a lynx and other beasts. 

2°. Another cause of confusion is the component ideas 
being jumbled confusedly together, although their number 
may be complete. He illustrates this by comparing it to 
a confused mass of colours upon paper, but which when 
viewed through particular glasses adapted to the purpose, 
are reduced to the order and position which form a pic- 
ture or likeness of something. 

3°. The mutability and indeterminateness of the com- 
ponent ideas is another cause of confusion. 

The way therefore to prevent confusion is, first to col- 
lect and unite to one complex idea, as precisely as pos- 
sible, all those ingredients whereby it is different from 
others ; and secondly, to apply steadily the same name to 
such combination. 

Complex ideas may be partly distinct and partly con- 
fused ; instances of which occur in the idea of infinity ap- 
plied to duration, divisibility, &c. 



117 
III. 

Heal and fantastical Ideas, 

1. Ideas, when considered in reference to their arche- 
types, or the things from whence they are taken, may be 
divided into 

1. Real and fantastical, 

2. True and false. 

Real ideas are again subdivided into adequate and in- 
adequate. 

2. An idea is said to be real when it is such as has a 
foundation in nature. This is the first criterion Locke 
gives for the reality of an idea. He however adds two 
others, scil. " they are such as have a conformity with the 
real being and existence of things, or with their arche- 
types." It will be observed that these criterions only 
agree when the archetypes of the ideas are real existences. 
If the ideas have not these qualities they are fantastical or 
chimerical. 

3. Simple ideas are real, not because they are images 
or representations, but because they answer and agree to 
those powers of things which produce them in our minds, 
that being all that is requisite to render them real and not 
fictions at pleasure. 

4. Mixed modes and relations having no other reality 
but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing 
more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but 
that they be so formed that there is a possibility of exist- 
ing conformable to them. The only requisite therefore 
to their reality is, that they should be composed of con- 
sistent ideas. 

5. The ideas of substances being designed for the repre- 
sentations of known existences are no farther real than as 
there are such combinations of simple ideas knoxmi to exist 
without us. 



LECTURE XVIIL 



I. 



Adequate and inadequate Ideas. 

1. A REAL idea is said to be adequate or inadequate 
according as it perfectly or imperfectly represents the arche- 
type from which the mind supposes it taken. 

2. All simple ideas are adequate, because being nothing 
but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and or- 
dained by God to produce such sensations in us, they 
cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those 
powers. 

3. Mixed modes being voluntary collections of simple 
ideas, which the mind puts together without reference to 
any real archetypes or standing patterns existing any where, 
are, and cannot but be adequate ideas. They are their 
own archetypes, and must be adequate to themselves. 

4. The ideas of mixed modes may however be inade- 
quate with respect to fixed names. This inadequacy takes 
place when ones idea is different from the ordinary signi- 
fication of the name. 

5. Ideas of substances, taken in every sense, are inade- 
quate. We have no idea of substance in the abstract, or 
of that real essence which constitutes the connexion of the 



119 

co-existing qualities. In this sense, therefore, we have no 
adequate idea of substances, because we have no ideas at 
all of them. 

Considering the ideas of substances as complex ideas, 
made up of the co-existing qualities,' they can never be 
adequate, because no one could have opportunities of ob- 
serving all the various powers of any substance upon every 
other species of substance, which however would be ne- 
cessary to form an adequate complex idea of the co-exist- 
ing qualities. 

6. With reference to their originals, ideas are either 
ectypes or archetypes. Ectypes are copies or signs of ori- 
ginals. Archetypes are the originals themselves. Simple 
ideas are therefore adequate ectypes; substances inade- 
quate ectypes, and mixed modes are archetypes, and there- 
fore necessarily adequate. 



II. 
True and false Ideas. 

1. Truth and falsehood are, properly speaking, affec- 
tions of propositions, and not of ideas ; and even when 
applied to ideas, there is some tacit proposition implied. 
An idea being nothing but a bare appearance or perception 
in the mind, can be no more said to be true or false than 
a single name can. 

2. Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to any 
thing extraneous to them, they are then, in reference to 
these things, capable of being called true or false. Because 
the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of 
their conformity to that thing : which supposition, as it 
happens to be true or false, so the ideas themselves come 

.to be denominated. Those extraneous things to which 



120 



ideas are referred are usually 1°. other men's ideas ; 2°. 
real existence; 3°. supposed real essences. The cause of 
the last reference is the disposition of the mind to genera- 
lise or to reduce particular individual things to sorts, in 
order to facilitate the enlargement of knowledge. The 
species of things being thus formed, a real essence of each 
species is supposed or assumed. This subject, however, 
will be more fully explained hereafter. 

3. In reference to other men's ideas, simple ideas are 
least liable to be false, because the standard of their truth 
is so obvious, that their falsehood is at once detected and 
corrected. Substances are liable to falsehood in this re- 
spect, but there being a standard to refer them to, the true 
idea may, in general, be obtained with comparative ease ; 
but the ideas which are most liable to this kind of false- 
hood are mixed modes, which not having any standards 
in nature, their falsehood is not in general either easily 
ascertained or corrected. 

4. No ideas referred to real existence can be false but 
those of substances. Simple ideas are true in this sense, 
for the same reason that they are real and adequate. 
Mixed modes cannot be false in this sense, because no 
reference is made to real existence in forming them. The 
ideas of substances may be false in this respect, 1°. when 
simple ideas are put together, which in the real existence 
of things have no union ; 2°. when from any collection of 
simple ideas, which always exist together, there is sepa- 
rated by a direct negation any other simple idea which is 
constantly joined with them. 

5. Ideas in general may be false : 

1°. When they are taken to be conformable to other 
men's ideas without being so. 

2°. When they are taken to be conformable to real ex- 
istence without being so. 

5°. W 7 hen they are taken to be adequate when in- 
adequate. 



121 



4®. When they are taken to represent the real essence of 
substances. 

True and false ideas are more properly called right and 
wrong. 

III. 

Association. 

1. Unreasonableness, eccentricity, and extravagance, in 
all its various degrees, extending to absolute madness or 
insanity, proceeds from a wrong association of ideas. 
Some things are associated in nature, and a corresponding 
association takes place in our ideas : but besides these na- 
tural associations, there are some of quite another kind, in 
which the ideas are arbitrarily put together by the fancy, 
without any other connexion than that which is given to 
them by the mind. 

Such associations are produced by our various inclina- 
tions, educations, interests, propensities, passions, &c. 
and are therefore different with different men. Such are 
the cause of most of our sympathies and antipathies. This 
explains why time cures mental disorders, which are out of 
the reach of any other remedy, because the association is 
broken, and the idea which produced the injurious effect 
no longer follows its companion. Thus the recent loss of a 
favourite child never occurs to the parent without bringing 
with it the idea of the pleasure derived from it while 
living; but time enables the parent ultimately to think of 
the loss without reflecting upon the pleasure, and thus 
mitigates the effects of grief. 



LECTURE XIX, 



Of Language. 

1. THAT man was designed by nature for a social 
being we may conclude from these circumstances: 1°. He 
has been made with an inclination for society. 2°. He is 
laid under the necessity of it in order to supply the various 
wants and conveniences of life ; and 3°. He is gifted with 
the means, by being endued with language, the great in- 
strument and common tie of society. There are three 
requisites for language: — 1°. To form articulate sounds — 
2°. To make these sounds the signs of ideas — 3°. To make 
them general. The last two are by no means necessary 
consequences of the first. For we find many animals able 
to produce articulate sounds, but which never are applied 
to communicate ideas ; neither does it follow, even if they 
did, that they would communicate general ideas, as it has 
been already shown that it is highly probable that animals 
have not general ideas. 

2. There are no names in any language which, properly 
speaking, signify no ideas. Negative terms, such as nihil, 
ignorance, &c. relate to the positive idea, and signify its 
absence. 

3. The structure of language would seem to confirm 
the principle that sensation is the original source of our 



123 



ideas; for these words, which express actions and notions 
quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and 
from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more ab- 
struce significations. (See Lecture II.) 

4. To understand better the use and force of language, 
as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be con- 
venient to consider, 

1°. To what it is that names in the use of language are 
immediately applied. 

2°. To consider what the species and genera of things 
are. 

5. Words, by reason of their plenty and quickness, are 
a fit instrument of communication. It is however by an 
arbitrary association made by the mind between the sound 
and the idea that the former comes so readily to excite the 
latter, and not by any natural or necessary connexion ; 
for if it was so, there would be but one language in the 
world. 

The proper signification of words is the idea s in the 
mjnjd^ofdie^sj^aJke^*. They are however secretly referred, 
1°. To ideas in the minds of other men ; and 2°. To the 
reality of things. The former applies to the names of 
simple ideas and modes, and the latter to those of sub- 
stances. 

The facility and quickness with which words excite ideas 
is to be ascribed altogether to the effects of association. It 
not unfrequently happens, however, that they fail in this, 
which shows how arbitrary the determination of the ideas 
expressed by language is. 

5. All things that exist being particulars, it might per- 
haps be thought reasonable that words being conformable 
to things, ought also to be particular in their signification. 
Yet the far greater part of words, that make all languages, 
are general terms. This is not the effect of neglect or 
chance, but of necessity and reason, 



1£4 



Words are the representatives of ideas, and not imme- 
diately of things ; and as it would be utterly impossible 
for the mind to frame and retain distinct ideas of all par- 
ticular things, it is not wonderful that we have not parti- 
cular names, not having the corresponding particular 
ideas. There is therefore a positive necessity that words 
should be general in their signification. 

But even were it possible that every particular thing 
should have a particular name, still it would be useless, 
either for the immediate purpose of communication, or for 
the extension of knowledge. Communication could not 
be effected by particular names applied to particular things, 
whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names 
of them could not be significant or intelligible to another 
who was not acquainted with all those very particular 
things which had fallen under my notice. Neither could a 
particular nomenclature serve the extension of knowledge, 
which enlarges itself by general views, to which things 
reduced to sorts under general names are properly subser- 
vient. Names, therefore, are for the most part general, 
those things only which it is necessary to speak of when 
out of sight having proper names. 

6. Ideas become general by abstraction (See Lect. IX,) 
and words become general by expressing general ideas. 
In the old Logic general terms served to facilitate and 
abridge definitions. Locke, however, thinks that defining 
by general terms is not only not the only way, but that it 
is not the best. He considers that the old Logicians 
defined by genus and difference, merely to save the labour 
of enumerating the simple ideas, and frequently to save 
the shame of not being able to do so. Definition by 
genus and difference is not always possible, for language 
is not constructed to accommodate the arbitrary rules 
of Logic, so that every term shall be exactly definable 
by two others. But even were this method of defin- 
ing always possible, still he thinks that it would serve 



t£». 



the purpose better to enumerate severally the simple 
ideas. 

7. According to Locke, species and genera are purely 
fictions of the mind. He denies that nature has made 
things in sorts or species, and holds that they are made 
individually, but that men observing certain degrees of 
similitude amongst individuals, from them into sorts fcfrAf! 
classes for the mere purposes of language, without which 
he conceives that species and genera would have never 
existed. The essence of a species he holds to be the ab- 
stract idea signified by the name of that species, which he 
attempts to establish syllogistically thus : 

Having the essence of the species makes a thing be of 
the species. 

Being of the species gives the thing a right to the name 
of {he species. 

Having a right to the name infers a conformity to the 
idea. 

v Having the essence is having a conformity to the idea, 

From this Sorites he infers that the essences of the an- 
cient Logicians were nothing but abstract ideas. 

7. Essences are of two kinds, reaL and. nommaj. The 
real essence is the real^and actual constitution of a thing 
whereby it is what it is, and from which all. its properties 
may be deduced. The nominaj^ essence is the complex 
idea signified by the name. Concerning the real essences 
of corporeal substances, there have been two opinions: 
the one is of those, who using the word essence for they- 
know not what, suppose a ^}^^^I^hsx^^S^^^^S'^^^ >^*7 
according to which all natural things are made, and 
wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so 
become of this or that species. The other, and more ra- 
tional opinion is, of those who look upon all natural things 
to have a real but unknown constitution of their insensible 
parts, from which flow these sensible qualities, which 
serve us to distinguish them one from another, according 



126 

as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common 
denominations. The former of these opinions, which sup- 
poses these essences a certain number of forms or moulds, 
has much perplexed natural knowledge. The frequent 
production of monsters is inconsistent with this hypothesis-. 
Besides, were there no other objection, the supposition of 
such unknown essences to distinguish species would be 
useless. 

8. In simple -ideas and. modes the real essence is the 
nominal essence; but in substances the real essence is the 
real unknown constitution, from which the qualities which 

• I ?¥*"' "'compose the nominal essence flow. The maxim that es- 
sences were ingenerable and incorruptible, shows that 
these essences must have been abstract ideas, and not the 
real internal constitution, which is continually liable to 
change. 

9. Though all words signify nothing immediately but 
the ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet upon a nearer 
survey we find that the names of simple ideas, mixed 
modes, and substances, have each something peculiar 
and different from the other. Locke enumerates six pe- 
culiarities in the names of simple ideas: 

1°. They (and those of substances) are distinguished 
from the names of mixed modes by intimating real exist- 
ence. 

2°. They (in common with those of mixed modes) are 
distinguished from those of substances by signifying both 
real and nominal essence. 

3°. They are undeflnable. 

4°. They are least doubtful. 

5°. They have but few steps in the predicamental line. 

6°. They signify ideas which are not at all arbitrary. 

10. We have already explained what a definition is, 
and shown why the names of simple ideas cannot be de- 
fined. (See Lect. III.) We have also shown the dif- 
ferent ways whereby the meaning of these terms may be 



made known. It is'obviously absurd to suppose all terms 
definable ; for if the terms of one definition were still to 
be defined by another, where at last should we stop i 
The not observing this has produced that eminent trifling 
in the schools which is so easy to be observed in the 
definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. 
The peripatetic definition of motion is " actus entis in 
potentia quatenus in potentia." The act of a being in 
power as far forth as power. Locke proposes that this 
definition should be given to a Dutchman to find that 
word in his language to which it belongs, as a test of its 
absurdity. The moderns, in attempting to define simple 
ideas, assign their causes. The atomists say that " motion 
is the passage from place to place." This is not properly 
a definition, because passage and motion are synonymous. 
(See Lect. III.) Descartes defined motion to be the 
successive application of the parts of the surface of one 
body to those of another. The peripatetic definition of 
light is the "act of perspicuous as far forth as perspicuous." 
Locke proposes to attempt to give a blind man the idea of 
light by this definition, a criterion to which no definition 
of motion could be subjected, because it is an idea of 
touch, a sense which is inseparable from life. Some have 
defined light by ascribing its supposed cause, by saying 
that it is a great number of small globules striking against 
the bottom of the eye. The idea of the cause, however, if 
we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the idea 
of light itself than the figure and motion of a sharp piece 
of steel would give the idea of pain. Fie illustrates the 
absurdity of attempting to get from definition a simple 
idea, of which we want the proper organ, by a blind man, 
who endeavouring to find out what scarlet was like, con- 
cluded that it resembled the sound of a trumpet. We are 
fitted to define the names of complex ideas when we know 
the component simple ideas and their names. In this case 
complex ideas can therefore be always defined. 



128 



11. Although the names of simple do not admit defi- 
nition, yet they are of all others the least doubtful. They 
have not that multiplicity of component parts which makes 
the signification of the names of mixed modes so doubtful, 
nor are they referred to any unknown essence which con- 
fuses those of substances. This great simplicity and un- 
compoundedness of these ideas prevents their names from 
having many steps in a predicemental line, for the lowest 
species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out 
of it, that so the difference being taken awaj', it may agree 
with some other thing in one idea common to them both. 

12. The peculiarity of the names of mixed modes is that 
they express ideas made by the mind arbitrarily, without 
patterns, and merely for the purpose of communication. 
That they are arbitrary is plain from this, that the idea and 
its name is frequently made before there has been any ex- 
istence conformable to it. This also explains why they 
are so complex, and why their names are usually acquired 
before the ideas themselves. (See Lect. XIV.) 



LECTURE XX. 



Language continued. Particles, terms abstract 
and concrete. The abuses and imperfections of 
words, and their remedies. 

WORDS are two-fold : Terms and Particles. 

Terms are words which express ideas. 

Particles are words which express the connexion of 
ideas, or of propositions. 

As the signification of terms is comparatively obvious, 
the right use of particles is what chiefly contributes to the 
beauty and perspicuity of style in composition. 

To think well it is necessary 1°. That we should have 
clear and distinct ideas. 2°. That we should perceive 
their agreement or disagreement ; and 3°. We must think 
in train, and observe the dependence of our thoughts and 
reasonings upon one another. So also to discourse well 
it is necessary to have distinct names, not only (terms) 
for our ideas themselves, but also (particles) for the con- 
nexion, restriction, distinction, &c. which we give to each 
part of our discourse. 

As an instance of the effect of particles on the sense of 
a sentence, Locke mentions the use of the word " but," 
of which he gives four applications. 

1°. " But to say no more," 

2°. " I saw but two plants." 
s 



130 



3°. " You pray, but it is not that God should bring 
you to true religion," 

4°. " But that he would confirm you in your own." 

2. Terms are concrete or abstract. 

A concrete term is the name of a quality or a thing, as 
black, rational, pater. 

An abstract term expresses the essence of a thing, as 
blackness, rationality, paternity. 

The distinction between abstract and concrete terms is 
not the same as between substantive and adjective, although 
Locke seems to intimate this; for pater and paternitas 
are both substantives, and yet the former is concrete and 
the latter abstract. An abstract term, however, is always 
a substantive, but a concrete term not always so. 

Locke affirms, that had men attended to the construc- 
tion of language they would probably have discovered in 
it a tacit acknowledgment that we have no ideas of the 
real essences of substances. For although we have ab- 
stract as well as concrete names of similar ideas, as sweet- 
ness, sweet, — and of mixed modes, as justice, just, — and 
of relations, as paternitas, pater, yet we have only con- 
crete names of substances. Although in the schools we 
find animal, animalietas ; humanus, humanitas ; corpus, 
corporietas, and such like, yet such terms have never 
come into general use, and must be considered to be in- 
vented by the schools to suit their absurd hypothesis of 
real essences. This exclusion from general use proves 
that men have no ideas corresponding to such terms. Al- 
though the term humanity is in common use, yet it is in 
quite a different sense the abstract of human. 

3. The use of words is two-fold: 
1°. For recording, 

2°. For communicating our thoughts. 

For the first purpose any words will serve, only observ- 
ing the rule to use the same words always in the same 
sense. 



1S1 



The use of words for communication is two-fold : 

1°. Civil, 

2°. Philosophical. 

The civil use of words is such a communication of 
thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the up- 
holding of common conversation and commerce about the 
ordinary aifairs and conveniences of civil life. 

The philosophical use of words is to convey the precise 
notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, 
certain undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon 
and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge. 
Much more exactness therefore is necessary in this than 
in the former. 

4. Words have but one imperfection, scil. doubtfulness 
in their signification. The causes of this imperfection are 
four-fold : 

1°. Where they stand for very complex ideas. 

2°. When the compound ideas have no necessary con- 
nexion, and therefore no standard to adjust the significa- 
tion by. 

3°. Where the word is referred to a standard not easily 
known. 

4°. Where the signification of the word and the real 
essence of the thing are different. 

These are the difficulties attending words which are in- 
telligible, but there are others which Locke thinks it un- 
necessary to mention, as the want of organs or faculties to 
acquire the idea which the word signifies. 

5. The first two of these causes of imperfection apply 
particularly to mixed modes. The reason of this com- 
plexity, and the arbitrary manner in which they are made 
by the mind without existing patterns, have already been 
explained. 

Propriety is but an imperfect remedy for these, because 
no one or two or more individuals have a right to set 
themselves up as the standard of propriety. Their causes 



132 

of imperfection are more sensibly felt in moral discourses, 
and in the construction of laws, than elsewhere, because 
the ideas which enter these sciences are all complex, 
mixed modes and relations. 

6. The last two causes of imperfection obviously apply 
to substances, the real essences of which are unknown to 
us. Even the nominal essences, or collections of necessa- 
rily coexisting qualities, are very imperfectly known, as 
has been already explained. Although with this imper- 
fection their names serve for the common purposes of life, 
yet it is a great obstruction to our progress in the science 
of bodies. 

To show how much we are misled by the imperfec- 
tion of modes, Locke mentions an instance of a dispute, 
whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the 
nerves. He proposed to the disputants to define liquor, 
upon which they found that the dispute originated in their 
having different ideas attached to that term. 

Of all words the names of simple ideas are least doubt- 
ful. See Lect. XIX. §11. Next to them, simple modes, 
especially those of figure and number, and the most doubt- 
ful of all are the names of mixed modes, and very com- 
pounded ideas of substances. 

7. Besides those defects which necessarily arise from 
the nature of language, there are others which arise from 
the wilful abuse of it. The abuses of words are seven : 

1°. Using words without any or clear ideas. 

2°. Using words unsteadily. 

3°. Affecting obscurity by their misapplication. 

4°. Taking words for things. 

5°. Setting them for what they cannot signify. 

6°. Supposing them to have a necessary signification. 

7°. Figurative language. 

8. The first abuse of words is two-fold : 

1°. Using words which have not, nor ever had, any dis- 
The various sects of philosophy and reli- 



13J 



gion have been most eminent in this. 2°. Using words 
which, in the propriety of language, do express distinct 
ideas, without any or without clear signification. This 
abuse is produced by children learning the names before 
the ideas, and beginning and continuing the use of them 
without ever taking the trouble of learning the exact sig- 
nification. Locke illustrates the difficulty of refuting men 
whose notions are thus unsettled by. that of dispossessing 
a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled place of 
abode. 

9. He compares the second abuse of words to one who 
in his accounts uses the figures unsteadily, sometimes to 
signify one number and sometimes another, as suits his 
interest. But he thinks this the more dishonest argu- 
ment, inasmuch as truth is more valuable than money. 

10. The third abuse of words is three-fold: 

1°. By applying old words in new and unusual signifi- 
cations, without defining them. 

2°. Introducing new and ambiguous terms, without de- 
fining them. 

3°. Putting words together so as to confound their or- 
dinary signification. 

In this abuse of words the schools have been most re- 
markable, and have done true philosophy the greatest in- 
jury. The absurdity of their doctrines necessarily led 
to this, for there is no more effectual way of defending 
strange and absurd doctrines than to guard them round by 
legions of obscure, doubtful and undefined words, which 
yet make these retreats more like the holes of foxes, or 
the dens of robbers, than the fortresses of fair warriors ; 
which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the 
strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and 
the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. Neither 
is there any ingenuity displayed in this abuse of language, 
no more than there would be in writing a book in which 



131 



the signification of the letters of the alphabet should be 
changed A for B, and B for A, D for E, &c. 

11. The fourth abuse is also remarkable in the schools; 
as instances, none of the disciples would for a moment 
think of doubting the existences of things called substan- 
tial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, in- 
tentional species, &c. ; no pluarist doubted of the exist- 
ence of w the soul of the world," nor Epicurean of the end 
carried towards motion in abuses at rest!! .The worst effect 
of this abuse is that it renders error lasting. 

12. As an instance of the fifth abuse, he mentions 
using the names of substances for the real essences. This 
is the reason why men who have different ideas of sub- 
stance, yet both refer them to the same species, because 
they secretly suppose the name annexed to an immutable 
essence of a thing existing, on which these properties de- 
pend. Hence it is generally admitted, that there may be 
a change in the subject without changing the species. 

13. The cause of this abuse is the supposition that na- 
ture works regularly in the production of things, and gives 
exactly the same constitution to each individual which we 
rank under the same name. This abuse contains two false 
suppositions. 1°. That there are certain precise essences, 
according to which particular things are made, and by 
which they are distinguished into species. 2°. That we 
have ideas of these essences. 

14. As an instance of the sixth abuse he mentions 
" Life," a term in common use, and yet if it come in 
question whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the 
seed, whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or 
a man in a swoon without sense or motion have life or no, 
it is easy to perceive that the term life has not a necessary 
and evident signification. 

15. Locke considers that although figurative speech 
may be tolerated in works from which pleasure only is 
sought, and in popular addresses, &c. yet that it cannot be 






135 



at all admitted in serious philosophical discourses, in which 
he admits no part of rhetoric but order and clearness. He 
anticipates however opposition in this doctrine, and de- 
clares that " Eloquence like the fair sex has too prevailing 
beauties in it to suffer itself to be spoken against.' , 

16. The ends of language are 1°. to convey our ideas; 
2°. to do it with quickness, and 3°. thereby to convey 
knowledge. Men's words fail in these. 

1°. When they are used without ideas; which is like 
one that knows the titles of books without their con- 
tents. 

2°. Where there are ideas without names; which is like 
a bookseller who has in his warehouse volumes that lay 
there unbound, and which he can only make known to 
others by showing the leaf sheets. 

3°. When the same word is not put always for the same 
idea. This is like one who at a market sells several things 
under the same name. 

4°. When the words of a language are applied out of 
their usual signification. 

5°. When substances are imagined which have no ex- 
istence. 

All these defects apply to the use of the names of sub- 
stances, the first four only to those of mixed modes. 

17. The remedies enumerated by Locke for the abuses 
and imperfections of words are five: 

1°. To use no word without an idea. 

2°. To have distinct ideas of modes and conformable of 
substances. 

3°. Propriety. 

4<°. To make known the meaning of words. 

5°. Steadiness in the use of them. 

For the several ways of making known the meaning of 
the names of simple ideas, see Lect. III. § 5. 

The names of mixed modes may be perfectly explained 



136 



by definition, because they consist of ideas arbitrarily 
made by the mind. See Lect. XIV. 

The names of substances may be made known partly 
by definition and partly by shewing. The leading and 
obvious qualities are best explained by shewing, and the 
powers by definition, 

Locke thinks that morality is susceptible of demonstra- 
tion, because the terms being the names of mixed modes, 
all admit of perfect definition. 



LECTURE XXI. 



Of Knowledge in general. The degrees of Know* 

ledge. 



1. KNOWLEDGE is the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of our ideas* This agreement or 
disagreement is of four sorts i 

1°. Identity or diversity. 

2°. Relation. 

3°. Coexistence, or necessary connexion. 

4°. Real existence. 

Actual knowledge is the present view which the mind 
has of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. This know- 
ledge consists in the perception of the thing proved, toge- 
ther with its proofs. 

Habitual knowledge is the memory, a former convic- 
tion of a truth. 

2. There are two kinds of habitual knowledge. One is 
the memory of a former conviction, united with a power 
of recalling and retracing the proofs if necessary. The 
other is the memory of the conviction when all recollec- 
tion of the proofs is lost. This latter knowledge is not 
inferior in certainty to the former, but its certainty de- 
pends on different principles. The certainty of the former 
depends on the continued ability to verify it by actunl 

T 



138 



proof. The certainty of the latter depends on the know- 
ledge of having once proved it; abstract ideas, as well as 
their relations being immutable, what was once true of 
them must continue to be true. Thus the principle of 
the immutability of the same relation between the same 
immutable things, is the principle upon which this 
certainty rests. It appears, therefore, that habitual 
knowledge of this kind is only applicable to abstract 
ideas as particular beings, and their qualities are mu- 
table. 

3. The degrees of knowledge are threefold, intuitive, 
demonstrative, and sensitive. 

Intuitive knowledge is the immediate perception, which 
the mind has of the agreement or the disagreement of two 
ideas, without the intervention of any other idea. This 
is the highest imaginable species of certainty, and is the 
foundation of all other knowledge. 

Demonstrative knowledge is the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the inter- 
vention of other ideas, whose agreement with each other 
and with the first is perceived intuitively. This is 
called reasoning, and the intermediate ideas are called 
proofs. Quickness in the discovery of proofs is called 
sagacity. Locke illustrates the inferior clearness of de- 
monstrative knowledge by a face reflected by several 
mirrors, by which lustre is lost in each reflection. It 
is not however to be concluded from this that the 
certainty of demonstrative knowledge is inferior to that 
of intuitive. 

Locke considers that the necessity that each step of 
demonstration should be intuitively perceived, gave rise 
to the maxim that all reasoning was " ex praecognitis et 
praeconcessis," which shall be hereafter shown to be er- 
roneous. 

The third degree of knowledge is that which we have 
of the existence of objects which affect the senses. Many 



139 

have doubted whether this ought to be allowed to be 
knowledge. Locke however thinks otherwise, for reasons 
which we shall give in a subsequent lecture. 

The clearness of our knowledge does not depend on 
the clearness of our ideas, but on the clearness of our per- 
ception of their agreement or disagreement. 



LECTURE XXII. 



Of the Extent and Reality of Knowledge, 



1. SINCE knowledge is the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of ideas, it follows that its extent 
is limited by our power of obtaining this perception, and 
this power is considerably limited in each of the three 
degrees of knowledge. 

1°. An intuitive knowledge cannot extend to all our 
ideas, because we cannot examine all the relations they 
have one to another by juxta position, or an immediate 
comparison of one with another. 

2°. Demonstrative cannot extend to all our ideas, be- 
cause we cannot always find such mediums as we can 
connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge. 

3°. Sensitive knowledge only extends to the existence 
of such things as are actually present to the senses. 

The clearness of our ideas by no means infers a clear 
knowledge of their relations. Locke gives two remark- 
able examples of this from mathematics and metaphysics. 

We have clear ideas of a square and a circle, and yet 
have never been able to describe them equal to each other. 
This is the well known problem of the quadrature of the 
circle. We have also clear ideas of matter and thinking, 



141 



and yet have never been able to determine whether mere 
matter is capable of thought; in other words, whether the 
thinking faculty can be the mere result of organization. 

2. To determine the extent of knowledge let us con- 
sider the four different species of agreement or disagree- 
ment. 

1°. Our knowledge of identity and diversity extends as 
far as our ideas. 

2°. Our knowledge of co-existence is very limited, owing 
to our ignorance of the real essences of substances, whe- 
ther material or immaterial. The repugnancy to co-ex- 
istence is more easily perceivable, owing to the impossibi- 
lity of inconsistent qualities belonging to the same being. 

3°. The extent of our knowledge of relations is the 
largest field of our knowledge, and it is hard to say how 
far it may extend, because its enlargement depends on our 
sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, to which there is no 
obvious limit. As an instance of the prodigious extent of 
demonstrative knowledge of relations, Locke mentions 
the wonders effected by algebra, and suggests that some 
similar methods may hereafter be discovered for investiga- 
tions in other departments of science. In particular, he 
conceives, that the science of morals is capable of being 
reduced to a demonstrative form, if proper methods were 
applied to it. For since the ideas of ourselves as rational 
and accountable beings, and that of God as a creator and 
moral governor are perfectly clear and defined, as well 
as those of our actions, he maintains that from self-evident 
propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable 
as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong 
may be made out to any one that will apply himself with 
the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does 
to the other of these sciences. As instances he proposes 
the two moral theorems : " Where there is no property 
there is no injustice," and " No government allows of ab- 
solute liberty. " For property implying a right, and injus- 



142 

lice a violation of a right, it is as evident that the propo- 
sition is true, as that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles. Again, the idea of government 
implying rules and laws, a conformity to which is en- 
forced, and the idea of absolute liberty being the power 
of absolutely doing what one pleases without reference 
to a rule, the truth of the second principle is also evi- 
dent. 

Two circumstances have contributed to the notion 
that propositions involving moral ideas are incapable of 
demonstration, their want of sensible representations, and 
their great complexity. In these respects the mathema- 
tical sciences, particularly geometry, have greatly the ad- 
vantage over ethics. The ideas involved in the former 
are all modes of the simple idea of quantity, and in geo- 
metry are capable of being represented by draughts or 
diagrams, which assist the mind in the investigation of 
their several relations. The ideas which are engaged in 
moral science, on the other hand, being those of the ac- 
tions of rational beings, are generally very complex, as has 
been already shown, and not being referred to visible or 
external things, but involving the notions of internal 
feelings and sentiments do not admit of any such pictures 
or draughts, the investigation of the relations of such ideas 
is attended with considerable difficulties. These difficul- 
ties are not, however, considered by Locke as insurmount- 
able, and he suggests as remedies for them, to have settled 
and clear definitions of all moral words, and to have the 
mind disengaged from all prejudices, and impressed with 
a sincere desire after truth. 

4°. Our knowledge of real existence is limited to an 
intuitive knowledge of our own existence, a demonstrative 
knowledge of the existence of the JDeity, and a sensitive 
knowledge of things present to the senses. 

3. Our knowledge being so confined it will give us 
some light into the present state of our minds, if we take 



143 



a view of the causes of our ignorance. These are three- 
fold : 

1°. Want of ideas. 

2°. Want of discoverable connexion between them. 

3°. Want of tracing and examining them. 

4. The want of ideas is two-fold : the want of those 
which we are incapable of acquiring, as those of colours 
to a blind man, and the want of those which we have fa- 
culties to attain, but which the remoteness or minuteness 
of the objects prevent us from receiving, as the state of 
vegetation and modes of life upon the different planAts, or 
the minute constituent parts of bodies which fall under 
daily observations. 

5. Our inability to perceive the nature of the consti- 
tuent parts of bodies induces Locke to suppose that the 
properties of bodies depending on their constituent parts, 
which are the object of chemistry, can never be reduced 
to a science. He acknowledges that our ideas of the sorts 
of bodies which fall under our notice may be distinct, but 
denies that under our present constitution they can be 
adequate. Our knowledge of the properties and constitu- 
tion of spirits must necessarily be even more confined 
than of bodies. 

6. The second cause of ignorance enumerated above is 
eminently observable in the ideas of secondary qualities 
of bodies, for we are and must continue to be utterly ig- 
norant of the connexion between these ideas and their 
exciting causes. Amongst other instances of the limits 
of our faculties he mentions the resurrection of the 
dead and the future state of this globe, as beyond our 
conception. 

The third cause of ignorance is wilful, and frequently 
proceeds from the abuse of words. 

The universality of our knowledge is equal with that 
of our ideas. 

7. As to the reality of our knowledge it may be ob- 



144 



jected, that if knowledge consist only in the perception 

of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, it may be all 
visionary and fanciful ; knowledge, however, is real when 
the ideas are real, and the criterions which determine the 
reality of ideas have been fully explained in Lect. XVII. 



LECTURE XXIII. 



L 



Of Truth. 

TRUTH is the joining or separating of signs according 
as the things signified by them do agree or disagree 
amongst each other. By the joining or separating of signs 
is here meant what by another name is called proposition. 
Signs are either words or ideas ; accordingly there are 
two species of propositions, mental and verbal. To form 
a clear notion of truth, it is necessary to consider truth 
of thought and truth of words distinctly one from ano- 
ther; but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder, 
because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental proposi- 
tions, to make use of words, and then the instances of 
mental propositions cease to be barely mental and be- 
come verbal. Another difficulty in treating of mental 
propositions is, that most men, if not all, in their think- 
ings and reasonings within themselves, make use of words 
instead of ideas, at least when the subject of their medi- 
tation includes complex ideas. Mental truth consists in 
the putting together or separating ideas in the mind, as 
they or the things they stand for do agree or not, and 
verbal truth is the affirming or denying words as the ideas 
they stand for agree or disagree. This latter, as will be 

u 



146 



presently explained is two-fold, either purely verbal and 
trifling, or real and instructive. 



II. 
Maxims. 

There are a sort of propositions, which, under the 
name of maxims or axioms, have passed for principles of 
science, and because they are self-evident, have been sup- 
posed innate. We shall, therefore, inquire into the reason 
of their self-evidence, and whether this quality be peculiar 
to them alone, and how far they influence the other parts 
of our knowledge. 

Knowledge being the perception of the agreement or 
disagreement of ideas, it is self-evident when this agree- 
ment or disagreement is perceived without the interven- 
tion of any other idea. This then is the true ground of 
the self-evidence of axioms; nor is this self-evidence pecu- 
liar to them, but extends to a vast class of other particular 
propositions. 

In identity and diversity our intuitive knowledge is as 
extensive as our ideas, and therefore all propositions ex- 
pressing this species of agreement or disagreement, are 
equally self-evident, although it is only a few general ones, 
such as " whatever is, is ;" and " it is impossible for the 
same thing to be and not' to be," and such that have been 
dignified with the name of axioms. 

As to co-existence, owing to our ignorance of real 
essences, we have few self-evident propositions. There 
are however some, e. g. the idea of filling space equal to 
the contents of its superfices being annexed to an idea of 
body, it is a self-evident proposition that two bodies can- 
not be at the same time in the same place. 

As to real existence, Locke declares that we have no 



14? 

self-evident proposition. He has here, however, forgotten 

what he elsewhere asserts, that we have an intuitive know- . 

ledge of our own existence, a. ^t^^a-A^/^Aa^u^^^^^^ 

We shall now consider what influence maxims have ' ' 

upon the other parts of knowledge. The rules of the 
schools, that all reasoning is ex prcecognitis et pratconcessis, 
seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these 
maxims, and to suppose them to be prcecog?iita i whereby 
is meant these two things: 1°. That they are the truths 
first known, and 2°. That upon them the other parts of 
our knowledge depend. 

Now that the very abstract propositions which pass for 
axioms are not the truths first known, will be perceived 
by any person who considers the progress of his own know- 
ledge. It is evident that we first acquire a knowledge 
of particular self-evident propositions, and from due 
contemplation of these particulars, the mind, by its 
abstracting power, makes the general propositions called 
axioms. 

It follows also from what has been said, that these 
maxims are not the foundations of our other knowledge ; 
for if there be a great many truths which have as muck 
evidence as they, and a great many which we know be- 
fore them, it is impossible that they should be principles 
from which we deduce all other truths. 

Although these general maxims are neither of use to 
prove less general self-evident propositions, nor are they 
the foundations of our knowledge, nor even of use in ad- 
vancing the progress of scientific discovery, yet they are 
not altogether to be rejected. They answer a two-fold 
purpose. 

1°. They are of use in teaching the sciences by the ordi- 
nary methods, as far as those sciences are already known. 

2°. They are of use in disputes for silencing obstinate 
wrangles, and bringing these contests to some conclusion. 
With those who dispute merely for the sake of victory, 



148 



and not for the love of truth, and who will therefore not 
scruple to deny the truth of any proposition, however 
self-evident, it is necessary to have those established 
maxims which are supposed to be granted in all disqui- 
sitions. 

In the use of maxims, even in this way, we should be 
cautious lest by the ill use of language we should be led 
into contradictions. He that with Des Cartes shall frame 
in his mind an idea of what he calls body, to be nothing 
but extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no 
vacuum by this maxim, " what is, is ;" for his idea of 
body being mere extension, his knowledge that space can- 
not be without body is certain. 

In the application of maxims to complex ideas, we are 
peculiarly liable to error, because men generally mistake, 
thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the 
propositions are about the same things, though the ideas 
they stand for are in] truth different ; therefore these 
maxims are made use of to support those which in sound 
and appearance are contradictory propositions. 



LECTURE XXIV. 



Trifling Propositions. 

THERE is an extensive class of Universal Proposi- 
tions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add 
no light to our understanding, bring no increase to our 
knowledge. Such Proposition may be reduced to three 
heads: 1. Identical Propositions. 2. Those in which a 
part of a complex idea is predicated of the whole. 3. 
Those in which words are used unsteadily. 

Identical Propositions are those in which a term is 
affirmed of itself, or two synonymes of one another. Such 
Propositions are contained under the general one, what is, 
is ; and they are manifestly trifling. 

The second class is where a part of a definition is pre- 
dicated of the word defined. This only teaches the sig- 
nification of words, but gives no real knowledge. This is 
most usual in our ideas of substances. In fine, Proposi- 
tions purely verbal or trifling, may be known by these 
marks : 1 . Predication in the abstract. 2. A part of the 
definition predicated of a term. 



Existence of God, 

It has been observed that we have a three-fold know- 
ledge of existence: 1. Our own existence, which is in- 



150 

stinctive. 2. The existence of God, which is demonstra- 
tive. 3. The existence of external things, which is sen- 
sitive. 

The proof of the existence of God is founded on two 
principles, which are assumed as self-evident. 1. That 
" ex nihilo nihil fit ," which amounts to this, that no being 
can be imagined to create himself. 

2. That what had its being or beginning from another, 
must also have that which is in and belongs to its being 
from another. All the powers it has must be owing to, 
and received from the same source. 

From the former principle it follows that admitting our 
own existence, there must have been an eternal existence j 
and from the second, that this eternal being must be most 
powerful, most wise, and in a word must possess all those 
powers which we find in ourselves and other beings in the 
greatest degree. Thus by adding infinity to duration, 
space, and the moral attributes, w 7 e obtain the most ade- 
quate idea of the Deity, which in our present state we are 
capable of having. 

Locke considers that of the two classes of beings whose 
existence we know of, viz. cogitative and incogitative, it 
cannot be supposed that the latter could produce the 
former, because he thinks it as difficult to conceive inco- 
gitative matter producing a.cogitative being as that nothing 
should of itself produce matter. 

We have shewn that the knowledge which we have of 
our own being is intuitive, and that of God demonstrative. 
The knowledge of the existence of other things we can 
only have by the senses; for there being no necessary 
connexion of real existence with any idea in the memory, 
nor of any other existence but that of God, with the 
existence of any particular man ; no particular man can 
know the existence of any other being, but only when by 
actually operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by 
him. Having an idea of a thing in our mind, proves the 



151 



existence of the thing no more than the picture' of a man 
proves his being in the world, or the visions of a dream 
establish a true history. 

The evidence of the senses, though inferior to the cer- 
tainty of intuitive or demonstrative knowledge, yet is as 
great as human nature is capable of, respecting the ex- 
istence of material beings. Independently of the confi- 
dence every man feels in it, we are also further con- 
firmed in this assurance by the following concurrent rea- 
sons : 

1°. We cannot have those ideas except by the senses. 
It is plain that the organs of sense themselves do not 
produce them, for then the eye would produce colours in 
the dark, and the nose the smell of roses in winter, 

2°. Because an idea from sensation, and another from 
memory, are different perceptions. (Lect. VIII.) 

3°. The pleasure and pain which accompanies the idea 
of sensation do not return when the same idea revives 
without sensation. 

4°. The senses confirm each others testimony. 

From what has been said it follows that there are no 
abstract propositions concerning existence, the truth of 
which is knowable by us. Our own existence, and that 
of the Deity, are singular propositions, and the existence 
of the things present to the senses at any time is a parti- 
cular proposition. 

The existence of spirits can only be known by re- 
velation, and past existence of material beings by me- 
mory. 

It has been shewn in a* former lecture, that maxims do 
not tend to the improvement of knowledge. Locke con- 
siders that the only true method of extending and improv- 
ing it is: 1°. To acquire clear and complete abstract 
ideas, and to express them by settled names. 2°. To dis- 
cover those intermediate ideas which are necessary to 
establish the agreement or disagreement of other ideas, 



152 



which cannot be immediately compared. Concerning our 
knowledge it may be further observed, that it is partly 
necessary and partly voluntary. The degree of attention 
which we give to any investigation is voluntary, but the 
relation perceived between the ideas is necessary. We 
must perceive things as they are, and not as we please. 



LECTURE XXV. 



Of Probability, and the degrees of Assent. 

LOCKE uses the word Judgment in different senses. 
As opposed to Wit, it has been defined in Sect. IX. As 
opposed to Knowledge, it consists in the putting together 
or separating of ideas in the mind when their certain 
agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed 
to be so, which is, as the word imports, taken to be so 
before it certainly appears* 

Probability is to judgment what demonstration is to 
knowledge. Demonstration consists in shewing the agree- 
ment or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of 
ideas which have a constant, immutable, and visible con- 
nexion with each other. 

Probability, on the other hand, consists in perceiving 
the agreement or disagreement by the intervention of 
proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, 
or not perceived to be so; but is, or appears to be, gene- 
rally so. Hence it follows, that a remarkable distinction 
between certainty and probability is, that the latter admits 
of degrees, the former of none. 

The matter of probability is two-fold : v matter of fact, 
and matter of speculation:) 

In matter of fact the grounds of probability are two- 
fold : • 

x 



154 



1°. The conformity of the particular fact with our own 
general knowledge, observation, and experience of similar 
facts. 

2°. The testimony of others vouching their knowledge, 
observation, and experience of the particular fact. 

Locke has here omitted to include, in the second ground 
of probability, the testimony of others as to the conformity 
of the particular fact to similar facts. In examining the 
degrees of assent, he however subsequently takes this into 
account. 

In order to give its due weight to the testimony of wit- 
nesses, we must consider, 

1°. The number of witnesses. 
2*. Their skill. 
3°. Their integrity. 

4°. The design of the author, if a book be cited. 
5°. The consistency of the circumstances of the nar- 
rative. 

6°. Contrary testimonies. 

The opinion of others is frequently urged as a ground 
of probability. Locke considers this a most dangerous 
principle, and one which is productive of much falsehood 
and error among men. If authority be a good ground of 
probability, men would be Heathens in Japan, Mahome- 
tans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, 
and Lutherans in Sweden. 

The degrees of assent are, or ought to be, regulated 
by the grounds of probability. In matter of fact the 
highest degree of assent is where the concurrent testimony 
of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, agrees 
with our own constant and never-failing experience as to 
the conformity of the particular fact, with similar facts, 
of which all men, in all ages, and ourselves, have been 
witnesses, and where the particular fact is vouched by the 
testimony of undoubted witnesses. Thus, for example, if 
it be said by all Englishmen who have occasion to men- 



155 



tion it, that it froze in England last winter, or that they 
saw swallows there last summer, the fact would be nearly 
as certain as demonstration. Our assent, in this case, 
which is the highest degree next to absolute knowledge, 
may be called moral certainty, or assurance. 

The second degree of assent is, where the testimony of 
mankind concurs with our own experience as to the gene- 
ral (but not never- failing) conformity of the particular 
fact with similar facts, and where the particular fact is 
vouched by undoubted witnesses; Thus, for example, 
the general experience of mankind testifies that most men 
sacrifice the public good to their private advantage. Now 
if all historians who write of Tiberius agree that he did 
so, it is extremely probable. In this case, our assent 
rises to that degree which may be called confidence. 

The third case is, where a particular fact is of an indif- 
ferent kind, or which cannot be reduced to any general 
rule, as that a bird should fly this way or that way, that 
it should thunder to the right or the left, and such like. 
In this case the general experience of mankind cannot 
be taken into account, and our assent rests wholly upon 
the testimony as to the particular fact. As an instance of 
this may be given, the existence of Julius Caesar, 1700 
years ago, the existence of the city of Rome, &c. 

From these degrees downwards, through belief, con- 
jecture, guess, doubt, &c. the shades of assent and dis- 
sent are innumerable, and change with various degrees of 
accuracy and credibility of the witnesses. 

Traditional testimony becomes weaker the more re- 
moved it is from its original source. Nothing, there- 
fore, can be more fallacious than the received doctrine 
that opinions become venerable by their age. No proba- 
bility can rise higher than its first original, and every re- 
move from this weakens its force. 

In matters of speculation the only ground of probabi- 
lity is analogy ', since they are not capable of testimony, 



156 



being never the subjects of experience of ourselves or 
others. Such are 

1°. The existence, nature, and operations of finite 
material beings without us, as spirits, angels, devils, &c. 
or the existence of material beings not perceivable, 
by reason either of their remoteness or minuteness. 

2°. Concerning the manner of operation in most part 
of the works of nature, wherein, although we see the sen- 
sible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we per- 
ceive not the way whereby they are produced. 

There is but one case where contrary experience does 
not diminish the force of the testimony, and this is the 
case of miracles. These, when well attested, not only 
command our assent for themselves, but also prove other 
propositions, which it would be vain to attempt to demon- 
strate by human reason. 

The testimony of revelation has a force equal to de- 
monstration, because he who gives the testimony cannot 
err ; it is necessary, however, to be certain that it is reve« 
lation, and that we understand it rightly. 



LECTURE XXVI. 



Of Reason and Faith. 

THE word reason, in the English language, has four 
different significations : 

1°. It signifies true and clear principles. 

2°. Clear and fair deductions from these principles. 

3 d . The cause, and particularly the final cause. 

4°. That faculty by which man is supposed to be dis- 
tinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much 
surpasses them. 

There are two faculties employed in reasoning, sagacity 
and illation. 

Sagacity is the faculty of discovering the intermediate 
ideas necessary to establish the connexion between any 
two ideas proposed. Illation is that faculty by which we 
perceive the connexion in each step of the deduction. 

In reason Locke distinguishes these four degrees : 

1°. The highest is the discovery of proofs. 

2°. Disposing them so as to make their connexion 
plainly and easily perceived. 

3°. The perception of their connexion. 

4°. Drawing a right conclusion. 

In treating of reason Locke takes occasion to refute 
the received opinion, that the syllogism of the old logi- 
cians is one of its most efficient instruments. ♦ 



1.58 



His reasons for thinking this opinion unfounded are as 
follow : 

1. Because syllogism serves our reason but in one of the 
forementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the con- 
nexion of the proofs in any one instance, and no more : 
but it is of no great use even in this ; since the mind can 
conceive such connexion where it really is, as easily, nay, 
perhaps better without it. 

2. Men who are ignorant of syllogistic rules reason 
clearly and rightly without them. 

3. Although syllogism has been supposed the best me- 
thod of exposing a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, 
or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period, yet the arti- 
ficial form into which the argument is put, only shews its 
fallacy to those who are acquainted with the rules of mode 
and figure. 

4. If syllogism be the only instrument of reason, how 
did men who lived before Aristotle reason, and also the 
large portion of the world since his time, who know no- 
thing of his rules ? As an example of reasoning more 
clearly without the form of syllogism than with it, Locke 
proposes to infer the proposition, " that men can deter- 
mine themselves;" from this " that men shall be punished 
in a future state." And he asserts that a simple arrange- 
ment of the terms in succession, " God the punisher — 
just punishment — the punished guilty — could have done 
otherwise — freedom— self-determination," is much less con- 
fused than the train of syllogisms in which it would be 
necessary to arrange the same reasoning. 

The only case where Locke acknowledges the syllo- 
gistic forms to be of use, is in the schools where men are 
allowed without shame to deny the most manifest truth ; 
or out of the schools, to those who from thence have 
learned shamefully to deny the connexion of ideas which 
is visible to themselves. 

5. He gives, as a further reason for the inutility of syllo- 



159 

gism, that before the ideas can be reduced to a syllogism 
their connexion must be perceived, and then it is use- 
less. 

6. Another reason for concluding syllogism not to be 
the proper instrument of reason, is, that it is quite as 
liable to fallacies and sophistry as any other species of 
reasoning,^and therefore it often happens, that when men 
are baffled and silenced in this way, they are seldom or 
never convinced. They perhaps acknowledge their ad- 
versary to be the more skilful disputant, but rest satisfied 
that the truth is nevertheless on their side. 

Syllogism, in determining the degrees of assent, is of still 
less use than in demonstration ; for the assent being to be 
determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing 
all the proofs, with all the circumstances on both sides, 
nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism ; 
which running away with one assumed probability, or one 
topical argument, pursues that until it has led the mind 
quite out of sight of the thing under consideration ; and 
forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there, 
manacled in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it 
the liberty, much less affording it the helps requisite to 
show on which side is the greater probability. 

Locke objects to the syllogistical reasoning, because it 
requires that in every syllogism there must be at least one 
universal proposition, whereas we principally reason about 
particulars. He seems, however, to mistake a particular 
proposition for a singular. He prefers the order of the 
reasoning in a sorites to that of the propositions of a 
syllogism in the first figure. 

However extensive and powerful human reason may be, 
yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal 
being ; and there are many instances wherein it fails us : 

1°. It perfectly fails where our ideas fail. 

2°. It fails when our ideas are obscure and imperfect. 



160 

3°. It fails when intermediate ideas, or proofs are 
wanting. 

4?°. It fails where false principles are adopted. 

5°. It fails where doubtful terms are used. 

The last two are, however, abuses, rather than defects 
in our reasoning, and are our own faults, and not those 
of our faculties. 

There are four sorts of arguments used to supply the 
place of demonstration : 

1°. The argumentum ad verecundiam, which is quoting 
the authority of men of parts and learning. 

2°. The argumentum ad ignorantiam, which is a chal- 
lenge (according to Locke) to admit what is alleged as a 
proof, or assign a better. It is however more properly 
requiring your adversary to admit your principles, or 
prove the contrary. 

3°. The argumentum ad hominum, which is pressing a 
man with consequences drawn from his own principles or 
concessions. 

4°. The argumentum ad judicium^ which is an argu- 
ment drawn from the foundations of knowledge or pro- 
bability. This alone, of all the four, brings true instruc- 
tion with it. For, 

1 °. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, be- 
cause out of respect I will not contradict him. 

2°. It argues not that I should adopt the opinions of 
another, because I am too ignorant to refute them. 

3°. It argues not that another is right, because he has 
shown me I am wrong. 

Propositions are either above, according, or contrary 
to reason. As instances ; the resurrection of the dead is 
above reason, the existence of one God according to 
reason, and the existence of several gods contrary to 
reason. , 

Reason, as contradistinguished from faith, is the dis- 
covery of the certainty or probability of such propositions 



161 



as the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas 
as it has got by its natural faculties. 

Faith, on the other hand, is the assent to any proposi- 
tion not made out by the deduction of reason, but upon 
the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some 
extraordinary way of communication.) This way of dis- 
covering truths to men is called revelation. 

Faith is not, as is sometimes supposed, opposed to rea* 
son, since reason must be used in determining whether 
any proposition should receive faith* and is therefore the 
foundation of right faith. 

Ideas, which never before entered the mind, may be 
conceived to be conveyed by immediate revelation : thus 
St. Paul, when rapt up into the third heaven, describes 
the ideas he received as such as " eye hath not seen., 
nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the mind of man 
to conceive.^ Traditional revelation cannot, however^ 
communicate any new idea ; nor can it give to proposi- 
tions, which are within the scope of reason* the same 
certainty which they receive from demonstration. 

Propositions which are above reason, are the proper 
matter of revelation. Nothing which contradicts reason 
can ever be the subject of revelation,; for he cannot con- 
ceive that to come from God, which, if received for true, 
must overturn all the principles and foundations of know- 
ledge he has given us, render our faculties useless, and 
wholly destroy the most excellent part of his own work- 
manship, our understandings* 



LECTURE XXVIL 



Of Enthusiasm and Error. 

WHATEVER degree of assent is given to any pro- 
position beyond that which the grounds of probability 
warrant, is to be ascribed to enthusiasm. This term, 
however, is most generally applied to religious feelings. 

Immediate revelation being an easier way to establish 
opinions than the elaborate process of strict reasoning, 
it is no wonder that some have pretended to revelation, 
and have persuaded themselves that they were under the 
peculiar guidance of heaven. This is the origin of reli- 
gious enthusiasm. The enthusiast may always be detected 
and exposed by stripping his language of the metaphors 
and figures of seeing and feeling, &c. and reducing it 
to plain terms. 

Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of 
our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. 
The causes of error are fourfold : 

1°. The want of proofs. This is two-fold : either those 
proofs which are beyond the reach of human reason, or 
those which we are prevented from obtaining by want of 
opportunity, industry, or inquiry. 

2°. The want of skill to use the proofs which we pos- 
sess. This varies with the different faculties and oppor- 
tunities of improvement of different men. 

3°. Want of will to use the proofs which we possess. 



163 



This is produced by the various prejudices of education 
and interest, as well as the violence of passions and indo- 
lence of disposition. 

4°. Wrong measures of probability, which are four- 
fold : 

1°. Doubtful or false propositions assumed as princi- 
ples. To this the doctrine of innate principles has pro- 
bably mainly contributed. 

2°. Received hypotheses. The difference between those 
who adopt received hypotheses and hold doubtful prin- 
ciples, is this, that the former will admit matter of fact, 
but differ in assigning the reasons, and explaining the 
operation. 

3°. Predominant passions obstruct the due exercise 
of our faculties in estimating probabilities. They induce 
us to evade plain probabilities, by alleging either a sup- 
posed fallacy in the reasoning, or supposed arguments to 
the contrary. An unprejudiced mind can, however, only 
suspend its assent either where no examination into the 
subject has been made, or where, upon inquiry, the 
grounds of probability are equally balanced. 

4°. Authority is also a wrong measure of probability, 
which keeps more persons in ignorance than all the others 
together. By authority is meant, giving up our assent to 
the common received opinions, either of our party or 
country. 



Division of the Sciences. 
Locke divides the sciences into Physica, Practica, and 

^TflfASKjJVTllCrj. 

Physica includes the knowledge of things (body and 
spirit) as they are in their own proper beings, their con- 
stitutions, properties, and operations. 



164 



Practica includes the skill of rightly applying our 
powers and actions to attain things good and useful. 

STjjuawvrtjo), or the doctrine of signs, the most usual 
whereof being words, is aptly enough termed also Logic, 
is the consideration of the nature of signs the mind makes 
use of for the understanding of things, or of conveying 
its knowledge to others. 






APPENDIX 



As it has been thought desirable by students who are subject to examhiBtioa 
in the Essay, to know the principal questions which may be put to them out of 
the different parts of the Essay, 1 here subjoin a selection of those which cor- 
respond to the foregoing lectures. The answers will readily be found in the 
sections referred to. The most striking questions are marked thus (§). Those 
which may be considered in some degree indispensable are distinguished thus (t). 




LECTURE I, 

INTRODUCTION. 

1. § What are the inducements to the inquiry? 
§ In what consists its nobleness 1 

§ What is its utility ? 

What are its object and end 1 

What is the distinction between object and end? 
t In what consists the difficulty, and how is it illustrated ? 

2. § What is Locke's design ? 

What does he mean by the original of our ideas ? 
t In what respect does he decline the inquiry ? 

What is " the physical consideration of the mind V 
t Why does he decline this ? 

f What error is the consequence of observing the contradictory opinions, 
&c. 

3. § What is his method? 

§ What is faith or opinion? 

4. § What is scepticism ? 

M 



§ What 1b dogmatism 1 

T How does the latter produce the former? 

t How does he illustrate the folly of-scepticisni 1 

When shall we use our understanding rightly ? 

What is the remedy for these errors ? 
t How does he illustrate the sufiiciency of onr faculties? 
+ How does he illustrate the limits of our faculties? 

Why should we rest satisfied with these limits? 

What is the most important species of knowledge 1 
§ What is Locke's postulate? 

What reasons does ho give for assuming this \ 



LECTURE II. 

1. i What are the principal arguments on which Locke founds his theory of 

sensation and reflection? 
Z. What secondary proofs does he adduce ? 
What is meant by an innate idea? 

3. How does Locke subsequently depart from his " method " ? 

4. § To what single source does he trace our ideas ? 
§ W T hat is sensation ? 

What discrepancy exists in these definitions ? 

5. § What is reflection? 

t How is the term" operation" used here? 

What coincidence with the common Logic is observable in the use of this 

word ? 
There are two objections to it, one of which only is answered by Locke. 

6. What ether names does he give to sensible ideas ? 
What is the difference between sensation and perception ? 

7. f Why do ideas of reflection come later than those of sensation.?,.. 

8. What is the Cartesian division of beings ? 
What is the Cartesian definition of spirits? 
What is the Cartesian definition of bodies ? 
What principles follow from these definitions ? 

9. t What relation has thinking to the soul, according to Locke? 

How does the power of the soul over its thoughts differ from that of the 

body over matter ? 
How does this difference favour the Cartesian principle ? 
t What sophism does Locke ascribe to Des Cartes in establishing this 
principle ? 
What are the proper objections to Des Cartes' principles ? 
; What are the absurdities which Locke professes to deduce from these 
principles ? 



LECTURE III. 

§ What is the first division of ideas made by Locke? 
§ What is the second ? 
i What is a simple idea ? 



Ill 



t Why is " different" and uot " several " to be osjed here ? 

2. How does Locko confound simple with complex ideas ! 

3. f In what respects does Locke compare the power of the mind over its 

ideas to that of the body over matter ? 

4. t How does Locke illustrate the passiveness of the mind in tho percep- 

tion of simple ideas of sensation? 
Why does not this apply to simple ideas of reflection ? 

5. § What is a definition ? 

t Why are the names of simple ideas undefinable ? 
t How are their meanings made known 1 
C. Why is it absurd to suppose that there are not other beings with more 
senses than we have ? 

7. § How are simple ideas divided as they enter the mind ? „ 
t What are the principal ideas which enter by but one sense? 

8. Why is U impossible to enumerate all our simple ideas 1 
t Which does he prefer to examine? 



LECTURE IV. 



1. § By what sense do we get the idea of solidity 1 

§ Why does Locke prefer this term to impenetrability ? 

2. t How does Locke describe solidity ? 

Is this quality peculiar to matter, according to Locke? 

3. Shew that Locke ascribes to spirit qualities similar to what he calls the 

primary qualities of matter? 
In ascribing extension to spirit, how does Locke contradict himself? 

4. What defect in his hypothesis produced this absurdity ? 

What is the division of being, according to Locke? 

5. What is the popular sense of the term solidity 1 
t In what does solidity differ from hardness ? 

6. What are "pores'"? 
What is compressibility? 

What wrong view does Locke take of the Florentine-experiment ? 

7. t What was the Florentine experiment? 
t For what purpose was it instituted ? 

What would have been necessary in order that it should have effected 
this purpose? 
t Why was a globe used ? 
Is water compressible ? 

8. What is the physical sense of " solidity" ? 

9. What is the mathematical sense of that term ? 

10. In what does Locke differ from Des Cartes as to extension? (See also II,) 
How does Locke vacillate in the use of the term extension? 

From what passages does it appear that he uses it indifferently as space 
itself, or an attribute of space ? 

11. t According to Locke, how do we obtain the idea of pure space? 

t How does he answer the objection " that motion in one body supposes 
motion in every other? 
How docs he illustrate the alleged absurdity of (his objection? 



IV 



"What does he infer from the disputes about a vacuum ? 
2. How may all this be replied to by a Cartesian ? 
t ^hat properties of body depend upon its solidity ? 



LECTURE V. 



1. § What ideas enter the mind by " divers senses "? 

2. $ What are the principal ideas which enter by reflection alone ? 
£ What is the understanding? 

$ What is the will ? 

In what sense is the word " thinking" used in the definition of the 
understanding? 

3. § What are the ideas which enter the mind by all the ways of sensation 

and reflection ? 

4. Give instances of pleasure arid pain from reflection? 

5. ^ What are the uses of pleasure ? 
§ What are the uses of pain ? 

6. What would be the consequence if pleasure or pain was not attached 

to our thoughts and actions ? 

7. t Prove that pain is efficacious in preserving the organs in their most per- 

fect state ? 

9. How manifold is power ? 

How is the idea of active power obtained ? 
How is the idea of succession obtained ? 

10. t What are the three illustrations of the sufficiency of sensation and re- 

flection as the source of our ideas ? 



LECTURE VI. 



In his theory of qualities how does Locke violate his prescribed method ? 

On what hypothesis is this theory founded ? 

AYhat is the physical part of sensation I 

Can sensation be produced by the action of the mind on the body? 

What defect is there in the hypothesis of the existence of a material 
world ? 

How is vision produced ? 

What confusion is observable in the names of colours ? 

How are ideas of sounds produced 1 

How does the sense of touch differ from the other senses ? 
t What is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities ? 
t What is Locke's doctrine concerning these ? 

t What are the principal arguments used by Locke to prove secondary 
qualities not resemblances ? 



5. What are his arguments to prove primary qualities resemblances? 

What species of sophism are they ? 
C. Shew that his reasoning to prove primary qnalities resemblances, would 
also prove secondary qualities so ? 
f What is a quality? 

How does Locke divide ideas as qualities? 
What absurdity is in this division? 

7. What is the cause of obscurity in Locke's theory of qualities ? 

8. What are the objections to the hypothesis of an external material world? 
What are the principles of Berkeley and Hume on this subject ? 

What are those of Reid? 

9. AVhy may privative causes produce positive ideas ? 
How do powers differ from secondary qualities ? 

f Why are powers not supposed resemblances as well as secondary qua- 
lities? 



LECTURE VII. 



1. t Why cannot perception be defined? 

§ Why is it the first idea of reflection ? 

What are the different senses in which Locke uses " perception" ? 

2. t How is perception distinguished from " thinking" ? 

t Why must the mind always be passive in perception of sensible ideas? 
Why must it be active in the perception of ideas of reflection'? 

3. § What are the requisites for perception ? 

Why is it difficult to determine the perfection of an organ ? 

4. t What is a sufficient impression? 

What ideas does he conjecture to have precedence ? 
G. Prove that the eye is no judge of distance nor motion ? 

7. Nor of space or extension ? 

8. Nor of figure? 

9. § What is Molyneux's problem ? 

What objection has been made to his solution? 
How is this answered? 

10. What inference has Berkeley drawn from the difference of visible and tan- 

gible figure and magnitude? 

11. t What objection is there to Locke's theory of alteration by judgment? 
t How does he answer these? 

What relation subsists between the visible and tangible idea ? 

12. What is his reason why this is not usual with our other senses ? 
How is this reason defective ? 

t What is the essential difference of animals ? 



LECTURE VIIL 



What is contemplation? 
How is it limited in man? 



M 



§ "What is memory ? 

Why is it inadequately accounted for by impressions on the brain 2 

2. t How does Locke illustrate the memory ? 
t Why is this an inapposite illustration? 

How far is Locke's account of memory figurative, and how far literal 1 
What is Reid's objection to Locke's supposed "revival" of our ideas? 
How is it inconsistent with Locke's own doctrine of identity ? 

3. In what do the systems of Berkeley and Hume differ 1 
What is Hume's account of memory ? 

4. § What are the helps of memory? 

5. § What are the causes of ideas fading from the memory ? 

6. t What example is given of ideas lost for want of repetition 1 
t How is the survival of the mind over its ideas illustrated? 

7. t How does he illustrate the different retentive powers of men ? 
t What instance is given of ideas lost by disease ? 

8. t What ideas are least likely to be forgotten ? 
1). How does memory differ from perception ? 

What are the different modes of memory, according to Aristotle? 

10. What mode of memory did Aristotle deny to brutes? 

How does Locke shew that the apparent memory in birds learning tunes 
cannot be either mechanism or instinct ? 

1 1 . § What are the defects of memory ? 

Shew that memory itself is a defect? 

What are the differences between an idea of sensation and one of memory ? 



LECTURE IX. 



1. t What is discerning ? 

What error had men fallen into from overlooking it ? 

2. t What are the causes of imperfection in discerning? 

§ How are judgment and wit defined in contradistinction? 

3. What further than mere similitude of ideas is necessary to wit ? 
Why is wit so generally acceptable ? 

Why is it to be consistent with truth and good reason ? 

4. t What class of ideas depends on comparing ? 
t How far do brutes compare ? 

Why is their power thus restricted ? 

5. What is the simplest species of compounding ? 
t Do brutes enlarge ? 

t Do brutes compound ? 

6. t Have they complex ideas ? 

7. § What is the definition of abstraction, according to Locke ? 

What occasions abstraction, according to Locke ? 

What would be the consequence if men could exhibit their ideas without 

words or signs? 
How dees Locke make the same distinction between mcu and spirits, 

and between men and brutes? 

8. Does Locke suppose an abstract existence ? 

What ancient sect of philosophers does Locke borrow his doctrine of ab- 
straction from ? 
In what did Plato and Aristotle differ a? lo abstraction? 



\'ll 



9. What are the opinions of Berkeley and Hume on abstraction t 

"What are the distinguishing tenets of the conceptualists, the nominalists, 

and the realists 1 
To which of these sects is Locke to he assigned ? 

"What are the contradictions and absurdities which Locke himself acknow- 
ledges to be involved in his doctrine of abstraction "? 

10. + What is Locke's proof that brutes do not abstract 1 

1 1. § What is the distinction between idiots and lunatics? 

12. Why has Locke illustrated the operations of the mind by considering 

them as employed about simple " ideas " 1 

13. How does Locke illustrate our perception of visible objects 1 
From what ancient philosopher is this borrowed ? 



NOTE ON LECTURE VII. § 6. 



As the dissimilitude between the ideas of space, figare, and motion, de- 
rived from the senses of sight and touch, 'seems to be a principle not easily 
conceivable at first view, the student will probably be desirous of having more 
positive evidence of it than could be found in abstract reasoning ; I there- 
fore subjoin the particulars of an experiment made upon " a young gen- 
tleman who was born blind, or lost his sight so early that he had no remem- 
brance of ever having seen, and was couched between thirteen and fourteen 
years of age." 

" When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about dis- 
tances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed 
it) as what he felt did his skin, and thought no objects so agreeable as those 
which were smooth and regular, though he could form no judgment of their shape, 
or guess at what it was in any object that was pleasing to him. He knew not 
the shape of any thing, nor any one thing from another however different in shape 
and magnitude ; but upon being told what things were, whose form he before 
kneiv from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them 
again ; but having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them. 
***** We thought he soon knew what pictures represented, which were 
shewn to him, but we found afterwards we were mistaken ; for about two monlhs 
after he was couched, he at once discovered they represented solid bodies, 
when to that time he considered them only as party-coloured planes, or surfaces 
diversified with variety of paint; but even then he was no less surprized, ex- 
pecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and was 
amazed, when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow appeared 
now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest, and asked which was the 
lying sense, feeling or seeing V 

This case has been extracted from Cheselden's Anatomy. The author 
states, that he has had many other instances of persons who, after the same 
operation, all made observations to the same effect. I have been informed 
by Mr. Cramptou (the Surgeon General) that in the case of Mr. Pringle, a 
young gentleman of ten years of age, upon whom the operation for conge- 
nital cataract was performed by him, he tried the celebrated question of 
Molyneux, and the result was, that the patient not only could not distin- 
guish the sphere from the cube by sight, but actually did not know th« 
things to be the same which he had before touched. 



Till 



Mr. Orampton's experience also fully confirms what I have stated in the 
text, that the abstract idea of a straight line or curve, acquired by the touch, 
bears no similitude to the abstract ideas of these lines acquired by the sight ; 
at least, if it does not establish this point, it overturns the existence of these 
abstract ideas altogether. It is much to be desired that the faculty would 
thus, when suitable cases occur, direct their attention to the metaphysical 
effects produced, as facts like these are the only sure foundation for theory, 
and are valuable in proportion to their infrequency. 



IX 



LECTURE X 



Ocfit/'/h t******' 



\. Whence do complex ideas receive their unity ? • j^***- *~~, /\ Jjjttf/rZ* 

2. § What are the classes of complex ideas ? - n*ee&*' t***^* 

What are Locke's Categories ? - /A^y /£«■*■■' /* 

§ What are modes ? . . c^j-l^ t j, A *U (U^^j ~^** >^ c if" r 'f 
$ Mow manifold are modes? *- **.-/,£< l^h^*-* ^j^LjUo^' r m**™"^/ 

§ What are simple modes? <wUwt/"^yA **.**»> ^* '^^ ,6^-^~*^ 

§ What are mixed modes ? - ^'w-/^ <*— /^ ccu^^ /v 

«= — , t What is Locke's apology for his use of the word " mode?'' ,, ^/^//m,*-. 't-i^jA 
§ What are substances? e~^ l*L~~ </-M~h* ^^^ H /h "^~^^ L Jj^ 
t into what classes does he divide our ideas of substances ? ^-^ ^y^^^Zw 
t What is the difference between single and collective substances? ' t t^J^Ax^d^ir, 
§ What are relations ? r^^AvUc^. ^>U^^ /w^ <?>*»^u^» /jf ■LiUx^+'fy^ *<.*y /J*^* 

3. § By what senses do we receive the idea of space ? /-^*& 1 V l /'> '-' tc^c<i^^~ 
t In what three respects does he consider space ? oUJa^t*. *•./'■ '^T^ a 

t What is distance ? . -*<— */~~~ *^w*Aw ^^CZ^^^^ — 
t What is rapacity ? «sL*~ ^«* «*» ^^-J ^PJ^ 

t What is extension ? «**W^V J~ a- ***&*.!*-- ^ ^J ~ ^^ a^***- 
How do we get the idea of immefl •? f/"^ £»* r *°LLt *&&< -tku^vJ*^ | 



5. 



now ao we get tiie iaea oi immensiiy c "V /■ 7 V- t<- / • *rLV 
§ What is figure ? .~/J~u£U }^1* L ^J^J£^L i~~* fo*^- 
How is its variety showed to be infinite j- W/£ T1T~UZ& &* « »>o~/^ 
t What is place? Pi, *#ASw-. ^^^^1^,7^^^ frr**"*'** 
What proves the necessity of fixed points to determine place ?.«£,* ?T^ LdjiilZ^J^Z ' 
What are the arguments against the Cartesian principle, ^^2^- e ^iS§^' on ' 

and body are inseparable? i,]m£ 4 t^iu^-^Ur/JuSb* fn&tJ3ci%, ■ 'f+-£?y 1r*-n£' / * 
What is the Cartesian definition of space? 'fay^*^™^***^. ■ ■ 77?^ d„ A «*./-"" 
What is the defect of this as a definition ? f^^t^^^^* 
How does Locke illustrate its absurdity ? 0" *# . ■ ■• *? ^ r****-. *£*#* ** 
Why cannot space be defined ? ^^ « -**** ~-*-<~M+'*- m ' ' "^\ 
What dilemma has been brought to prove space and body the same 1 * /^.^ * • 
What is the defect of this proof? ^^# ^**<*«j*«.* . g^g^St-/**- ^3?/Jw^ 
Why must body be considered infinite if pure space be denied ?&$£$,,& My r*^ 
What proves the possibility of a vacuum ? f^fr^J-/» $V /»—«y a** ~ «i % m r * 
— What, according to Locke, establishes the existence of a vacuum ? 



LECTURE XL 



Whence arises the difficulty of explaining what duration is ? ' *^<^w* ^ ££? *£* *J- 
t What is the translation of " si nou rogas, inteUigo ?" g*- '•"*" ^'Jlt* ^^y *&" *******, 
% How do we get the idea of succession ? *$*^^*& ~?Zl'J d*J~ sjLAJ?^?^ 
$ How do we get the idea of duration ? ^ t^^^Z** *^ l^^J^J,^ f^- 
t What is meant by distance between the parts of succession ? *" L ^L t .^ue/^*.^' t ^ M ^'' 
t What proves that succession is necessary for the idea of duration ?#£jL»** >'" te '* 
f How are we sensible of duration elapsed during sound sleep? ^T"/'' 



2. t Why is succession not necessarily derived from motion? ^ <C ^'Z^ en***** 






Why are motions very slow or very quick not perceived } -^ST<'^^T?- 
t Whence does it appear that the rapidity of the succession of ideas 

■ is limited ? ^ 7*—^' if /w r^rv^ ^ "t;/ /x v ^'" 



^-^ 



J^«»^ su^i- s>i c-t/'c, *6 <*s£ 




^ Zirr&frh-v &rc<^i~^/~ ^j5*2^ -^«.•-«■ , 



;Z^~ 



t What examples does Locke give of real successions not perceived ?( Uir f/iL 

4. t What power has the will over the succession of ideas? «"Ct'^t- I /-y^<^'- 

5. $ What rs time? -A—* 6, «*&* *j ~*~- ~~~ ~* ^^^ 






*&***. «.+~t i**y 



'+(zzJ? 



.ti^ae- 



t Why is it more difficult to measure than space? *&', 

§ What are the requisites for a good measure of time ?Uc*A«>.>Sy»*»- _. 

t Why are these qualities necessary to a perfect measure of it ? 9 7 »+u<*<~- ^// 

ime?C<ro^5-^ **$**' 



;sary to a perre<vt measure oi re : ? < "vr _ aj-c<- 
Why are the revolutions of celestial bodies good measures of time? c<r«-^-^ ^' u 
6. t Why can no two parts of duration be known to be equal if&ft n^kr t^^Utk^tz 



jnuions oi ceiesiiai oocues gooa measures < 
parts of duration be known to be equal tp 
time not a measure of motion ? "&****•.£ **A' " 
motion" be taken ? (<«*^ 



t Why 
Tn what two senses may 






i •<_♦**-»<- 



In what two senses may " motion" be taken ? (f*/™^/ ) f~r*~r**t**0("4~*-~ 

Are days, years, &c. necessary to duration? <**+*i;<cL . a~LO -> . ,. '^^^^ *-/ 

How do we obtain the idea of eternity ? ffy ^dJ^ **T-'''*"^t-^i-o 

j_y Urn** iKt *~* ar**—t^ 



LEC 




E XII 



I. 



i. § 



!. § 



>m0 



v- 



3. 



4. § 

5. t 



Why does Locke prefer the term 

Why doe's he prefer it to space 

Does he adhere to the use of this term ? «**■* 

Where in the present chapter does he depart from it? }JJt«i 

What are the six congruities or analogies of the ideas of expansion antjl-- 7,^ ^t^uUL] 

duration ? ^^'#^^.;^ 
What are the two differences? //> «- ^ ttyeUu*. . * *~f- «~*uU>*-. *+r ^t? 
What is meant by being capable of greater and less ? ^I^clo tttedzj' f ft- 1 **"^^/ 
Of what simple idea are expansion and duration modes ? yuo^&fy A r £rf»^ c - 

What ideas do nof admit of unlimited increase ? f&"- a^^j ^ ^*^* 
What is the moral objection to limiting space to matter? 9/- 3 
Why do men more readily allow of infinite duration than infinite ex- t 



pansion? ^A 3 
Does Locke consider space as merely a quality of matter/ 
In what two respects is time analogous to place ? ^jfjjh*^-*?, 
What are the simple ideas of space and duration ? - ^u^ty^t 
What is a moment? f+^mUtJ- j?*dr «f tC**±* .U^^Lf n^u*.± " 
What is a sensible point ? *~~*UUl-f>~*-1 *{*" M^-d^ 






• n 



II. 



~$&A 



1. § What is our most simple idea ? ^ty 

Which are the most simple modes ? »** ^ '*~*"~ , ' (J^^^M, £**.■*/-*«**■■ 
3. t Why are the modes of number the most distinct ?£ *< p«& ctt***^*^*^*- 
t By what example does he show that the modes of extension are not so 

distinct ? ** «V «b~r. ^ h^^ 

t Why are the demonstrations in number most precise ^i^L^t^^^ ^^Ij/. *»4f<l 



§ What are the requisites to perfect numbering 



Why do not children number earlier' 



A^~ 



- - ft^> t*J- 



i 



T 



l^cj&^l. 



XI 




III. 

1. t Of what idea are " finite" and " infinite" modes I C ^T M y^^^*^**^**-^ • 
§ To what ideas are they primarily ascribahle? *$****" / 
§ To which of the divine attributes does infinity literally belong ? ~£*\^ ■ 
§ To which of them is it figuratively ascribed ? fr***^ ****^^ f~J* t 
t In what senses may it be literally ascribed to these. ?7 * M ~*"~^/*7^*~ 

2. f How do we obtain the idea of infinity? &f '^TK^L #£<£ ^^ +f thf*** 
t To what simple ideas may it be ascribed? it **T 1 ^ o/^ 

3. t "What absurdity is there in supposing an idea of an infinite space 'f^ 
t ^Whence do we obtain the clearest idea of infinity ? ^^m^*«^*^^ 

? How does' Locke illustrate our different conceptions of the infinity of 

number, duration, and expansion ? ^^0 '>/L. /' ' ' ft ll£/ 

t How does matter give the idea of infinity ? r fy W d^^O^^^ 

4. $ By what argument has the idea of infinity been concluded to be ppx.- 

sitive? r JL^n^f— A-*.*.*/ ^r^^H*^'?J^[t<^) 

5. § How does be refute this ? ?*" |&,*~*£ -^** * rj£ ^^^T ^ 
t What is his analysis of our idea of infinity ' > \' h ^J^^ i f^ f 'Z***^' '''/ ** 




LECTURE XIII. 

Kuy woum n oe impossible to enumerate the simpic mu 
ideas ? a y*-* »u,£*s-^ £«-*- t**^ ~^-*^***** ■■ ^* p+ 
ay do the names of the modes of those ideas whichaf 
n general want particular names? ■'^^J*^!^ J^ 



t Why would it be impossible to enumerate the simple modes of all /^^ 
ideas ? a y™-*~ <n^e*^ fx-~^-~ ,u^ ^«^+*>& . M*» f^^*.<^^ ^ < ^JS 

Why do the names of the modes of those ideas whichadmit °J^egrees -fa v/ct^r+c^ 
in general want particular names? -"^^^J*^!^ J^jL^^i^TC^^-^ n^-^> 



What" are the most considerable of the modes of thinking •^""^T'T 
t What is sensation ? *-et+»* ±ut***~<4. A <x~l*U»> <W *f^jTLjh4 **~^~ 
+ What is remembrance ? C v^ n, ,, ;>*- i~eLuJ*°~**^i „ t 

t What is recollection? *>»#~S *~ &*" 7 Z, ^M^^^^ 



on? V*~~2 "***" 'fe^Ttf^£ ^t*-^*** 
What is attention ? «^-*±4"~ c «*■*■** 



What is reverie? 



wnat is attention if «^.*±4<*- 1 <ULAr \£ <r ^j^ U<~ ' , . - 

What is stud v or intention? x^-«£~~ %f^^n . crtM^C **«■**- +&%** 
What is dreaming ? lU< — S- '™/~\ "~ Z_ 
.What is ecstacy ? ^— £ —^ H—«y*~ '/*" 

§ What is inferred from the degrees of intention and remission in ' , 

thinking ? 4d+JeUj i. 4& ^4/~i^r+ 7?L >**— *± y *&: «"**" <* 




t What is a natural good and evil? T5l/a^.. M -~ ^T* J/ 
What is Love ? A X"Kr*+*> *- ET^lF^ * < ~ A+ *~*""?- l 

What is Hatred? • >^ . . ..- ^^~£\. 

What Is Desire ? *^^->-^^ fi***U~f &v>&~&**^% r+* * o 



Xll 



What is Jot J jtX*~~-~ f»- 

W hat is sorrow 

What is Hope ? }l 

"What is Fear .' 

What is Despair? '7Z&&J ■- 




What is Anger ? ^ '£ 
What is Envj ? *-~~ /- 
t How do anger and envy differ from the other passion 






^wffiP 



^£^ 




4. t How do we obtain the ideas of active and passive power 7 77- 
t What being is incapable of passive power ? fact* 
t What being is incapable of active power ? H^fi f~?2~ 
f What being is capable of both ? /*W- f^^ /W~ 
t What fs objected against classing powers amongst our simple 
f How is this objection answered ? ,-<j/f...' 

5. t Show that we can only acquire the idea of active power from reflection 7 !, o0 Lu^fU 
— • t In what respect only can motion give the idea of active power ? ^'^JtZUcvv I 
— + How does he illustrate the absurdity of supposing the continuation of 

motion and action ? 
t What are the will and understanding? 4&</,ateSt^ /ff^*z&-. 

Can the same action be voluntary. and oece_ssai'y ? M/^i^ ^-) 



What are their ad 



U and^understanding? 
icMs called? i*J<M*^t 



What is voluntary and its opposite? ZitfSzZ, T^^j^r™ ~ *"■ 



u*lllu* 



.v*- 



t How many fold is perception 
ihe p 






i Enumerate the principal simple ideas which are tl 
* others. *°' 



v and necessary '. J" _ 

elements of all 



LECTURE XIV. 



'fyUfrd 






^Ms**""* 






//»+~~ 



t Why bate mixed modes been called notions ? /^^ ^^/^^6 
+ Whence does a mixed mode derive its unity ? £r+**4rp*%*~~itt***£ 
i What is the mark of unity ? *£ caee" ^^ e^^Ui^ /*L~?^ , -/^ y 
WhaHis tbe cause of making mixed modes ? /<Uf¥->~*^ \%£$ **^<*i ^ ^^ 



What is the cause of obsolete aud untranslateable terms 



w^<i3fc 



§ What are the ways whereby we obtain the ideas of mixed modes ? 
§ What ideas have been most modified, and why? ^^/^^>^j2? 
t What terms appear to contradict the principle that allactipn cor 
thinking or moving I ft^ Z^"^^ * 




ar*+t** 



Co-Cft*-^-"*' 



, lt z- 



t What is substance in the abstract 
What are the sorts of substances ! 



zo^ms 



nL *>~/<J-y >'J" 



7 



Xlll 

?.. t How does he show the absurdity of defining substance in the abstract 

to be "Hie support of accidents 1 rf<^U^«- * ^tTTt^ZaJ^lT*^' " ' W^-- 

3. How do we obtain ideas of the sort's of substances ^*Lt*Uvf a i l ^y ,'cLaa *Jl£.<, &£«* 

4. t How does it appearthat we have as clear an idea- of body as ofspifrt? ro4r Yt-fv? 
t What are the simple ideas that compose our complex ideas of sub- 
stances? ^H^U-OSK^ .. ^£<r*~°tAA^t~ ,#-^- sk ^ _ 

t What would be the probable consequence if our organs of sense were jp > 

C much more obtuse than they are 1 .pttt&fr ^4ty^JUii. .r^^J" **-/^ </ 

t Show an example of this 1 ***V^^/*^ <*^ s ^f ^^^'-Jf^ oC ff K ^ \ ' ' 

What does he infer from this '? tfw- faet<£{<*~ «^« »<*xJ<tf ^- «-<^ ^fcfet ... 

What does he conjecture relative to the powers ofneEJMJtjon. ' in *jfj& l }i % ^M^x^^z-^-^ 
t How do we obtain the id|a-of God 1 (k-et^^g, <^y Ci'tyLjJa^ .«u^ rt ^f^ - 



t 



LECTURE XV. 

t How do we obtain the idea of relations ? ' 

t What are external denominations 1 * st 
Does a change of subject infer a change of relation t .**uf * ■ -<*-- (f*Cft£is *^&»«- / j 
Does a change of relation infer a change of subject 1 ***%« r fy<w*>yf qu^Xj) 
What does Locke observe of relations in general 1 /Oi &+&*%*,> 



L . . A. 

1. t What are cause and effect 1 £a£~ ^u/ Jfy+eL f&r*L^ JQ if^ /■fuZfi*-/ a^famfa 
t What is creation ? * 

2. t What is generation 1 

What is making'? 

What seemingly absolute terms are relations 1 



II. 



1 . t How do we get the idea of identity 1 

On what axioms do our notions of identity depend ? 
What are the criterions of identity 1 

2. t What are the classes of substances t 
t How is the unity of God proved ? 

t How is the identity of spirits determined 1 

t How is the identity of a particle of matter determined 

t How is the identity of a mass of matter determined 1 

3. f By what is the identity of living things decided 1 
t How does he illustrate the identity of an animal 1 

4. What is a " person V 

In what does personal identity consist 1 



XIV 



III. 



] . $ What are' proportional relations \ ...... ■ 

2. § What are natural relations 1 
t What is peculiar to these 1 

3. § What are instituted relations'? 

§ Why are they frequently overlooked 3 

§ In what do they differ from natural relations ? 



LECTURE XVI. 



4. § What are moral relations 1 

t What is natural good and evil 1 

t What is moral good and evil ? 
•§ Whatsis the sanction of a" law ? 

t What are the requisites for an efficacious law t 

§ Why should the sanction not be the natural consequence of the action ! 
6. § What are tjie laws prescribed to men 1 

§ How \s th# divine law promnlged? 

§ How^is God qualified to legislate 1 

§ How are actions denominated in respect to the divine law ? 

6. § What is the civil law 1 

§ How are actions denominated in respect to it ? 
§ What is the right of the civil legislature? 
* f§ W4iat is the sanction of the civil law ? 

7. § Wha#is - the law of opinion 1 

§ How are actions denominated with respect to it 1 

§ What proves this to be the proper sense of virtue and vice 1 

§ By what authorities does he prove this 1 

8. § Why does the law of opinion generally coincide with the law of God ! 

9. § What are the sanctions of this law 1 

§ Why is it more rigidly observed than the other t 
§ Why is the law of God so frequently transgressed 1 
§ Why is the civil law so frequently transgressed 1 
10. § Moral actions are to be considered in two points of view 1 
t When does the denominations of actions mislead us 1 



LECTURE XVII. 
I. 

1. § When is a simple idea clear? 

§ When is a complex idea clear ? 

2. t What are the oauses of obscurity 1 

t How does Locke illustrate these causes » 



II. 



1. t What is the first definition given of a distinct idea ? 
t What is objectionable in that definition ? 

2. t In what sense only can ideas be said to be confused 1 

3. t What are the causes of confusion? 

t Why are complex ideas -so often made up of too few simple ones 
t How does he illustrate the second cause of confusion 1 
What ideas are partly distinct and partly confused 1 



III. 



1. t How are ideas divided in reference to their archetypes ? 

2. t What is a real idea ? 

3. t Why are simple ideas real 1 

4. t When are mixed modes real ? 

5. t When are substances real 1 



LECTURE XVIII. 

I. 



1. § What is an adequate idea? 

2. § Why are simple ideas adequate ? 

3. § Are modes adequate? 

4. § In what respect may modes be inadequate ? 

5. § Prove that substances are always inadequate? 

6. What ideas are ectypes, and what archetypes ? 



[J. 



1. Are truth and falsehood affections of ideas ? 

2. In what sense only can they be said to be so ? 

To what are ideas referred as tests of their truth ? 

3. In reference to other men's ideas, which are least liable to falsehood ? 
Which are most so ? 

4. In reference to real existences, what ideas can be false? 
When are substances false in this sense ? 

5. In general when are ideas said to be false ? 

m. 

1. What is the cause of the prejudices and extravagancies of men ? 
How many fold is association ? 
What is the cause of our sympathies and antipathies ? 



XVI 



LECTURE XIX. 



1. j AY hat proves that man was designed for society ? 
§ What are the requisites for language ? 

2. $ What is the signification of negative terms ? 

3. § What argument is derived from the structure of language to prove- 

that sensation is the original of our ideas ] 

4. § YVhat is Locke's method of treating of language 1 
3. § YVhy are words a fit instrument of communication 1 

§ What proves vhat there is no natural association between words and 
ideas ? 
What is the proper signification of words ? 
f To what are they tacitly referred 1 
t YVhat words are referred to ether men's ideas 1 
t What words are referred to the reality of things 1 
t -Whence arises the facility wi.th which words excite ideas 1 
1 Why might it be expected that words should be particular 1 
t YVhy are they not so ? 

j YVhy is it not possible to have particular names for all particular things 1 
§ If it were possible, would it be useful ? 
§ What things only have particular names 1 

6. § How do ideas become general 1 
§ How do words become general 1 

§ Is definition by genus and difference the best method 1 
§ YVhy did the old logicians use it 1 
§ Why, is it not always possible? 
t YVhat is the best method 1 

7. t Whence have species and genera derived their existence ? 
f Prove that the abstract idea is the essence of the species ? 
f How manifold are essences 1 

f What is the real essence 1 
t YVhat is the nominal essence 1 

t What opinions have been held respecting the real essences of corporeal 
substances? 

8. In what ideas are the nominal essences the real essences ? 

t YY T hat conclusion does Locke draw from the maxim that essences were 
ingenerable and incorruptible ? 

9. § What are the six peculiarities of the names of simple ideas? 

10. § What examples does Locke give of the absurdity of attempting to de- 

fine simple ideas ? 
I What is the defect of the Atomist's definition of motion ? 
1 To what test does he propose to bring the peripatetic definition of light? 
t How does he show the absurdity of attempting to acquire a simple idea 

of which we have not the proper organ ? 

11. t YVhy are the names of simple ideas less doubtful than those of mixed 

modes and substances ? 

12. What is the peculiarity of the names of mixed modes ? 



xvn 



LECTURE XX. 

§ How manifold are words ? 

§ What is a terra ? 

§ What is a particle ? 

t On what does perspicuity of style depend ? 

What is necessary to think well ? 

What instance does Locke give of the different senses of a particle ? 
t How manifold are terms? 
§ What is a concrete term ? 
§ What is an abstract term ? 

f What analogy is there between a concrete and abstract terra and an ad- 
jective and substantive? 
t What conclusion respecting essences does he deduce from the nature of 

words ? 
§ How manifold is the use of words? 
t What is necessary in recording our thoughts ? 
§ What is the civil use of words ? 
§ What is the Philosophical use of words ? 
§ What is the imperfection of words ? 
t What are the causes of this imperfection ? 
t What particular classes of words do each of these causes affect ? 
t Why is propriety an insufficient remedy ? 
t In what science is the imperfection most felt ? 

What instance is given of dispute occasioned by this imperfection ? 
§ What names are least doubtful in their signification 1 
§ What names are most doubtful in their signification ? 
§ What are the abuses of words ? 
t The first abuse is two-fold ? 
t How does he illustrate the difficulty of refuting men whose notions are 

unsettled ? 
t To what does he compare the unsteady use of words ? 
t The third abuse is three-fold? 

Where has this most prevailed ? 
t How does he illustrate the difficulty of refuting men who practise this ? 

How does he show their want of ingenuity ? 

Where has the fourth abuse most prevailed ? 

What instances does he give of this abuse 1 

What is its worst effect ? 

What instance does he give of the fifth abuse ? 

Why do men refer different ideas of substance to the same species? 

Why do they admit a change in the subject without a change in the 
species ? 

What is the cause of this abuse ? 
t What false suppositions does it include ? 

What instance does he give of the sixth abuse? 

In what cases only does he allow figurative speech ? 

Where does he violate this rule himself? 
§ What are the ends of language ? 

Where do our words fail in these ? 
§ What are the remedies for the abuses and imperfections of words'? 
§ What are the ways of making known the meaning of the names of 

simple ideas ? 
t Why may the names of mixed modes be always defined ? 
t How are the names of substances explained? 
§ Show that morality is capable of demonstration ? 



XV111 



LECTURE XXI. 



§ What is knowledge ? 

$ How manifold is the agreement or disagreement of ideas ? 
N. B. These are sometimes called Locke's predicables. 

$ What is actual knowledge ? 

§ What are the two kinds of habitual knowledge ? 

t On what principles does the certainty of the second species of habitual 
knowledge depend ? 

+ To what species of ideas is this knowledge only applicable ? 

§ What are the degrees of knowledge ? 

§ What is intuitive knowledge ? 

§ What is demonstrative knowledge ? 

$ Wbat is sensitive knowledge ? 

t What is sagacity? 

t How does he illustrate the inferior clearness of demonstrative know- 
ledge ? 

t Whence arose the mistake that all reasoning was " ex pra?cognitis et 
praeconcessis" ? 

t Is the clearness of knowledge a consequence of clearness of ideas ? 



LECTURE XXII. 



t What is the most obvious limit to our knowledge ? 

t Why cannot intuitive knowledge extend to all our ideas ? 

t Why cannot demonstrative knowledge extend to all our ideas ? 

t What are the limits of sensitive knowledge ? 

t What examples does he produce to show that clearness of ideas does not 

infer clearness of knowledge about them? 
§ What is the extent of our knowledge of identity and diversity ? 
§ Why is our knowledge of co-existence very confined ? 
t WTiy is repugnancy to co-existence more easily perceived ? 
t Why is our knowledge of relations the most extensive ? 
t Why does he think that if proper methods were taken morality would 

become a demonstrative science ? 
t What examples of this does he give? 
t W r hy has it been thought incapable of demonstration ? 

What is the extent of our knowledge of real existence? 
§ Wbat are the causes of ignorance ? 
t What of ideas is two -fold ? 

In what ideas is the second cause most apparent? 

What most frequently produces the third cause ? 

How far is our knowledge universal ? 
t How far is our knowledge real ? 



XIX 



LECTURE XXIII. 



§ What is truth ? 

What is meant by joining or separating signs ? 
t How manifold are signs? 
t How manifold is truth? 
t Why is it difficult to treat of mental truth ? 
t What are maxims ? 
t Why have maxims little effect upon other parts of knowledge ? 

What use does Locke admit maxims to have ? 

What example does he give of their leading to error ? 

What ideas should they be most cautiously applied to ? 



LECTURE XXIV. 



What are the classes of trifling propositions? 
t What is the proof the existence of a God ? 

What is the species of knowledge of external things which we have? 

What are the reasons why the certainty of this knowledge is to be de- 
pended on ? 

W T hat kind of propositions only can we know of existence ? 

How is the existence of spirits known ? 

What is the method of improving our knowledge ? 
t How far is knowledge necessary and how far voluntary ? 



LECTURE XXV. 



t In what senses does Locke use the word "judgment?" 
§ What is probability ? 

How manifold is the matter of probability ? 
§ What are its grounds in matter of fact ? 

What false ground is sometimes used ? 
§ What is the ground of the highest degree of assent? 
$ What is the ground of the second degree of assent ? 
§ What is the ground of the third degree of assent ? 
t What is the ground of probability in matter of speculation ? 

Give examples of matter of speculation? 
t Does contrary experience always lessen probability ? 

What is to be examined in matters of revelation ? 



XX 



LECTURE XXVI. 



§ What are the significations of the word reason ? 
t What faculties are employed in reasoning? 
t What are the degrees of reasoning? 
§ What are Locke's objections to syllogism? 

What instance does he give of reasoning without syllogism ? 

Where does he admit syllogism to be useful ? 
t Why is syllogism of less use in probability than demonstration ? 

What error does Locke fall into about " particular" proposition ? 

What form of syllogism does he prefer ? 
t When does reason fail us ? 
t What are the four arguments used to supply the place of demonstration? 

Why is the last the best? 

What instances does he give of propositions above, according to, and con- 
trary to reason ? 
t How are reason and faith distinguished ? 

Is faith opposed to reason ? 

Can new ideas be conveyed by immediate revelation ? 

Can new ideas be conveyed by traditional revelation? 

What is proper matter for revelation? 

Can propositions be proved by traditional revelation as. certainly as by 
reason ? 

Can revelation contradict reason ? 



LECTURE XXVII. 



What is enthusiasm ? 

What is its origin ? 

How is it detected ? 

What are the causes of error ? 

What are the wrong measures of probability ? 

What is the difference between those who hold doubtful principles and 

received hypothesis? 
What is Locke's decision of the sciences ? 



The Students having complained that the former part of the Lectures on 
Locke contained much extraneous matter, which, under the existing method 
of examining, would not be available, the Compiler has in this part strictly 
confined himself to what will be useful at the quarterly examinations. The 
following pages will be found to contain every thing in which the students 
are liable to examination, and nothing else. It is presumed that it is some 
advantage that the subject is altogether contained in forty-eight pages, in 
place of four hundred. 



Errata informer part. 

Page 12, line 6, for back, read book. 
App„ p, i, line 7, 8, for § read f, and vice versa. 



